2nd Battalion Royal Norfolk Regiment Diaries
2nd Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment was part of 4th Infantry Brigade which, in turn, was part of 2nd Division
The following are the Brigade Diaries and notes taken from the Campaign in France 10th May 1940 – 31st May 1940. We are extremely grateful to Kate Thaxton and the Royal Norfolk Regimental Museum for allowing us access and allowing to transcribe the diaries.
GLOSSARY
We have not been able to decipher all of the Army anacronyms but these are the main ones
1 R.S. The 1st Battalion The Royal Scots
1/8 L.F. 1/8th Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers
2.D.I.N.A. 2nd Division d’infanterie nord-africaine
2.Norfolks. The Second Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment
2/5 W. Yorks 2/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment.
4/7 DG. 4/7th Dragoon Guards
A.A. Anti-Aircraft
ACK. Acknowledgement
ADC. Aide-De-Camp (a military officer acting as a confidential assistant to a senior officer)
A.F.V (s). Armoured Fighting Vehicle (s)
A.Tk. Anti-Tank
A.D.S. Advance Dressing Station
A.& S. H. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
Adjt. Adjutant
Amn. Ammunition
Armd. Armoured
Att. Attached
B.E.F. British Expeditionary Force
Bde. Brigade
Bg.(s) Bridge (s)
Bn.(s) Battalion (s)
Brig. Brigadier
Bse Base
C.R.A. Commander Royal Artillery
C.R.E. Commander Royal Engineers
Cav. Cavalry
Comd Commander
Comdt Commandant
Coy. (s) Company (ies)
C.P. Command Points
D.A.A.G. Deputy Assistant Adjutant General
D.A.P.M. Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal
D.F. Defensive Fire
D.L.M. Division Légère Mecanique (Light Mechanical Division)
D.R. Dispatch Rider
Det. Detachment
Drs. Drivers
F.D.L.(s) First Defence Line (s)
Fd. Field
Fwd Forward
G.I. Part of the framework of the British Army which ensures the force is staffed appropriately and that personnel are supported effectively
GII Part of the framework of the British Army responsible for gathering and analysing intelligence to support operational planning
Gd. Guard
Gp Group
G.Q.C. Believe Central Command HWQ Brussels
INTERCOMN Internal Communications
Junc Junction
K.O.R.R. King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)
L.A.D. Light Aid Detachment
L.O. Liaison Officer
M.C.(s) Motor Cycle (s)
M.D.S. Main Dressing Station
M.G (s) Machine Gun (s)
M.G.R.A. Major General Royal Artillery
M.L.O (s). Military liaison Officer (s)
OME Ordnance Munitions and Explosives
O.C. Officer Commanding
O.O Operation Order
O.R. Other Ranks
O.P. Observation Post
Offr(s). Officer (s)
POLFORCE. Assembled under command of Major General Curtis. It defended the sector between St Omer and Pont Maudit and took its name from St Pol where its units were initially stationed.
Pdrs. Pounders
Pet. Petrol
Picquet (ed.) Small unit of soldiers placed on a defensive line forward of a friendly position to provide warning and screening against enemy advance
Pl(s). Platoon (s)
Posn. Position
Pro. Provost (Military Policing)
Prs. Pounders
Q.M. Quartermaster
Q.M.G Quartermaster General
R.A. Royal Artillery
R.A.S.C. Royal Army Service Corp
R.E. Royal Engineers
R. Ir. F. Royal Irish Fusiliers
R.O.A.C. Royal Army Ordnance Corps
R.V. Rendezvous
R.W.F. Royal Welch Fusiliers
Res. Reserve
Rd. (s) Road (s)
Ry. (s) Railway (s)
Recce Reconnaissance
S.C. Possibly Section Commanders (Sec Comds)
S.O.S. Extreme Distress Signal (Save Our Souls)
S.P. Start Point
Sgt (s) Sergeant (s)
Sup (s) Supply(ies)
T.C.P. Transport Control Point
Tps. Troops
Tpt. Transport
Vehs. Vehicles
V.t.m. Vehicles to the mile
W.O. Warrant Officer
CODE NAMES
HOBO: 4th Infantry Brigade
DUGU Assumed 2nd Division
SUMMARY OF MOVEMENTS OF HEADQUARTERS 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE.
10th MAY to 31st MAY 1940
10th MAY
In billets on ‘GORT’ Line at ROSULT. Commenced to move forward in BELGIUM in accordance with Plan ‘D’ at 2130 hrs.
11th MAY
At TOMBEEK on the R. DYLE
12th to 15th MAY
Moved to CHAMPLES. Defence of R. DYLE – WAVRE-GASTUCHE.
Battle of WAVRE 14th and 15th May.
16th MAY
Arrived at BAEKENBOSCH 0300 hrs. Temporary defence of LA LASNE – night withdrawal.
17th MAY
Arrived at LOTH en route for R. DENDRE (GRAMMONT).
Arrived in billets at GEOFFERDINGE, preparatory to denying line of
R. DENDRE.
18th MAY
Moved to EVERBECQ. Withdrawal to FROIDMONT ordered this afternoon.
19th MAY
Moved back via RENAIX and TOURNAI to FROIDMONT preparatory to denying line of R. ESCAUT.
20th MAY
Defence of R. ESCAUT – CALONNE – excl TOURNAI. Headquarters at BARGES near ERE.
21st MAY
Battle of R.ESCAUT
22nd MAY
Defence of R.ESCAUT. Headquarters moved to Cement Factory. Orders to withdraw to ‘GORT’ Line.
23rd MAY
Moved to BACHY. Temporary defence of ‘GORT’ Line BACHY – BOURGHELLES. Relieved by French and withdrew to G.H.Q reserve at AUBERS.
24th MAY
Arrive at MESPLAUX. Units to billeting aera for 3 hours. Defence of LA BASSEE Canal. Headquarters moved to I’EPINETTE.
25th to 27th MAY
Battle of LA BASSEE Canal (BOIS DE PAQUEAUT – LE CORNET MALO - LES GATIGNIES). Headquarters at I’EPINETTE till 1100 hrs 27th MAY, when it moved to LESTREM, thence North of R. LYS to North of ESTAIRES.
28th MAY
a.m. – Withdrawal to line POPERINGHE – WATOU.
p.m. - Withdrawal on to DUNKIRK.
29th to 30th MAY
At TETEGHEM collecting remnants for the defence of ‘Last Ditch’.
31st MAY
0330 hrs – Embarked for England in H.M.S ‘IVANHOE’. Arrived DOVER 0800 hrs and dispersed to collecting area camps.
ORDER OF BATTLE 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE.
10th to 30th MAY.
OFFICERS.
Brigade Commander Brigadier E.G. Warren
Brigade Major Captain J.A. Grant Peterkin, The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders.
Staff Captain Captain R.M. Allen, The Royal Norfolk Regiment
Comd.4 A. Tk.Coy Captain P.L.H. Stragham, The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
Bde Signal Offr Captain A.W. Damon, Royal Corps of Signals.
Bde Tpt Offr Captain J.D. Gibbon, The Border Regiment.
Bde Int. Offr Captain F. Fitch, (Missing from 27/5), Royal Norfolk Regiment
Bde R.A.S.C. Offr Captain C.L.A. Hall, Royal Army Service Corps.
Bde O.M.E. Lieut. J.G. Johnstone- Hall, Royal Army Ordnance Corp.
French L.Os Lieut. Mousset, 13i eme Tirailleurs. Agent de Liaison F. Gazelle. Agent de Liaison D. Dreyfus.
Battalion L.Os Lieut. Carpenter, (Missing from 27/5), The Royal Scots.
2/Lieut. C.C. Swainson, 2nd Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
2/Lieut. N.S. Clarke, (Missing 27/5). 1/8 Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers.
W.Os and N.C.Os
Bde Ord, W.O S/Cdr. Francis, Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
Chief Clerk S/Sgt. H. Ayrton, Royal Army Service Corps.
Intelligence Sgt Sgt. D. Risdon, The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
Transport Sergeant Sgt. A. J. Wearing, The Border Regiment.
Commanding Officers and Adjts of Bns in 4th Infantry Brigade.
1st Bn. The Royal Scots.
Commanding Officer Lieut-Col. H.D.K. Money, (Wounded 27/5).
Adjutant Captain (A/Major) J. Bruce, (Missing 27/5).
2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment
Commanding Officer Lieut-Col. G.P. St C. de Wilton, (Returned U.K. sick 18/5).
Lieut-Col. N.P. Charlton. (Wounded 20/5).
Major L.C.D. Ryder. (Missing 27/5).
Adjutant. Major F.R. Marshall. (Wounded 20/5).
Captain C.W.H. Long. (Missing 27/5).
1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers.
Commanding Officer Major Gardiner - till 13May.
Lieut-Col. Stayner from 2nd Bn.
The Dorsetshire Regiment. (Missing 27/5).
Adjutant Major F.S. Eaton (Missing 27/5).
HEADQUARTERS, 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE. WAR DIARY.
ROSULT.
1st MAY.
Normal routine. 1st Bn. The Border Regiment played 1st Bn The Royal Scots at Rugby; the former won 9-0. A farewell match, after which officers of The Border Regiment entertained other officers of the Brigade.
2nd MAY.
Advance party of 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers arrived to take over from the 1st Bn The Border Regiment . Brigade Commander sited reserve A,Tk. ditch with Os. C. 16th Field Regiment and 13th A. Tk. Regiment, R.A.
3rd MAY.
Major-General H.C. Loyd, D.S.O. ; M.C. ; Commander, 2nd Division, addressed The Border Regiment on leaving the Division,; the Brigade Commander attended . The officers of The Border Regiment were entertained by the Brigade Staff in the Brigade Mess in the evening. The Divisional Commander with the G.1., and the A.A. & Q.M.G. and many other officers attended.
4th MAY.
The Border Regiment left ROSULT station for COMINES where they were to join 42nd Division (125th Infantry Brigade). Pipers of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and many officers saw them off. 1/8th Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieut. Colonel Bird) arrived at ROSULT station at 1950 hrs and marched to their billets. The road party (complete transport) arrived at 1400 hrs.
5th MAY
Nothing to report.
6th MAY
The Commander- in- Chief, Lord Gort, visited the Headquarters and discussed various matters with the Brigade Commander. He afterwards visited the forward battalion areas where he met both C.Os. Normal routine was maintained. In the evening, the Brigade Commander addressed officers, W.Os & Sgts of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, welcoming them to 4th Infantry Brigade.
7th MAY .
Nothing to report.
8th MAY.
The Brigade Commander visited 2nd Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regiment to watch embussing exercise near BERSEE. He also visited a guard found by the same unit at BOUVIGNIES.
The Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major attended a conference at Headquarters, 2nd Division in the evening. The proposed move of 2nd Division to the ARMENTIERES area was discussed.
9th MAY.
Nothing to report.
10th MAY.
At 0415 hrs Air Raid Warning ‘RED’ was followed by the sound of A.A. firing from the direction of DOUAI. Later, German planes were seen heading from BELGIUM. At 0445 hrs the warning ‘DAVID’ was received, this meant that a precautionary period had begun and that the Brigade was at 6 hrs notice to move. It was announced on the wireless that HOLLAND and BELGIUM had both been invaded by GERMANY. Action was immediately taken for the putting into operation of Plan ‘D’, and at 1100 hrs, a zero hr of 1300 hrs was given from 2 Div. This was the hour at which the leading troops were to cross the frontier. The head of the Brigade was timed to cross some 8½ hours later. The day was spent destroying all papers and documents, etc., no longer required and making final preparations.
The preparations for this project worked out well and the Brigade was soon ready to move, except that the troop carrying Coy allotted to the Brigade was held up by delay-action bombs at DOULLENS on its way from AMIENS area and it was not until 2000 hrs that definite news that they were to be in time, reached the Brigade Commander.
The Brigadier, the Brigade Int. Offr. and the Bn Commanders, left Brigade Headquarters at 2115 hrs and crossed the frontier at 2145 hrs. There was considerable air activity in the area of the S.P. but no bombs were dropped in the immediate vicinity. One GERMAN plane was brought down within 500 yds of the S.P. There was very little moon and in spite of a very black night, the Brigade ‘R’ Group, reached the R. DYLE by 0430 hrs and the Brigade Commander started to make his recce.
The Brigade followed behind, crossing the S.P. at PONT CAILLOUX at 2330 hrs. The move throughout was well organised and everything went according to plan. The success of the ‘Police Lights’ on the side of the road at every corner made movement simple and it was difficult for anyone to lose his way.
The distance from ROSULT to the R. DYLE was about 67 miles and all transport arrived safely with the exception of two M.Cs.
The Belgium people throughout the advance showed all outward signs of enthusiasm and appeared to welcome the British troops.
11th MAY. – TOMBEEK.
The Brigade moved up during the night and took up position covering the whole of the Divisional front with three battalions forward in accordance with Plan ‘D’ – 1st Bn The Royal Scots …RIGHT; 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers …CENTRE; 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment … LEFT. (4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 1 issued at 1230 hrs attached at Appx. ‘A’ and trace). The Brigadier held a conference at 2100 hrs and Operation Order No. 2 was issued. This operation order covered the handing over of the LEFT half of the Divisional front to 6th Infantry Brigade and the sidestepping of 2 Norfolk to Brigade Reserve (Appx ‘B’ and trace attached). This was according to Plan ‘D ‘. At this conference the Brigadier announced that he had received a report that the Germans had reached TONGRES and were advancing towards HANNUT and that the Belgium Corps H.Q. had not been heard of. During the whole of this day, the Brigade tried to make contact with the French on our right but were not successful. It was afterwards discovered that the French move forward of the 2 D.I.N.A. had been delayed. Their advanced elements did not reach the R. DYLE till next day. It was reported later in the evening that the D.L.M. were at HUPPAYE. There was considerable air activity throughout the day and one bomb fell within 70 yds of Brigade Headquarters which was temporarily established in a large Chateau close to TOMBEEK, an excellent Headquarters but too obvious a target. Towards evening the roads through WAVRE became crowded with refugees among whom was a very large proportion of Belgium soldiers in lorries.
12th MAY. – CHAMPLES.
6th Infantry Brigade took over, according to plan, and left sector of the Divisional front; 4th Infantry Brigade took over the right sector with 1st Bn The Royal Scots.. RIGHT; 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers .. LEFT ..2 Norfolk went into Brigade reserve. Brigade Headquarters moved to CHAMPLES. 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers both contracted their fronts so that each hold half of the Brigade front. There was considerable air activity throughout the day and bombs were dropped in front of the F.D.Ls and at X Rds in the rear; there were no casualties. The situation, although very obscure in front, seemed to improve during the day. Contact with the enemy was not made and little information was obtainable.
A bomb struck the Headquarter office of the H.Q. Coy of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots but beyond minor wounds, no casualties resulted.
There was a scare of gas during the afternoon but no confirmation was obtainable. It was reported later, that the scare was caused through an ammonia factory catching fire. Work during the day was carried on as quickly as possible to strengthen the existing defences made by the Belgians. They consisted chiefly of isolated pillboxes for which great difficulty was found in getting keys and many of them had to be broken open.
Contact with 2 D.I.N.A. on the right was made and two international posts were established, containing British and French personnel, each being commanded by an officer. The Brigade Liaison Agents formed part of the garrison. British personnel were provided by 1st Bn The Royal Scots.
The position could have been made very strong given time, and although the enemy had good observation from the high ground on the far side, the heights on our side gave our artillery excellent O.Ps.
All bridges were prepared for demolition and some minor ones were blown during the evening. Patrols were active during the night from AISEMONT to GASTUCHE in front of the large wood at BOIS DE LONGCHAMPS. No sign of the enemy was seen..
13th MAY.
Digging and consolidation proceeded. Wire and other R.E. stores had been received during the night. All the bridges in WAVRE with the exception of two which were prepared but were to be left till last until 4/7 D.G. had retired over them, were blown. The Divisional Commander visited the front and asked for the town of WAVRE to be more strongly prepared. Little air activity. One bomber circled over the area but dropped no bombs. At 2230 hrs, the Divisional Liaison Officer reported that 4/7 D.G. would be crossing the R. DYLE through WAVRE and that the French D.L.M. wished to come through as well. No information was known about the enemy. The result of this was that on the bridges in the Brigade sector, all of which were ready for demolition, and R.E. and an infantry officer were posted with a French Liaison Officer and were ordered to stand by to blow up the bridges as soon as 4/7 D.G. had passed and any of the D.L.M. which were immediately behind them. That night all outposts were withdrawn and only one section of Carriers left in front of the bridges to give warning of enemy approach. Patrols were again active along the front but contact was not made.
Owing to the evacuation of the civil population, much livestock was to be seen in the fields in a pitiful condition. No plans for the collection of the stranded animals were made and much valuable livestock was left to the enemy. No attempt was made as far as could be seen to utilise the civilian resources of the country which might have been more useful had the campaign lasted a little longer.
There was increased rearward movement of both armed and unarmed Belgian troops through the sector. No organised attempt was made to collect those with arms, chiefly because their officers seemed to have a semblance of an order to take their troops to the North of BRUSSELS where the shattered 7th Belgian Corps was to reform.
14th MAY
Lieut-Col H.D.K. Money, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, reported that one Sqn of 4/7 D.Gs passed over his bridge instead of the bridge in 6th Infantry Brigade area. The Sqn Commander told Lieut-Col Money that as far as he knew, the other two Sqns had passed over the other bridge and all the vehicles were over the river. He said he had seen an officer of the D.L.M. who said all D.L.M. were over the river. It was reported that the whole of the 12th Lancers had reached this side of the river. The 4/7 D.G. had not been in contact with the enemy, but whose near approach was now confirmed by a Liaison Officer from the 12th Lancers who came in from them on his way to G.H.Q. The authority to blow bridges had by this time, delegated to Brigade Commanders; on the Brigade front, the Brigadier further delegated the authority to the forward Bn Commanders. As it was obvious that enemy mechanised forces in considerable strength were approaching, O.C., 1st Bn The Royal Scots decided to blow up the bridge at WAVRE. Meanwhile, orders from the Corps Commander were given to the Brigade Commander by the G.1. that aerial recce having shown that there were no enemy advancing in this sector, outposts would be re-established and bridges would not be blown. Before this message could be sent to the 1st Bn The Royal Scots, the bridge at WAVRE had been blown. The 4/7 D.G were ordered to send a Sqn back over the river to re-establish the outpost line about DION LEVAL. 4/7 D.G. crossed over the bridge at Bse WAVRE which was the only bridge not blown, to carry out a recce of the other side, at about 1400 hrs. During the afternoon, intercepted wireless messages showed that the 4/7 D.G. had made contact and were being slowly driven back . At about 1900 hrs. the D.Gs returned over the bridge less one vehicle which had to be abandoned, and the bridge was blown. That evening, considerable enemy concentrations of light armoured vehicles were seen but no attempt was made to approach in strength until about 2228 hrs. An enemy attack was launched and the S.O.S. was fired by 1/8 Bn Lancashire Fusiliers. 16th Field Regiment, brought down D.F. fire at 2230 hrs which neutralised a mortar post, and by 2345 hrs, the attack ceased. There was no reply to our artillery fire, except the Mortars which were silenced, WAVRE was set on fire by incendiary bombs and two A.Tk. gun positions had to be abandoned and alternative positions taken up. After the attack had been repulsed, the rest of the night was fairly quiet. The enemy attack was launched between the posts held by the two forward Bns.
Major D.J.P.P. Stayner, Dorsetshire Regiment, was selected to command 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers. He reported for duty this evening. He took over from Major Gardiner, who had commanded since Lieut-Col. Bird left for the U.K.
15th MAY.
During the day, enemy were seen on the Brigade front but no attack was made. The enemy, however, attacked the French on our right and 6th Infantry Brigade on our left. They lost two forward positions at the South end of the BOIS DE LAURENSART, as a result of which a Platoon of the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were ordered to move to the left flank to hold the high ground at BOIS DIT LE BOOK. 6th Infantry Brigade counter-attacked and re-established two posts about 1300 hrs. This second attack was launched between Brigades but the brunt was taken by 6th Infantry Brigade. The third attack was launched between the French and the British. This attack was greater in strength and as the 2 D.I.N.A. had by this time moved back off the line of the R. DYLE to the high ground about LA HAIE it was clear that the right flank of the Brigade was in danger. The artillery kept up a practically continuous fire both on our front and also on that of the French, so as to assist them. During the afternoon a report was received that BIERGES had been over-run and that the French were retreating. All arrangements were made to cover the right flank and Brigade Headquarters was organised for defence. Lieut-Col Money sent an officer in a Carrier to investigate. This officer, Captain Kerr, reported that all was quiet and that the French were not even being attacked in that area. There was continual aerial activity throughout the day but no bombing. At 1930 hr. orders were received to withdraw. A conference was held at 2100 hrs and bns received their orders for taking up a defensive position on the R. LASNE, the forward bns withdrew through the reserve Bn which held itself in readiness in case there was an attack through the right flank. ‘C’ Company, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reinforced by the Brigade carriers and two D.G. vehicles, retired last. These two vehicles were a section of the 4/7 D.G. that had become detached. As the present whereabouts of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment was not known, they were retained in the case of emergency. The other vehicle of the section was ditched and had to be destroyed.
The withdrawal was carried out successfully, though the Brigade was in close contact with the enemy when it started to withdraw. As soon as the last troops were over the R. DENDRE, the bridges at TOMBEEK and ROSIERES were blown. ROSIERES bridge was not wholly demolished but it was covered by fire from the Brigade Anti-tank Company and finished off later in the day.
A Brigade reserve ammunition dump had been formed whilst holding this position. It was unfortunately sited on the forward side of the R. LASNE and a very large quantity of the ammunition and stores had to be abandoned.
16th MAY. - BAEKENBOSCH
The orders for the occupation of the position on the R. LASNE are at Appx. ‘C’.
The enemy did not appear until 1400 hrs.in front of the R. LASNE and the day was spent digging in and making positions secure. Throughout the day there was constant rumours and reports of a break-through on the right but no confirmation could be obtained. There was some aerial activity but no bombs were dropped. The Germans engaged several of our lone recce planes and at least three were brought down.
The position was a very bad one for a defensive battle, the enemy having complete observation of the obstacle which was not of much value. Once again there was difficulty over the blowing of the bridges. The one at ROSIERES in the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers area was not destroyed by the initial charge and it was not until 1930 hrs. that an R.E. officer arrived to arrange its destruction. Unfortunately, his truck with tools, men and explosives got lost and so this bridge was not, in fact, ever properly destroyed.
At 1730 hrs orders were received to withdraw again, this time to take up a position behind the HAL-BRUSSELS Canal. The Brigade Commander attended a conference at Division and when he returned he held a conference at which he informed the Bns that the Brigade would not halt on this canal, but would be taken after crossing the canal, in busses to a billeting area near GRAMMONT. Notes for the withdrawal were immediately amended to cover the entire distance to be travelled. It was normally the case that there was no time to issue written orders. Attemps (sic attempts) were always made to issue route cards to each driver but the instructions (Note 1 to Appx ‘C’), seemed to help Bns although they were not always absolutely correct, as they were typed during the time the Brigade Commander was at the conference. The Brigade once again withdrew under enemy fire and observation and there was much enemy shelling when the Brigade commenced to withdraw at about 2230 hrs. The Brigade moved by march route through the FORET DE SOIGNES where the Brigade Commander waited to see all Bns safely through. Marching columns and transport were all mixed up together and in the complete blackness of the forest, many men and vehicles got lost. It was quite impossible to follow the route on the map as many new roads had been made.
17th MAY.
All Brigade columns became very mixed and in varying degrees lost. The Brigade Commander himself was taken nearly as far as BRUSSELS and finally crossed the canal at RUYS-BROECK instead of LOTH which was to be the Brigade R.V. At the X Rds just over the bridge, an indescribable mass of transport was mixed up - particularly complicated because it was on a main road out of BRUSSELS which was being evacuated next morning. The Brigadier and the Brigade Major spent most of the day acting as traffic policemen and collecting the Brigade as it arrived. The Bns were put into three orchards where a hot meal was issued to them.
At about 1500 hrs enough busses were collected to take the Brigade back to GRAMMONT. The Brigade moved by Bns and after escaping considerable enemy bombing, reached GEOFFERDINGE where they had a good night’s rest, the Bns being extremely tired after a long and tiring march the day and night previous.
Late that night, the Divisional Commander and the G.1. arrived with the orders for the occupation of the R. DENDRE position. Brigade Operation Order No.3 (Appx ‘D’) was issued under considerable difficulty, as all ranks of the Brigade Staff were extremely tired and continually dropped off to sleep.
Bns were to find post on all the Brs in the area at once and the Commanding Officers to have completed the recce of their areas by 0600 hrs, when they were to meet the Brigade Commander.
Major N.P Charlton, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment took over command of his Bn, vice Lt Lieut-Col G.P. St. C. de Wilton, who was evacuated sick.
18th MAY- GEOFFERDINGE.
The Brigade Commander started his recce at 0430 hrs and met the Divisional Commander at 0700 hrs. The Brigade had occupied the position by 1030 hrs and had started to dig in. A confirmatory Operation Order was issued that morning (Appx ‘E’).
All bridges were prepared for demolition.
Brigade Headquarters moved to EVERBECQ.
Grammont throughout the day was undefended except for three section posts found by 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment on the bridges and it was not until about 1300 hrs that information was received that the 6th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders under Co. Stewart were being sent up to garrison the town. They took over the posts at about 1730 hrs.
At 1530 hrs, orders were received that a further withdrawal was to take place that night and at 1930 hrs the Brigade Major was ordered to attend a Divisional conference for orders. Brigadier Davidson, C.R.A. 1 Corps, was now acting as Divisional Commander, General Loyd having been evacuated sick. Orders were not completed by 2100 hrs, when it was decided Brigadiers should meet at Headquarters 5th Infantry Brigade for a further conference from which the Brigade Commander did not return until nearly 0010 hrs. Reports had been received that enemy infantry and A.F.Vs had been seen on the right of the Brigade front.
No attack was made and the forward Bns reported all quiet. This position was a very strong defensive position and the troops of the Brigade were at a loss to understand why they were once again being withdrawn, without showing the enemy what they were made of.
During the evening a report was received from the 6th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders that the bridges in GRAMMONT were not properly demolished. This was verified and it was found that one bridge – a newly built one and very strong – was still open for traffic of all kinds. As it was vital that this bridge should be demolished prior to the withdrawal, Lieut-Col. Tyler, Commanding 16th Field Regiment, R.A., ordered one of his guns to be taken forward to destroy the bridge by direct fire. 50 rounds were fired from a distance of 80 yds; 47 hits were registered and the bridge was rendered useless.
A rear-guard under Lieut-Col. Lumsden, Commanding, 12th Lancers, was formed to cover the Divisional front. The Carriers of the Brigade together with ‘D’ Company, 2nd Bn. The Manchester Regiment (under Captain Wolsley who was severely wounded in the withdrawal next morning), and a Sqn of the 4/7 D.Gs was to hold the Brigade front until noon the next day.
The Brigade once more withdrew in the face of the enemy, again without loss.
Strange to relate, the rear-guard also did not have much difficulty next morning. The enemy did not appear to realise that only a small force was holding him.
There were a large number of parachute scares this day: one man captured reported to have been seen by “someone else” was clothed as a priest. He was found in suspicious circumstances and was sent to Headquarters, 2nd Division.
What his fate was, was never heard.
19th MAY – FROIDMONT.
The withdrawal from R. DENDRE was successfully carried out. Transport moved away very slowly as at least three Divisions were using the same road, and one Brigade of another Division actually embussed on the road, holding up all traffic for at least 35 minutes.
Owing to the congestion in RENAIX caused by refugees, the column was held up for several hours. Busses which were returning to pick up the Brigade were very late in arriving and Bns started the withdrawal on foot. The Brigade Commander commandeered 10 busses, the drivers of which did not know where they had to report, and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were picked up by them and taken as far as RENAIX. The busses then returned and with the Brigade Commander as guide, picked up the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and took them to FROIDMONT; whilst embussing, 1st Bn The Royal Scots were spotted and heavily bombed by some 50 enemy planes who scored no hits. By this time, the busses which should have lifted the Brigade had been found and the rest of the Brigade was taken to FROIDMONT.
The Brigade passed through or in fact round TOURNAI which had been heavily bombed by the Germans. It was, in parts in flames, and great damage had been done. The centre of the city was impassible.
On arrival, the Brigade went into billets and had a good night’s rest which was well appreciated. The transport lines were bomb but nothing was hit.
Late that evening, the G.1 spoke on the wireless to the Brigade Major, saying that a Bn was required from the Brigade to search for snipers who had been firing at the D.Rs.As the country was thickly populated with civilians, and very many troops billeted there, it was not considered possible. The Brigade Major was sent to Divisional Headquarters to inform them of the difficulties and whilst he was there, three shots rang out. The instant arrival of enemy snipers was expected but it turned out to be the officer’s mess cook killing a young suckling pig for the officer’s dinner!
No further search for snipers took place!
20th MAY.
During the morning orders were received that the Brigade was to take over a defensive position on the line of the R. ESCAUT from 48th Division.
A recce was to be made as far as possible, without disclosing the relief, and with this object in view, the Brigadier and the Brigade Major, together with the Commanding Officers of all Company and Platoon Commanders, rendezvous’d at ST MAUR to see in daylight what they were to take over.
There was considerable difficulty in determining the actual areas to be taken over as the boundaries of 2nd Division and 48th Division did not coincide, further it was obvious that no detailed recce in daylight was possible.
The 143rd Infantry Brigade whom the 4th Infantry Brigade were to relieve, had been attacking during the morning and had received some casualties; their Headquarters at ST MAUR was heavily shelled.
Several stragglers of the units of this Brigade were kept to assist the 1st Bn The Royal Scots when discovered next morning.
The Brigade Commander issued orders for the relief which was to commence at 2115 hrs and to be completed by 0300 hrs. This in fact, was achieved, as no serious interference was met whilst taking over this position. 4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 5 (Appx ‘F’) gives details of the position.
At 1600 hrs a report was received that 70 civilians had crossed the river at CALONNE and had barricaded themselves into some houses and fired on anyone approaching. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment were ordered forward at short notice to check any further infiltrations if necessary and with this in view, they marched out of FROIDMONT and took up position of assembly in a wood behind ST MAUR. The 5th Infantry Brigade also sent one Bn (The Cameron Highlanders) but their assistance was not called for by the 48th Division.
By 2359 hrs, the Brigade was in position with all three Bns in the line – RIGHT …1st Bn The Royal Scots at WARNAFFLES FM; CENTRE … 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers at ring contour 20; LEFT … 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment at CHATEAU DE COUCOU.
Brigade Headquarters moved from FROIDMONT to BARGES where a very suitable Headquarters in some cottages was set up. There was much enemy bombing over the villages surrounding TOURNAI – in all cases they were attempting to block the roads but only in one place where a direct hit smashed a house on to a road, had any clearance work to be done.
Considerable difficulty was also experienced by the Signal Section in keeping line communications through on the position owing to the continual breaks caused by enemy shelling.
The Brigade Commander was informed that night that it was the intension of the B.E.F. to “stand and fight” on this position.
21st MAY – BARGES.
The enemy attacked from across the canal on the whole front at 0440 hrs; the S.O.S. was fired by the right Coy of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and artillery fire was immediately brought to bear. The enemy used shrapnel and mortar fire very effectively and followed this up with intense M.G. fire. A report was received that the enemy had broken through in the centre, and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment immediately organised a counter-attack which was successful. A Platoon of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers combed the whole area where the enemy were reported to be, immediately after the counter-attack. The enemy also crossed the river beyond CALONNE at ANTOING where they found little opposition. They established themselves and threatened the right flank of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots. A counter-attack was made but without success; two further counter-attacks were made by 1st Bn The Royal Scots and Carrier Pls of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment; they were unsuccessful. It was not possible to do more as 1st Bn The Royal Scots had suffered large casualties. In spite of being hard pressed and considerably weakened, both flank Bns were able to hold out. A Bn of the 6th Infantry Brigade (Royal Welch Fusiliers) was placed under command of 4th Infantry Brigade at about 1400 hrs with the object of a night counter-attack to clear this position. Recce was made and an order issued but the attack was cancelled by 2nd Division at about 2130 hrs. A copy of this order is attached at Appx ‘G’. Throughout this day, The Royal Scots were continually in action and at all times gave a good account of themselves. They were throughout, heavily shelled and “mortared” and had considerable difficulty in getting casualties away.
Their stand on the right flank, simplified the task of 6th Infantry Brigade and on the right where the Cameron Highlanders were working up the side of the river in order to cut off the enemy in CALONNE.
Early that morning, about 0630 hrs, the mess that the Staff Captain had found – a most suitable cottage with all the necessary equipment – was wrecked by a direct hit, luckily the mess staff were none the worse. The mess was then changed to a more healthy surrounding. Two men of the Brigade staff were injured that morning as a result of the heavy shelling. It was perhaps a good lesson as all ranks were most casual about the way in which they went about the Headquarters whilst aeroplanes were up.
Nearly all the casualties during the day had been caused by mortar fire. The enemy continued to attack throughout the day and intensified the attack after nightfall. It was reported that the enemy had broken through between the 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers front; re-enforcements were called for from The Durham Light Infantry but owing to the effective artillery barrage laid down, were not committed and by morning the situation was well in hand.
Once again, rumours and exaggerated reports were to the fore. All reports that the enemy had broken through were proved to be false, and on the situation being cleared up, no enemy casualties were discovered, though much firing had taken place.
From reports received at Brigade Headquarters, it was possible to expect the enemy at close quarters at any moment. In fact they were never within a thousand yards.
22nd MAY.
Brigadier N.M.S. Irwin, D.S.O., M.C., Commander, 6th Infantry Brigade took over the command of the 2nd Division vice Brigadier Davidson who had been acting temporarily since the evacuation of General Loyd.
The morning was very quiet, the enemy being content to sit and watch. He was evidently concentrating his efforts against the French on our right. A certain amount of movement could be seen but no attempt at any infiltration forward was made.
Brigade Headquarters, owing to spasmodic shelling, moved 500 yds forward into a disused cement factory where ample protection against shelling was to be found.
The enemy was still active in CALONNE but were kept subjected to heavy fire from the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and The Cameron Highlanders on their right and by the 16th Field Regiment.
At about 1700 hrs an order was received, in spite of the “stand and fight” message, that the Division was to withdraw to the ‘GORT’ Line – the area allotted to 4th Infantry Brigade being BACHY-BOURGHELLES. As soon as it was dark, the withdrawal was to commence. It was to be by march route (14 miles) and this time, for the first time, no congestion of any kind occurred. The morale of the troops was very high though they had had ten days of hard fighting and continual movement.
They could not understand why they could not stand and fight on the good obstacles. There was a feeling that the British Army was running away.
4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 7 (Appx. ‘H’) was issued to cover this withdrawal. It was the only occasion during the withdrawal that there was time to issue a written order for the move; it is not considered in the light of previous experience, that a written order is necessary. Verbal instructions to commanders or their representatives on all occasions worked satisfactorily and at no time did a Commanding Officer require confirmation of instructions given at a conference.
Much office work can thus be avoided and therefore enables Commanders and staff to visit their troops more often. Every opportunity was taken for doing this.
The Brigade Commander waited at ERE to see the Brigade out. No enemy interference was encountered, thanks chiefly to the good work of the supporting artillery which kept up a continuous harassing fire to cover the withdrawal.
The route back to the Brigade to within three miles from where it had started only 12 days before – a withdrawal of 64 miles having been completed in six days.
It was about 0230 hrs when the last man passed through a rearguard of the 4/7 D.G. supported by the carriers of 6th Infantry Brigade.
The casualties in the Brigade up to this date, were 20 officers and 500 other ranks. The Royal Scots had the heaviest casualties as they were responsible for the defence of WAVRE and also encountered, stopped and counter-attacked the enemy opposite CALONNE.
23rd MAY.
The Brigade arrived in the early morning at BACHY and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers immediately manned the blockhouses on the ‘GORT’ Line on the part that which had been built by 1st Division, i.e., BACHY – HELL FIRE CORNER – BOURGHELLES. 1st Bn The Royal Scots were in position on the Divisional reserve line about GORIEUX. Headquarters was established one mile East of BOURGHELLES.
It was discovered on arrival that a section of machine guns from ‘D’ ‘Coy. 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment did not receive the order to retire on the previous night. Their Coy Commander, Captain Churchill at once returned to the front to find them, which he did successfully, only being sniped at at long range. This was about 0900 hrs and so the enemy had made no attempt to follow up the withdrawal. The rear-guard was not molested in any way.
This was a temporary move only as it was known that during the night the French were to take over this line and that the Brigade was to go back into reserve, having been in the front line ever since the move forward to the R. DYLE.
At 1400 hrs the French Regiment of Zouavres commenced to take over this line and orders were received from 2nd Division at 1700 hrs for the Brigade to move back into the area around AUBERS. A bus column of 26 lorries was placed at the disposal of the Brigade and it was arranged that the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1 Coy each of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers and the transport of Brigade Headquarters under Lieut-Col Money, should move first, the busses returning to pick up the remainder of the Brigade at midnight. As was usual, congestion on the road delayed the return of the busses and it was daylight on the 24th May before the busses returned for the remainder of the Brigade, the position being evacuated without any enemy interference. The Divisional Instruction is attached at Appx. ‘J’.
At approximately 1700 hrs, the Carrier Pls of 4th Infantry Brigade under 2/Lieut Edie, 1st Bn The Royal Scots were taken to augment POLFORCE, a force under Brigadier Findlay, C.R.A., 2nd Division , which had been got together rapidly to occupy a portion of the LA BASSEE Canal , which was to be held against any further enemy penetration to the North. 2nd Division Instructions at Appx. ‘K’.
N.B. Up to this point in the narrative, notes written by the Intelligence Officer daily, were available; they have been expanded from the memories of individual officers. From 24th May to the embarkation at DUNKIRK, the narrative has been compiled from the memory and Appendices which the Brigade Major managed to bring home.
24th MAY.
The bus column largely owing to the lack of large scale maps in possession of the officers and other ranks, very soon became split up among the other columns on the road, and it was actually about 1100 hrs before the Brigade began to concentrate in the area around NEUVE CHAPPELLE, where the India War Memorial had been badly damaged by German bombing. The Brigade Headquarters concentration area was MESPLAUX; 1st Bn The Royal Scots …ESSARS; 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment….LESGATIGNIES; 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers…RUE d’EPINETTE.
The column was bombed during periods of congestion but luckily no damage was done to any of the Brigade transport. Practically before the Brigade was in billets, an order came that 2nd Division, as soon as it had had its mid-day meal, was to take up and prepare a position on the Canal AIRE – LA BASSEE. Notwithstanding the fact that the Brigade was expecting a short rest, the Bns quickly moved up to their sectors of the Canal and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, who were on the right, very quickly reported that they were in position. On the left 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers. were in position, having been attached to 4th Infantry Brigade from 25th Infantry Brigade. They held the salient opposite BETHUNE from SEVELINGUE to GORRE. 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve respectively at CALONNE and EPINETTE. Brigade Headquarters was established in a farm at MESPLAUX. (4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No.8 attached at Appx ‘L’.) The Divisional Warning Order and the Operation Order issued at 1810 hrs that evening are at Appendices ‘M’ and ‘N’. They show that 2nd Division was to hold a front of 21 miles of which the 4th Infantry Brigade had 6 miles, including the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT and the BETHUNE Salient.
Late in the afternoon, 1st Bn The Royal Scots reported that a post on the bridge in front of ESSARS had been captured, but Lieut-Col Money quickly reorganised a counter-attack, and although some losses were suffered, this post was recaptured and handed back to the 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers.
In the evening, the Brigade Commander decided that he would move his H.Q.to EPINETTE so as to be more centrally placed within the sector. The move was successfully carried out at 2300 hrs and Brigade Headquarters was established in a farm in this village.
The positions as occupied on the night 24/25 May are shown on the trace attached at Appx. ‘O’.
25th MAY.
Brigade Headquarters at l’EPINETTE was on the edge of MERVILLE Aerodrome on which were several burnt out British and French planes. There was also immense stores of abandoned ammunition and petrol, much of which was salved by the R.A.S.C.
At 0500 hrs 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers reported contact with the enemy along the LA BASSEE Canal.
At 0800 hrs 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers reported that enemy had captured the bridge-head opposite BETHUNE, and much movement was observed opposite SEVELINGUE. Two Pls of reserve Company Royal Irish Fusiliers and Carriers of the Bn went forward to clarify the position but failed to drive the enemy back over the canal. Little flanking liaison had seemed as yet, to have been obtained, Bns and Coys being in most cases, still isolated bodies of troops. The difficulty of the ground, the lack of time for a proper recce and the scarcity of maps being responsible.
Situation was quiet except for signs of enemy recce.
There was intense aerial activity during the morning but little bombing or machine-gunning took place.
At 1300 hrs an Anti-tank gun position on the main road from BETHUNE was fired on by machine guns of 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment in the 1st Bn The Royal Scots area and it was seen that the gun crew was successfully put out of action. The situation in the afternoon became more complicated and Officer Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported that infiltrations were taking place in the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT and that he was not in touch with 6th Infantry Brigade on his right nor with 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers on his left.
At 1400 hrs information was received that the carriers attached to POLFORCE were returning. They reported back but were still more depleted, but yet a useful force.
At 1500 hrs a section of carriers from 1st Bn The Royal Scots and a Platoon of M.Gs from 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment were ordered to come in to support of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment on the right flank, and the Brigade Commander warned Lieut-Col Money to order his Bn to be prepared to move out from CALONNE to PARADIS . The Brigadier also ordered Lieut-Col Stayner, 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers to be prepared to take up a position in the centre, covering CORNET ST MALO and gave orders that liaison with the flanks must be obtained. One Coy 1/8th The Lancashire Fusiliers was to move to CORNET ST MALO forthwith.
At 1745 hrs a liaison officer of 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers arrived and said that they were being relieved that evening. No official information of this move had been received at Brigade Headquarters but the G.1 at Division gave confirmation on the telephone that this was correct. Thus plans had to be changed. 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were ordered to relieve 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers that evening, relief being actually completed next morning, 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers reverting to 125th Infantry Brigade. 1st Bn The Royal Scots were ordered to move forward in reserve around PARADIS.
It was realised at this time that the situation on the 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk front was unstable. Reports came in that Companies were not in touch with each other and that there were gaps in the line. Major Ryder, now commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, went up to clear the situation but it was not until late in the night before touch between the Royal Norfolk Coys was satisfactorily gained.
It turned out that, probably owing to the lack of maps, a Coy had taken up position on the wrong canal. They were eventually shifted back, to play a large part in the battle which was to come.
A sample of the maps that were being used by Coy and Platoon Commanders is at Appx. ‘P’. This particular one was the only one a Platoon Commander of 1st Bn The Royal Scots had for the forthcoming battle.
Brigade Headquarters issued a tracing which it was hoped would help commanders – only four 1/25,000 were available for each Bn.
During the evening, the enemy was seen to be dropping supplies from the air and the aerial activity was maintained.
Many rumours and exaggerated reports were received at Brigade Headquarters throughout the day. All ranks were content to take reports of enemy activity from N.C.Os of other regiments and arms, without making any attempt to see if they were true. Many troops turned about because an N.C.O. of the Field Ambulance had been reported to say that the enemy were in VIEILLE CHAPELLE. No enemy were in fact within 2 miles of that place at the time.
In support of the Brigade in this position, owing to the fact that the 16th Field Regt had been taken away to join POLFORCE, was 61st Medium Regiment (Lieut-Col Fitzhughes); ‘D’ Coy 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment under Captain Churchill had one Pl with each forward Bn and one Pl in reserve in PARADIS.
The evening was quiet, the only item of importance being that lines of flame were thrown along the enemy lines at intervals of about 400 yds, from about 0001 to 0100 hrs. It appeared that these flames might have been guiding lights for aircraft which were still fairly active.
B Echelon was situated North of the Canal de la LYS and spent a comparatively quiet day.
At 1800 hrs, a Coy of French Tirailleurs who were resting at LESTREM volunteered to come to the assistance of 4th Infantry Brigade and moved that night to support 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers on the left. Actually, they took up a position in the 5th Infantry Brigade Area. The main difficulty experienced was to obtain ammunition for them.
The 2nd Division Instruction for this day and situation report for this night are attached at Appendices ‘Q’ and ‘R’.
The lights from the flames of ESTAIRES burning on this night must have been visible for miles.
26th MAY. - EPINETTE
Brigade Headquarters remained at EPINETTE.
A day of tension. Reports were continually coming in all day on enemy concentrations and movements and varied reports that enemy were in large numbers, small numbers, or not at all in the BOKS DE PAQUEAUT. In any case, when the enemy were definitely seen, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment saw that they did not make any progress on this front.
Owing to the length of front held by the Brigade (6 miles), the Brigade Commander decided to move up two Coys of 1st Bn The Royal Scots under Lieut-Col Money to assist 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
‘C’ Coy., 6th Bn Argyll & Southerland Highlanders was placed under command and the Coy commander reported to Brigade Headquarters for orders. One Pl was allotted to each forward Bn under command. The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders Coy Headquarters joined Captain Churchill in EPINETTE.
At 1200 hrs, reports now confirmed that touch had been gained with all Coys within the Brigade and with 2nd Bn The Dorset Regiment at GORRE, but it was impossible to get in touch with 6th Infantry Brigade. It was discovered later, that owing to enemy action, 6th Infantry Brigade were 2 miles away on our right defending ST VENNANT, and there was a large gap through which enemy infiltrations were shortly to take place.
At 1400 hrs forward Coys of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, were in close contact, but all attempts on infiltrations through and around the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT were held up. It was reported at this time that enemy armoured cars had infiltrated on the right flank as far as MERVILLE, where 7th King’s Own, a Pioneer Bn, were finding the garrison.
At 1600 hrs a further French Detachment who were near VIEILLE CHAPELLE came and offered help although they had little or no ammunition. The Brigade Commander decided that they should garrison CALONNE so as to strengthen the right flank. Lieut. Mousset, the senior French Liaison Officer of the Brigade with Captain Gibbon, arranged the move of this French Detachment, which took up a position holding the bridges of CALONNE, that evening.
The Carriers of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment together with a Pl of M.Gs of 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment were moved to fill up the gap between 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 6th Infantry Brigade on the right of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT. They took up a flank guard position about RIEZ DE VINAGE.
1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers reported a heavy attack on SEVELINGUE which was partly successful. Local counter attacks failed to clear the enemy from increasing the size of this bridge-head. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported that the enemy could be seen digging in on the hill North of HINGES and artillery fire was brought to bear on them.
That evening, although wireless communication held, communication by line was continuously interrupted by direct and accurate shelling, particularly by Mortars.
There was considerable difficulty at Brigade Headquarters in assessing the actual situation. Reports that light armoured tanks had been seen were reported from 5th Infantry Brigade and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported much mechanised movement across the canal in front of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT. Leaflets were dropped in the Brigade area this morning – the text of which is as below (sic):
BRITISH SOLDIERS.
“Germans around! You are encircled! German Troupes invaded COURTRAI, TOURNAI, VALENCIENNES. LILLERS, AIRE, ST OMER are occupied. CALAIS will be taken immediately. Why do you fight further?
Do you really believes this nonsens, that Germans kill their prisoners? Come and see yourselves the contrary!
The match is finished! a fair enemy will be fairly treated.”
At 1800 hrs, the line held by the 4th Infantry Brigade was North edge of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT – CORNET ST MALO – just North of LES CAULDRONS – GORRE. The situation was quiet that evening up to about 2200 hrs. The message attached at Appx ‘S’ was received at 1800 hrs but as all Bns were in close contact with the enemy, and several Coy Commanders had already become casualties, it was not possible for action to be taken upon it. Bns could not have competed had such personnel been withdrawn.
At 2100 hrs the Brigade Commander attended a conference at Division, as a result of which Officers Commanding all units were warned that a large scale attack was to be expected the following morning and that the Brigade was to hold its ground and fight.
At 2200 hrs a report was received from the 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers that the enemy had broken through their centre. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment also reported an attack through the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT but that they had successfully held it up. Many rumours from the left flank continued to come in and it would appear that the enemy were streaming through. Stragglers arrived at Brigade Headquarters with exaggerated reports, but beyond small infiltrations in the dark, the enemy in fact made little progress.
At 2330 hrs Lieut-Col Stayner, 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, reported by wireless that his Bn with the exception of one Coy with which he could not make contact, was still in position of holding its own.
From 2330 hrs to 0330 hrs the situation remained fairly stable.
The lack of sleep that commanders were getting was now becoming obvious. The necessity for each Headquarters to have its organised rest roster and a’ rest room’ to which officers could go without being disturbed except in the case of an emergency, was most needed.
A sketch of the positions held by the 4th Infantry Brigade and attached troops that evening is at Appx ‘T’.
27th MAY – BATTLE OF EPINETTE.
At 0445 hrs, Captain Churchill, ‘D’ Coy 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment, reported that one of his Pls and six Carriers had been over-run by an A.F.V. attack. This was the first intimation that a general attack with tanks and A.F.Vs over the Brigade front was starting; reports from all fwd Coys started to come in to Brigade Headquarters that heavy infantry attacks with accurate dive bombing were taking place.
From 0500 hrs to 0800 hrs, Bns reported frequently by wireless of the progress of the enemy attack. Because of the A.F.Vs and tanks, Coy localities were soon cut off from Bn Headquarters but all continued to fight on. Owing to the heavy shelling all line communications failed for this time. Enemy action made their maintenance quite impossible.
Lieut-Col Money reported that his Bn and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment were being repeatedly attacked from the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT while Lieut-Col Stayner reported at 0750 hrs that he was cut off from all his Coys except one. Heavy firing was heard at Brigade Headquarters and enemy aircraft were active.
At 0730 hrs, in response to a report on the situation, 2nd Division said that one Bn of the 25th Infantry Brigade were coming to the left of the Brigade area (1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers) and that two 2- pdrs were coming up to PARADIS. Unfortunately, these arrived with little ammunition, but some was soon obtained thanks to the Staff Captain and Captain Hall, R.A.S.C. Some difficulty was experienced on wireless to 2nd Division this morning as they had just moved, and therefore were using ‘F’ procedure. There was also a report that a tank Bn was to arrive in the area shortly. This information was passed to Bns and may have raised their hopes in vain. The remnants of the Tank Bn was used later on the 5th Infantry Brigade front.
The general order was ‘hold on’ and the Brigade was doing this nobly and at no place was any ground given whatsoever.
At 0830 hrs a report came through that light tanks were passing round the right of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and shortly afterwards three were seen on the aerodrome 800 yds to the right of and beyond Brigade Headquarters. They were engaged by a Corporal of the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers Pl which was acting as Brigade Guard, with a Boys (sic Boyes) rifle. The effect of this fire could not be accurately seen. Soon after, three enemy troop-carrying planes landed on the Aerodrome. Machine-gun fire on Brigade Headquarters was also brought to bear from the right and one signal orderly was wounded.
Lieut-Col Money came in to Brigade Headquarters and reported the situation and then collapsed. He had been wounded in the back and was on his way to the A.D.S., having been ordered to leave his Bn by the Medical Officer. He was satisfied that all was as well as could be, though serious infiltrations had been made.
By 0930 hrs, the situation had become ‘hot’ round Brigade Headquarters with a distinct danger of being cut off.
The Brigade Commander ordered the withdrawal of Brigade Headquarters to behind the BETHUNE-ESTAIRES Canal at LESTREM.
Bns were still in continuous wireless touch with Brigade Headquarters and were all confident although by this time surrounded in their localities. Shortly afterwards Brigade Headquarters moved to LESTREM where it remained until the evening. Between 1000 and 1300 hrs, the enemy attack relaxed temporarily but no movement between forward Bns or Coys was possible. Much enemy movement, M.Cs., A.F.Vs., and infantry was observed.
Wireless communication first broke with 1st Bn The Royal Scots. The last message from the acting Commanding Officer, Major J Bruce (Adjt), to the Brigade Major was that his Bn was completely isolated in groups, no intercommunication being possible, but that they were all fighting strongly in their positions. Bn Headquarters was surrounded and they had received many casualties but were giving more than they got, although the enemy had tanks.
At 1430 hrs, the adjutant of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, Major F.S. Eaton reported that their Bn Headquarters had been set on fire and that they had moved to the next house. Their situation was similar to that of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots., each Coy cut off and Bn Headquarters surrounded, and that they were being subjected to heavy shelling and accurate Mortar fire. They asked continuously for artillery support throughout the day, which the 61st Medium Regiment (Lieut-Col Fitzhughes) gave to their utmost.
Shortly after, Major Eaton reported that their new Headquarters was on fire and that things were very serious and that they were only hanging on with difficulty, and that no touch had been obtained with Coys. Heavy firing from 5th Infantry Brigade area left of GORRE was also reported. (This was the answer to the main tank attack by the enemy on 1st Bn The Cameron Highlanders and 2nd Bn The Dorset Regiment East of GORRE).
From this moment, no further signals from 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers were received, nor would they answer repeated calls from Brigade.
At 1300 hrs, the Brigade Commander got a permissive order from 2nd Division for withdrawal but no R.V. was given. Little or no hope of organised withdrawal in daylight was held out but at 1445 hrs and R.V. – LA NOUVELLE FRANCE – was received and communicated to 2 Norfolk who agreed that no withdrawal was possible till dark. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment was asked to repeat this information to 1st Bn The Royal Scots, but it was doubtful whether, until it was dark, this could be done. The Brigade was to come into reserve on this aera. 2nd Division Instructions are Appx. ‘U’.
For the next hour, Major Ryder, Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, kept the Brigade in touch with the situation at and around CORNET DE MALO. It was the same story – surrounded – every man fighting at fairly close quarters but inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
At 1530 hrs, the Divisional Commander with G.1. visited Brigade Headquarters and repeated the orders for a withdrawal across the R. LYS as soon as possible. The Brigade Commander gave the Bn Commanders views of this and it was agreed that very heavy casualties would ensue from a daylight withdrawal.
The Divisional Commander watched enemy movement on the EPINETTE Aerodrome whilst the 61st Medium Regiment shelled it heavily. Soldiers, guns, staff cars and many M.Cs were seen to be crossing making in the direction of MERVILLE.
About noon, 2 Coys of the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers had reached VIEILLE CHAPELLE and they also had a Coy guarding the bridge at LESTREM. They were in action with parties of the enemy who had infiltrated past 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers.
Information re the withdrawal was sent to 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers by Captain Fitch, the Brigade Intelligence Officer, who volunteered to go. Two D.Rs accompanied him. As the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers situation was very obscure at the time, it is doubtful whether the information reached them. As Captain Fitch and the D.Rs have not been seen or traced since, it is feared that they must have been killed while taking the message. The message was also sent through wireless via 2nd Division and the composite Calvary Regiment (5th Dragoon Guards) co-operating in that area. It is hoped that it reached them but no acknowledgement ever came.
At 1530 hrs Major Ryder, Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment rang up to the Brigade Major to say that their Bn Headquarters was on fire and that their wireless was in a cellar and could not be got out; they were going to break it up. He reported in this, his last courageous message, that the regiment was fighting on their ground surrounded by enemy A.F.Vs and M.Cs supported by most accurate mortar fire. He said he would bring his Bn to the R.V. given, after dark. From that moment no further news of the fighting Bns of the Brigade was heard.
In each case they broke communication in a similar manner -surrounded by superior numbers of the enemy who were in possession of superior equipment, yet each Bn was holding its ground and not giving an inch.
All this time, a strong post at EPINETTE; the Section of Captain Churchill’s M.Gs., two guns of Captain Straghan’s A.Tk. Coy and a Pl of 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers, together with remnants of Brigade Headquarters were closely embroiled.
They took a heavy toll of the enemy, suffering few casualties themselves. They fought throughout the day and thanks to the leadership of Captain Churchill and Captain Straghan, successfully managed under cover of the smoke of a heavy mortar attack to leave their positions to cross the R. LYS soon after 2130 hrs.
Brigade, now out of touch with all except ‘B’ Echelon which was still 2 miles N.W. of ESTAIRES, moved back to the R.V. – LA NOUVELLE FRANCE – having found a way through ESTAIRES with difficulty as it had been badly damaged by bombs.
En-route, a wireless message was received changing the R.V. to one 4 miles N.E. of ESTAIRES.
The Staff Captain was dropped to pick up ‘B’ Echelon and so a small party of 5 vehs, the Brigadier and the Brigade Major, the Signal Officer (Captain Damon), 2/Lieut. Swainson 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Liaison Officer, and a wireless set arrived at the R.V. to find it crowded with all manner of French troops making their way back. Guides were left for the Staff Captain at the R.V. whilst four farms were taken over. However, no sign of the transport was forthcoming at midnight, when the Brigade Major made a recce of the area without avail; it was a sad little party that tried to get some sleep that night. All touch with the Brigade was lost; stragglers, both British and French were everywhere and there were signs that the enemy was following up quickly the remnants of the Brigade, who it was hoped had succeeded in crossing the two waterways.
A sketch of the positions held by 4th Infantry Brigade at noon on this day is attached at Appx ‘V’.
28th MAY
At first light, the Brigade Major made a further search of the area but without meeting anyone of the 4th Infantry Brigade. ‘G’ Staff of 2nd Division were on the roads trying to collect stragglers but it was not until about 0830 hrs that any further connection was made with anyone of the Brigade.
At about 0900 hrs, the Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major still touring the area met Captain Read, Q.M. 1st Bn The Royal Scots who knew the R.V. of the various ‘B’ Echelons. Orders were quickly given to all available officers that a withdrawal behind the line POPERINGHE – WATOU was to be made that day, the orders having been given a short time before to the Brigadier by the Divisional staff.
Check points and Brigade R.V. were given and various columns set out under masses of enemy bombers, who bombed and machine-gunned many places but without damaging the Brigade transport.
The roads were one mass of transport and the conglomeration at the X Roads North of ST JAUS had to be seen to be believed. French tanks, French ambulances, French horse vehicles, British vehicles of all kinds, converging from three roads would have kept any T.C.P. extremely busy, yet no T.C.P. was established.
Having got through this traffic jam after a period of two hours, a wireless message was received from 2nd Division as follows:
“Situation West grid 44 obscure (.) keep to East (.) Discard all tpt (.) Walk (.) Inform all and order all RA to R.V. further East ……”
Luckily, movement down a side road was found possible, though perhaps dangerous, and Divisional Headquarters column under the G.II., Major Dolphin and Brigade Headquarter column, about 6 vehs, managed to get through to the R.V. without further difficulty. Others were not so lucky and it was many hours before the transport column arrived. A large part was still missing when the next move took place. The move so far had not been influenced by enemy action, except from the air and that appeared to have little effect.
At 1400 hrs a temporary Headquarters was set up 3 miles N.W. of POPERINGHE. The Brigade Major proceeded to Division for orders, but owing to a change of plan of III Corps under whom 2nd Division had now come, no orders were issued until after 1800 hrs.
Meanwhile the enemy had been following up quickly with A.F.Vs, and varied reports of actions were being received. Luckily a terrific thunder-storm came and this, although wetting all our troops, must have impeded the advance of the enemy A.F.Vs, etc. At this time, the first news of the default of King Leopold was known. It was difficult, however, in the present circumstances, to realise how this would effect (sic) the fate of the B.E.F.
At about 1630 hrs, orders were received by the Divisional Commander for the Division to take up a defensive position on the BERGUES Canal about 5 miles in front of DUNKIRK but as the strength of the Division was only reckoned to be a few hundred men, he ordered that Brigadier Warren should report the situation to III Corps in person. The remainder of the Brigade such as it was, was to make for DUNKIRK – all unnecessary kit and transport to be dumped.
Whilst the seriousness of the situation had not been realised by the regimental officer and the rank and file, it was evident that the B.E.F was now in difficulties. The roads were crammed with traffic, military British and French and a certain amount of French civilian refugees as well, all making for DUNKIRK at their best speed.
The Brigadier gave orders for the Staff Captain to arrange the destruction of papers, kits, transport, etc, and to move off to the R.V. at BERGUES bridge as soon as he could.
Meanwhile, the Brigade Commander with the Brigade Major and Captain Burns, 12th Lancers, a liaison officer from the late G.Q.C. at BRUSSELS attempted to reach Headquarters III Corps near TETEGHEM, which was inside the DUNKIRK perimeter.
Only by dint of some good driving did the column make the R.V. The road in places was four abreast, made worse by many abandoned vehs which had not been put off the road. One place was completely blocked by a string of lorries which had been bombed and caught fire.
Brigadier Warren arrived at Headquarters III Corps, where the acting Corps Commander, Major- General Sydney Wayson, M.G.R.A. III Corps was not in, but who was sent for. The position regards 2nd Division was explained and it was decided that it was impossible for 2nd Division to carry out this role of the defence of the BERGUES Canal that had been allotted to it.
The Divisional Commander had ordered the Brigade Commander to recce the canal and collect what remained of 2nd Division. At that moment, the known strength of the Brigade was just about 100 men, mostly transport drivers. That number had been seen to leave the R.V. that morning at BEAUVAIS FARM, though many did not connect up at BERGUES or DUNKIRK.
It was dark by the time the Brigade Commander arrived back at the Canal and it was impossible to sort out the odd men who were still crossing into DUNKIRK, a depressing sight, with the oil wells ablaze and a thick pall of smoke covering the sky.
The night was spent on the main X Rds so that stragglers could be collected.
29th MAY
However, very few of 2nd Division arrived at this bridge. In addition to the B.E.F. there were many French and much transport, causing indescribable confusion on the roads, as many were loath to abandon their transport containing all their personal kit etc. However, the order, thanks largely to Captain Burns, the liaison officer who tactfully dealt with the French, that no vehicles except guns were to enter the perimeter was obeyed.
At about 0900 hrs, the Staff Captain arrived and was seen to mount a stolid looking horse. He said he was off to complete the recce of the position which it was still thought 2nd Division might possibly have to take up – not to be seen again for many hours.
Shortly afterwards, the Germans started to shell the roads and all traffic stopped, vehicles having been abandoned where they stood in the traffic blocks. This fact was reported to Headquarters III Corps who said they hoped to clear the roads, but it was a task that would have taken many men many hours, if not days. It was never even attempted.
The sight of the abandoned vehicles, some still with horses in the traces, some ditched, some crashed in the deep canal, the majority still blocking the three approaches to the bridge, was one, once seen, that will never be forgotten.
No officers or men of the Bns of the 4th Infantry Brigade were seen during this morning and it was not until orders were received from Headquarters, 2nd Division that the Division was to hold the “last ditch”, the canal about 1 mile from the coast, when Brigade Headquarters was established in its concentration area, contact was regained.
Here, Captain Churchill, Lieut. Holt of the M.G. Coy attached, the Staff Captain, Captain Read, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, and 2/Lieuts Edie and Carmichael, 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, re-appeared with 25 other ranks all told, this party comprising the Brigade as it was then known.
Reports were to hand that some of the 2nd Division had already embarked and it was hoped that this included a large proportion of the part of 4th Infantry Brigade known to have set out for DUNKIRK.
Headquarters was established in two houses in TETEGHEM. Consequent on the orders for 2nd Division’s “last ditch” defence, it was decided to move back from this obstacle and behind the 2nd Division collecting centre, which had been set up at the bridges in front of ST MALO LES BAINS. The Divisional Commanders drawing of this area is attached at Appx. ‘W’.
The afternoon was spent by the Brigade staff collecting Bren guns and ammunition for the defence of the canal. About 20 were collected, cleaned and made ready and when later, the 4th Infantry Brigade were relieved of their part, they were handed over to the 5th Infantry Brigade. The amount of abandoned transport, stores, etc. was tragic for the British Army.
The original orders were for 5th Infantry Brigade to come under the orders of Brigadier Warren on this position but as Brigadier Gartlan arrived with a comparatively strong Brigade at about this moment, (about 400) and in view of the fact that 4th Infantry Brigade did not exist, these were cancelled, and the 4th Infantry Brigade were to, and could, take no part in the defence.
Brigade Headquarters remained as established except for a short move caused by local inhabitants in the shelled area in the East end of DUNKIRK.
The picture of the embarkation of the B.E.F. was first seen from here. The beaches filled with men as thick as Brighton beach on a bank holiday, both French and British, and the sea dotted about with vessels: large and small cruisers, destroyers, yachts; some out of action, others loading and departing for England; men wading waist deep in the water to get to the smaller boats. The sand dunes were littered with every sort of equipment, transport and military stores – a pitiful sight of waste and fruitless endeavour.
Enemy bombing attacks were frequent and it was cheering to see the British fighters in the sky.
That night was the first real sleep that many officers and men of Brigade Headquarters had had for many nights, only to be shattered by the sounds of heavy firing and shelling at 0330 hrs next morning, the cause of which was never ascertained.
30th MAY.
That night, duty officers and N.C.Os were out all the time trying to find the remnants of the 4th Infantry Brigade, but only about a dozen men came in.
Lieut-Col Moore, Commanding 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment, of which Bn Captain Churchill’s Coy had done such good work to support the Brigade, with the remnant of this Bn attached himself to this small party and the next day – the date and the day of the week unknown and uncared for – was spent awaiting orders for the embarkation of the Division. Attempts were made to collect salvage but owing to the fact that the French were commandeering as much as they could see, and the few men available, little was accomplished (see Appx ‘X’).
Orders for embarkation came at about 1400 hrs when it was known that 2nd Division was to follow 44th and 46th Divisions who were going that night. Shortly afterwards, an order came from 2nd Division for the Commander 4th Infantry Brigade to report to the Embarkation Officer at ST MALO to take over embarkation duties. (see Appx. ‘Y’)
On the beach were thousands of men and more and more were always arriving; the Navy was taking them off at about 2,500 an hour, so they said.
Throughout the time 4th Infantry Brigade were on embarkation duty, DUNKIRK was shelled incessantly, the target being chiefly the Mole.
Men were marshalled into groups of 50 by use of a megaphone and a cornet. Each group of men was under an officer and passed through the cordons in an orderly manner to march to the DUNKIRK Mole, silhouetted in the evening darkness against the burning fires of the town and oil tanks. About 8000 – 9000 men were passed through and the beaches at about 1.00 a.m. on 31st May were cleared of men.
A thorough search was made by the Brigade Staff and the use of the cornet and the megaphone made. After being absolutely satisfied and convinced that no more troops were on the beach or in its vicinity, The Brigade Commander sounded the “gone away” on the cornet and with Colonel Hamilton and the Brigade Staff then proceeded to the Mole.
This was reached about 2½ hrs later, just as dawn was breaking and were lucky in getting aboard H.M.S. ’Ivanhoe’ one of H.M. destroyers, which quickly and without incident, except for unsuccessful bombing attacks, left DUNKIRK for DOVER where everyone was only too thankful to land.
One of the most re-assuring sights of this embarkation, was the sight of Captain Churchill passing down the beach with his bows and arrows! His actions in the SAAR with his arrows are known to many and his disappointment at not having had the chance to keep in practice, had tried him sorely. His high example and his great work with his machine guns was a great help to the 4th Infantry Brigade.
31st MAY.
Thus, this small part of the B.E.F. It had left England on 21st September, 1939, and had spent 8 months working on the defences of Northern France. Then on 10th May, it had advanced as the spear-head of the B.E.F. to the R. DYLE.
From then onwards, it had to bear the brunt of every attack….. the gallant defence of WAVRE on the R.DYLE by 1st Bn The Royal Scots; the defence on the R DENDRE South of GRAMMONT, by 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment; the days of resistance by 1st Bn The Royal Scots at CALONNE (near ANTOING) and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment at CHEROQ (sic CHERCQ) on the ESCAUT, then back to the LA BASSEE Canal, where the resistance of the three Bns of the 4th Infantry Brigade may have had a large bearing on the eventual success of the evacuation from DUNKIRK.
The Brigade started out about 90 Officers and 2500 Other Ranks; only approximately 650 of these returned.
Captain Fitch, the Brigade Intelligence Officer and a percentage of the Brigade Signal Section were missing, whilst all Bns suffered heavily. Lieut-Col. Money, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, was wounded on the LA BASSEE Canal; Lieut-Col. Charlton, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment was wounded on the ESCAUT, with his Adjt., Major Marshall, whilst Major Ryder, who took over, was not seen after the battle on the 27th. Major Stayner, 2nd Bn Dorsetshire Regiment came into command 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers on the 13th May and was last heard of in the middle of his Bn in LES GATIGNIES surrounded by enemy.
No Commanding Officer, 2nd -in -Command, Adjutant, nor any forward Company Commander of the three Battalions appeared from amongst the stragglers.
A list of the wounded and missing officers of 4th Infantry Brigade, as far as can be ascertained, is attached at Appx. ‘Z’.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the original Officers of the Brigade who marched into BELGIUM on May 10th, the following are the only ones who were left to reform with their units at BRADFORD on June 15th, all the remainder either being killed, wounded or missing:
Brigade Headquarters
Brigadier E.G. Warren, Brigade Commander.
Captain J.A. Grant Peterkin, Cameroons Brigade Major.
Captain R.M. Allen, R. Norfolk, Staff Captain.
Captain J.D. Gibbon, Border, Brigade Transport Officer.
Captain C.L.A. Hall, R.A.S.C, Supply Officer.
Captain A.W. Damon, R. Sigs., Brigade Signal Officer.
Lieut. J.G. Johnstone-Hall, R.A.O.C.. O.M.E.. L.A.D.
1st Bn The Royal Scots
2/Lieut J.A. McGregor, Bn Transport Officer .
2/Lieut F.M.W. Edie, a/Carrier Officer.
Captain G.W. Read, Quartermaster.
2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment
2/Lieut C.E.M.C. Fulton, Liaison Officer.
2/Lieut C.C. Swainson, Bde Liaison Officer to I.R.Ir. F.
2/Lieut N.F.H. Merritt, Bn Transport Officer.
2/Lieut D.E.Jones, Coy Officer.
Lieut A.E. Grant, Quartermaster.
1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers
Captain A.J. Moon, Bn Transport Officer.
2/Lieut L.T. Carmichael, Officer i/c Brigade H.Q.Guard.
Lieut J. L. Christie, Quartermaster.
4 Anti-Tank Coy: Chaplains to the Forces.
Captain P.L.H. Straghan. Captain G.A.B. Lee,
2/Lieut D.A. Hatch. attached 2 Norfolk.
2/Lieut A.K. McGeorge. Captain W.A. Passmore,
2/Lieut C.J. Wilson. attached 1/8 L.F.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘A’
SECRET.
4 INF BDE OPERATION ORDER NO. 1.
Copy No…Ref Map: France & Belgium, Sheet 56 – 1/50,000.
11th May 40.
INFORMATION.
1 Enemy.
Air activity continues.
2 Own Tps.
4/7 D.G. occupy line East of R. DYLE. Adv of 4 Inf Bde Gp is nearing completion. Groupe de Reconnaissance, 2. D.I.N.A. have reached line LA BARAQUE 8035 - WAVRE. 1 R.S. will liaise.
3. Att Tps.
Under comd as for move fwd.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl WAVRE 7940 - incl HALT 8244.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT……..1 R.S.
CENTRE …1/8 L.F.
LEFT……….2 Norfolk
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 2.D.I.N.A. incl to 1 R.S. JODOIGNE 9740. X Rds 798392 – rd & ry junc 788396.
Between Right & Centre Sector incl 1 R.S. Copse 819406 – Bse WAVRE 8040 - STADT 794414.
Between Centre & Left Sector incl 1/8 L.F. LES PRES. 833424 – Spur 820427 - LA TOMBE 8143.
LEFT with 1 Div incl 2 Norfolk BOSSUT GOTTECHAIN. 8544 – HALT 8244 – VET ZAAT 810455.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
Incl 1 R.S…………with 1/8 L.F. br 804406.
Incl 1/8 L.F……… with 2 Norfolk 823429.
Incl 2 Norfolk…… with 1 Div VET ZAAT.
8. Outposts.
Fwd bns will find outposts within sectors on general line 789392 –
Fme de CHEREMONT 795397 – track junc about 810410 – thence edge of wood at 812406 – Western edge BOIS DU LONG-CHAMP –
GASTUCHE – LES PRES – East end ARCHENNES Wood 8444.
9. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Observation from high ground by day. Extreme resistance.
1 R.S. will post outposts forthwith. 1/8 L.F. and 2 Norfolk by 1830 hrs.
Outposts will be withdrawn by order 4th Inf Bde.
No posts will be established between track junc 808402 and
Northern end BOIS DU LONG -CHAMP. This gap will be continuously and actively patrolled.
10. Main Posn.
Ground essential to hold…..line of F.D.Ls.
F.D.Ls to include X Rds 798392- X Rds 799398 – br 798400 – thence line of R. DYLE to junc pt with 1 Div.
11. Policy for Defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence; digging where necessary and occupation of houses permitted.
Priority of tasks – completion of defences on line of F.D.Ls.
Posn will be occupied as soon as possible.
12. R.A.
Defensive fire tasks – Trace later.
13. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk guns – One tp area S.W. BOIS DE BEAUMONT 7840. RIGHT one tp area WAVRE…one tp South of Fme RYS 7881. LEFT one tp South of VEEWIEDE 8244; one tp gap in sq 8142; one tp area LA TOMBE 8143.
4 Inf Bde A.Tk. Coy will take over approaches to brs of R. DYLE at 1500 hrs. Guns of this Coy come under comd sec comds.
14. R.E.
Priority of R.E. tasks. ) As in para 41 Pt II of 4
Minefields ) Inf Bde Operation Order
Brs. ) No. 8 dated 11 May apl 40.
15. M G…Posts as under:
(a) 789394. (b) 784403. (c) 797402. (d) 803405. (e) Roles.. all in front of F.D.Ls. One Pl will occupy pillbox at 799409, if suitable.
16. Forecast.
On arrival 6 Inf Bde, 2 Norfolk will come into Bde res in area ANGOUSART 770409 – rd & track junc 799420; 1/8 L/F. will side-step to their right.
17. Flank Protection.
1 R.S will site one Coy area East edge BOIS DE BEAUMONT 7839.
18. Patrolling.
Continuous patrols on outpost posn by night .
ADM.
19. Later.
INTERCOMN.
20. Location of H.Qs as follows;
Bde H.Q…………………………..CHATEAU 761445
1 R.S………………………..………Ho 789401.
2 Norfolk………………………….at 806436
I/8 L.F……………………………..Ho in BOIS DIT LE BOOK 816423.
16 Fd Regt………………………..H.Q. as for Bde H.Q.
21. Light Sigs.
S.O.S Outpost posn ) Two RED. Not to be delegated
S.O.S main posn. ) below Coy Comd.
22. Liaison.
Offrs remain Bde H.Q.
ACK. Sd J.A Grant Peterkin,
Capt.,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of issue: L.Os and Sigs.
Time of signature: 1230 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 4 A.Tk Coy.
2 Norfolk. 2.Div.
1/8.L.F. 1 Div.
16 Fd Regt. Comd.
13 A.Tk Regt. I.O.
2 Manch. B.T.O.
War Diary.
File.
See map one at bottom of page.
APPENDIX ‘B’
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 2. SECRET.
Ref Map: 1/50,000, Sheet 56 11 May 40.
INFORMATION.
1. Enemy.
Nothing of importance to report.
2. Own Tps
D.L.M. have progressed well fwd on right. Adv gd of 1 Div (3 Inf Bde) will take up posn on R.DYLE about 0400hrs 12 May. 6 Inf Bde will move up and take over front as previously arranged early 12 May. No handing over will take place. Comds 2 Norfolk and 1/8 L.F. will vacate posns after liaising with bn comds taking over.
3 Att Tps
‘D’ Coy 2 Manch & 4 Fd Amb under comd;
16 Fd Regt, 61 Med Regt and one Bty 10 Fd Regt, in support of 4 Inf Bde.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl X Rds 798392 to a mutually arranged junc pt on the line of the F.D.Ls about 817413.
METHOD.
5. Sectors
RIGHT………………1.R.S
LEFT………………...1/8 L.F.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 2 D.I.N.A. as in Operation Order No.1.
INTER Bn incl 1/8 L.F. track running from DION LEVAL 8239 -X Rds 8040 – thence to S.E.corner of Wood at 787412.
LEFT with 6 Inf Bde incl bend in rd 861416 – neck of wood 842417 -excl rd junc 825419 – thence rd to 818411 – all incl K in BOIS DIT LE BOOK 8141- Wood 803419 – Wood 7942 - Fme DU TEMPLIERS.
7. Junc pts on Boundaries.
Inter Bn incl 1/8 L.F. – X Rds 8040.
8. Outposts.
Fwd Bns will find outposts within sectors on general line as in Operation Order No.1. GASTUCHE 8241 will be occupied.
Pt of junc with 6 Inf Bde incl 6 Inf Bde T rd 825419.
9. R.A. Outpost Posn.
Later.
10. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Extreme resistance and if ordered to withdraw, you will resist without being seriously committed.
Outposts will be limited to one Coy. Carriers may be employed in support by day.
Outposts will be withdrawn by orders 4 Inf Bde.
11. Main Posn.
Ground essential to hold . As in Operation Order No. 1.
F.D.Ls. As in Operation Order No 1
All brs will be held whilst outposts are out. As in Operation Order No 1.
12. Policy for Defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks.
Improvement of defences.
Slit trenches for A.A. defence.
Posn to be occupied by 1300 hrs.
13. Bde Res Area
Ground essential to hold. To be decided after Comnds recce,
D.Ls. To be decided after Cmmds recce
Posn will be occupied by 1300 hrs.
junc pts – RIGHT with 2 D.I.N.A. BIERGES 7739. LEFT with 6 Inf Bde bend in rd 788409. Both excl 2 Norfolk.
14. R.A.
Later.
15. A.Tk Defence.
A.Tk. mines. Bns requiring A.Tk. mines will state location and number required as soon as possible.
A.Tk. Guns. Trace of A.Tk. defences will be issued later.
16. R.E.
Demolitions. Priority belt on and East of R. DYLE. First task, preparation of all brs over R. DYLE within Div boundaries. Subsidiary belt of rd demolitions on line CHAPELLE ST LAURENT 8941 - NODE BAIS 8945.
Stores. 6000 yds dannert allotted fwd bn. This will be erected as a triple fence.
17. M.G.
Tasks allotted to D Coy 2 Manch remain. Comd 2 Norfolk will recce tasks for further M.Gs on Bde res line.
18. Cav.
In the event of cav withdrawing across R. DYLE, brs at 823446 and 8040 will be used.
19. Res.
2 Norfolk. Location …. about line STADT 7941 -Fme de RYS 7841 - excl BIERGES.
20. A.A. Protection.
All bren guns not within 2000 yds of the line of F.D.Ls will be mounted and manned for A.A. Fire will not be opened at any enemy machine over 2000 ft. One gun per pl in fwd areas will be mounted and manned during the hrs of daylight.
21. Patrolling.
Area between 1 R.S. post at 807402 and GASTUSCHE will be patrolled continuously during hrs of darkness. Mutual arrangements to be made by bn comds concerned.
ADM.
22. A.D.S…..ROSIERES 7542.
INTERCOMN.
23. Location of H.Qs as follows :
Bde H.Q. closes present posn 0930 hrs approx. and reopens same hr at CHAMPLES 7641. H.Q. 6 Inf Bde OTTENBURG 8044. 4/7 DG GOEROUBIEZ 8641.
24. Light Sigs.
S.O.S. Outpost posn. Two RED Rockets.
S.O.S Main posn. Two red rockets
Not to be delegated below Coy Comd.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin
Method of Issue : SiGS. B.M. 4 Inf Bde. Capt.
Time of signature : 1930 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 2.Div.
2 Norfolk. 6 Inf Bde.
1/8.L.F. Comd.
16 Fd Regt. I.O.
13 A.Tk Regt. B.T.O.
2 Manch. File.
4 A.Tk Coy. War Diary.
See Map two below
APPENDIX ‘C’.
S E C R E T.
4 INF BDE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 1. 16 May. 40.
INFORMATION.
1. 2 Div and att tps withdrew last night from the WAVRE posn successfully, suffering a few casualties
2 Div are taking up a defensive posn on the general line rd junc.6841 -rd and ry crossing 728411- thence West bank of R. LASNE incl TERLAENEN 7845.
The following are under comd 4 Inf Bde :
16 Fd Regt less one Bty.
One Coy & one Pl 2 Manch.
4 Fd Amb.
One Coy 6 A.& S.H.
INTENTION.
2. 4 Inf Bde will deny the West bank of the R. LASNE to the enemy from rd junc 717402 incl TOMBEEK 7644.
METHOD.
3. This line will be held as follows
RIGHT…..1 R. S.
LEFT…….1/8 L.F.
RES………2 Norfolk who will attach one coy to 1/8 L.F. for the defence of the Left sector.
4 Boundaries.
Between 1 R. S. and 5 Inf Bde – incl 1 R.S. ry GROENENDAEL -OTTIGNIES 7634.
Between B Coy 2 Norfolk and 6 Inf Bde incl to 6 Inf Bde – TOMBEEK -REUTEN 7444 – HAGAERDE BOSCHE 7245.
Mutual arrangements between tps already on the ground will be retained as far as boundaries are concerned.
5. Brs.
Orders have been issued for the immediate destruction of all brs in this sector and the defence of the crossings has priority.
6. Arty.
16 Fd Regt will support 4 Inf Bde on this posn.
7. A.Tk.
An A.Tk. Bty from 48 Div is in posn within the area. 4 A.Tk. Coy will detail Pls to be under comd as under ;
Two pls…….. 1 R.S.
One pl……… 1/8 L.F.
8. Outposts.
Outposts across the R. LASNE have been withdrawn as approaches have been mined. Observation will be kept upon the enemy from the high ground behind the F.D.Ls. No withdrawal from this posn is contemplated yet.
ADM.
9. A.D.S. established at Fme ROUGE 6943.
10. Tpt.
All B ech tpt and A ech if not required for tactical purposes, will R.V. at the rd ESPINETTE CENTRALE 6345 – X Rds 663463.
11. Amn.
Bde R.A.S.C. Offr has arranged for amn to be delivered to units as soon as possible.
INTERCOMN.
12. Bde H.Q. opened at 718440 at 0900 hrs today. Bde Sig Offr is arranging for a line to be laid to all bns.
13. S.O.S.
Three RED.
14. Password.
For 16-17 May…..HITLER.
15. Mines.
Mines are allotted to bns as under:
1 R.S……………..... 300.
2.Norfolk……………200.
1/8 L.F………………200.
A plan of minefields laid will be passed to this H.Q. as soon as possible.
ACK.
Sd. F. Fitch, Capt.,
for B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Distribution: 1.R.S.
2 Norfolk.
1/8.L.F.
4 A.Tk. Coy.
16 Fd Regt.
D Coy 2 Manch
6 A & S.H.
Comd.
War Diary.
NOTE 1 to APPX ‘C’.
NOTES FOR WITHDRAWAL, 16-17 MAY.
I. F.D.Ls.
F.D.Ls. will be abandoned at 2200 hrs. No thinning out before 2100 hrs. Fwd Coys of fwd bns to withdraw first. Rear Coys of fwd bns to withdraw through 2 Norfolk, who will remain in posn until 2300 hrs. B Coy 2 Norfolk will remain under comd 1/8 L.F. until passing ESPINETTE from where they will return to comd 2 Norfolk.
2. Patrols.
1 R.S. and 1/8 L.F. will provide a strong fighting patrol under an offr which will remain on the front to cover the withdrawal by active operations until ……. They will report back independently through MALAISE and thence direct route to …….. Suppers will be left for the patrols at unit supper places.
3. Movement.
Vehs will move without lights. Tps will march in file in Pl blocks so that tpt can get back at the same time. The route will be picqueted by the Pl of 2 Norfolk at present att Bde H.Q. The Coy comd of the last 2 Norfolk Coy to withdraw, will be responsible for withdrawing these picquets, who will be placed on all important corners, etc. from the Bde S.P. to the supper places.
4. Southern Route.
Bde R.V. bend in rd 706447. Bde supper places for marching personnel only.
5 Feeding.
Q.Ms have been warned and guides will be awaiting units.
6 Tpt.
10 v.t.m. and 40 yds between vehs. If tpt move is not completed at night, a day density of 10 v.t.m. must be maintained by all drs.
7. Breakdowns.
Vehs must be towed if possible.
8. Halts.
Marching personnel - as decided by unit comds.
--------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘D’.
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 3.
Copy No…..
17th May 40.
INFORMATION.
2 Div are taking up a defensive posn on the line of the R. DENDRE 2646 with:
RIGHT………………… 5 Inf Bde.
LEFT…………………… 4 Inf Bde.
RES……………………. 6 Inf Bde
Probable junc pt with 5 Inf Bde Ho 262444.
INTENTION.
2. 4 Inf Bde will take up a defensive posn to deny West bank of river from incl Right LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – ry & rd br 275480.
METHOD.
3. Tps…. RIGHT…..1 R. S.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
RES…… 1/8 L.F.
4 A.Tk Defence.
Posts will be placed at the following places, forthwith:
By 1/8 L.F. on approach to br at 273473.
By 1 R.S. “ “ “ “ “ 284482.
By 1 R.S. “ “ “ “ “ 286483.
By 2 Norfolk at 287487.
By 2 Norfolk at 284490.
Each post will consist of 2 N.C.Os and 6 men, with one A.Tk Rifle.
5. Br Heads.
Bri heads consisting of carriers are to be placed on all brs over the R. DENDRE at :
269448 to be found by 1 R.S.
272473 “ “ “ “ 1 R.S.
275446 “ “ “ “ 2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
Inter-bn boundaries will be fixed after recce. Probable junc pt fwd area PLANKEN 2546 incl 1 R.S.
7. Outposts.
Line of outposts will be decided after recce.
8. Posn will be occupied by 0800 hrs 18 May 40.
9. F.D.Ls.
The line of F.D.Ls will be generally the line of the R. DENDRE.
10. Arty.
10 and 16 Fd. Regts will support 4 Inf Bde.
11. A.Tk Guns.
O.C. 4 A.Tk. Coy will arrange for an A.Tk. gun to guard each crossing of the river within the Bde sector.
12. Recce.
Bn comds will recce their posn and be prepared to meet Comd 4 Inf Bde on br at 273473 having completed their recce of their areas including outposts, at 0600 hrs.
ADM.
13. Full details later.
INTERCOMN.
14. Bde H.Q. opens 0800 hrs EVERBECQ 2347.
ACK.
Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Time of signature.. 2306 hrs. B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Issued through Sigs.
Distribution :- As for 4 Inf Bde Operation No. 2.
APPENDIX ‘ E’
4th INF. BDE OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 4.
Ref Map 1/50,000 Sheet 54. S E C R E T.
18 May 40
INFORMATION.
1. Enemy.
Continues to adv in a S.E. direction; on the right there has been some penetration on the French front. The situation may be described as serious.
2. Own Tps.
2 Div with right 48 Div and left 1 Div are taking up a defensive line on R. DENDRE from incl GRAMMONT – incl LESSINES.
3. Att Tps.
16 and 27 Fd Regts are in support of 4 Inf Bde. D Coy 2 Manch; one Bty 13 A.Tk Regt are in support.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – br 275480.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT…..1 R. S., with under comd one Coy 1/8 L.F.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde incl 4 Inf Bde neck in Wood 2842 – LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – T in LONGPONT 2444.
INTER Bn all incl 1 R.S. corner of wood 272458 -North edge cutting 262464 – North end of cutting 249419 – excl EVERBECQ 2347.
LEFT with 48 Div rd junc 276480 thence straight to Mill 229494.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
RIGHT ……..LES DEUX ACREN.
LEFT………..br 275480.
8. Outposts
Fwd bns will find outposts within sectors on general line thick contour 50, 2745 – ring contour 70/ in sqs 2746 and 2747.
9. R.A. Outpost posn.
Later.
10. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Role watching and warning for R.E personnel on brs.
Outposts will be withdrawn by order of bn comds.
11. Main Posn
Ground essential to hold – line of R. DENDRE.
12. Policy for defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks – preparation of F.D.Ls.
Posn was occupied by 0800 hrs.
13. R.A.
Later.
14. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk. mines – 600 available for issue; details later.
A.Tk. Guns. Will protect approaches to all brs and the rds leading into areas from the East.
15. R.E.
(a) Under orders C.R.E. – the preparation of all brs for demolition.
(b) Barges on R.DENDRE will be sunk forthwith or destroyed in such a way as to make their use impracticable.
(c) Brs to be blown under orders of bn comds. They will NOT be allowed to fall into enemy hands.
16. M.Gs.
One Pl area 250439
One Pl area just South GELEMBEKE 2546.
17. Refugees.
All refugees will be directed Northwards away from France – all rds must be kept clear.
18. Res.
1/8 L.F. less one Coy – GELEMBEKE – GEOFFERDINGE 2547.
19. Tpt.
Great care will be taken in parking of tpt. A v.t.m. of not more than 30 must be observed and all offrs using rds must be active to see that they are kept open.
ADM.
20. A.D.S………. EVERBECQ, 2347.
M.D.S……… MOTT 1847.
INTERCOMN.
21. Password … COURAGE.
22. Location of H.Qs as follows :
4 Inf Bde……229480.
5 Inf Bde……GHOY 2343.
1 R.S……… Ho at 252466.
2 Norfolk…... 254478.
1/8/ L.F……..CHATEAU 253479.
23. Main Sig Artery.
Lines will be laid to bns.
24. Light Sig.
S.O.S. outpost posn : Three REDS, Not to be delegated below Coy Comds
S.O.S. main posn: Three REDS. Not to be delegates below Cop Comds.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde Capt.
Method of issue: Sigs.
Time of signature 1153 hrs
Distribution: 1 R.S. 2 Div.
2 Norfolk. 5 Inf Bde.
1/8.L.F. Comd.
4 A.Tk. Coy. S.C.
16 Fd Regt. I.O.
2 Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt. B.T.O.
d Coy 2 Manch. File.
War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘F’
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 5.
Copy No ……..
20 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
The enemy have adv to the North bank of the R. ESCAUT:
2. Own Tps.
1 Corps are holding the line of the river and 2 Div are relieving 48 Div on the present fwd posn.
3. Att Tps.
Following under comd of 4 Inf Bde:
5 Fd Coy.
D Coy 2 Manch.
One Coy 7 King’s Own.
In support: -
One Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from br excl 961287 to br incl 942307 tonight 20/21 May taking over from part of 48 Div.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT…..1 R. S.
CENTRE..1/8 L.F.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde incl 5 Inf Bde LE COUCOU 9628 - rd junc 956286 - rd- CALONNE – rd junc 944285 - WARNAFFLES FM – ST MAUR.
Between Right & centre sector incl 1/8 L.F. ry and track xing 962298 X Rys 954295 – rd and track junc 940289 – incl track junc 933287.
Between centre & Left sector incl 1/8 L.F. Ho at 20 contour 949302 – North edge Wood at 943298 excl Ho at LE CORNET 936297.
LEFT with 42 Div rd and ry xing 940305 – ry br 934302 - thence to X Rds 928300 – ERE 9028.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde br 961286.
LEFT with 42 Div br 942307.
8. Relief.
To commence from present billets at 2115 hrs and to be completed by 0300 hrs.
9. Main posn.
Ground essential to hold line of R. ESCAUT.
F.D.Ls. to include all crossings and approaches to brs.
10. Policy for Defence Main posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks. Improvement of F.D.Ls and cover from fire.
Posn to be occupied by 0300 hrs.
11. Move to Battle Area.
S.P…………. X Rds 885282
Route………. WILLEMEAU 8928 – ERE 9028 –
PONT A RIEU 9229 – thence Bn areas.
Timings S.P…1 R.S. 2120 hrs.
1/8 L.F. 2145 hrs.
Bde H.Q. & 2 Norfolk will move by separate route.
All moves by Pls - well spaced out.
12. R. A.
Defensive fire tasks : 16 Fd Regt & 99 Fd Regt and one tp 61 Med Regt will support 4 Inf Bde.
C Prep & Harassing Fire: details later.
13. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk mines as decided by comds. 50 allotted to each bn as a primary issue.
A.Tk guns will cover approaches to all brs.
14. R.E.
Under order 5 Fd Coy – improvement of defences. One sec will be under orders of each bn. They will report to bns prior to leaving present locations except for 2 Norfolk who will report to 2 Norfolk H.Q. at 0001 hrs.
15. M.G.
One Coy 2 Manch: One Pl area 2 Norfolk.
One Pl.) Details later.
One Pl)
16. Pioneers.
One Coy 7 King’s Own will be available for work in area. They will be billeted in Fm.
17. RES.
One Coy 2 Norfolk and one Coy 1/8 L.F. will be sited back near rd.
One Pl 1/8 L./F. will be att to Bde H.Q. for defence.
They will report to S.C. on arrival.
18. Tpt.
The minimum of tpt will be taken into fwd area. No lights will be used.
19. Patrolling.
Active patrolling of R. ESCAUT will take place throughout hrs of darkness.
ADM.
20. (a) Med. A.D.S ………WILLEMEAU CHURCH 896285.
C.Ps……… On rd about E in ERE 912288.
(b) Bde ‘T’ Gp.…………….. HAU d’HOTEL 835280.
(c) Pro. S.C. will arrange for guides to be on the routes fwd from 2115 to 2315 hrs.
INTERCOMN.
21. Location of H.Qs.
4 Inf Bde……Fme 922296.
Adv 2 Div… TAINTIGNIES 8826.
2 Norfolk…... CHATEAU 936304.
1/8/ L.F……..940295.
22. Main Sig Artery.
Cable, when available to all bns. Wireless will be manned and an offr available at all times.
23. Light Sigs.
S.O.S. Outpost Posn) Three RED. Not to be delegated below Coy Comds.
S.O.S. Main Posn. Three RED. Not to be delegated below Coy Comds
24. Password. – HOLDFAST.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Capt.
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of issue; Sigs.
Time of Signature; 1700 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 5. Fd Coy.
2 Norfolk. D Coy 2 Manch.
1/8.L.F. 2 Div.
4 A.Tk. Coy. 5 Inf Bde.
16 Fd Regt. File.
2 Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt. War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘G’
S E C R E T.
Actions
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 6.
Ref Map ; 1/50,000, Sheet 64 21 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
Enemy still hold a small bridgehead about CALONNE 9528. 4 Inf Bde and in particular 1 R.S. have been in close contact with the enemy all day and a limited enemy retirement seems to have taken place from about 1800 hrs – perhaps due to adv of 1 Camerons from BRUYELLE 9526 in N.E. direction.
2. Own Tps
1 R.W.F. have been placed under comd of 4 Inf Bde from 2100 hrs 21 May, otherwise same tps remain in support and under comd 4 Inf Bde.
INTENTION.
3. 4 Inf Bde will attack and destroy enemy posns on West bank of R. ESCAUT in and about CALONNE 9528.
METHOD.
4. Tps.
The attack will be carried out by 1 R.W.F. under a barrage arranged by C.R.A. 2 Div.
5. Zero.
0300 hrs 22 May.
6. Approach Line.
MERLIN – Church 942269 – thence track Northwards to behind start line.
7. Start Line.
On rd BRUYELLE 9526 – TOURNAI from 947276 – 944278, i.e., 250 yds either side of track and rd junc 946277.
8. Check Line.
Track junc 955279 – Pt 42, 9528 – pt on rd at approx. 952285 (i.e where left boundary strikes the rd.) on which attack will pause for 1 min.
9. Objective.
Line of Canal from incl br 961286 North along Canal to excl Ferry 959292.
10. Boundaries of Attack.
250 yds S.E. and N.W. of track from 947277 running N.E. to CALONNE.
11. Support.
R.W.F. on reaching line of canal will gain touch with:
RIGHT…….. 1 Camerons.
LEFT………. 1 R.S.
(Further details as to subsequent action follows).
ADM.
13. Med.
Casualties will be cleared through A.D.S. 5 Inf Bde if possible, if not, . A.D.S. 4 Inf Bde at WILLEMEAU 9028.
INTERCOMN.
14. One wireless set will be allotted to 1 R.W.F. by 6 Inf Bde.
Success signal …..RED WHITE RED WHITE.
Bde H.Q. remains present posn 921296.
A Liaison Offr from 1 R.W.F. will report H.Q. 4 Inf Bde at 2100 hrs; he should have a M.C.
Password …………. BUTTERFLY.
S.O.S………………. GREEN RED GREEN.
ACK.
Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin,
Method of issue: Sigs. B.M. 4 Inf Bde. Capt.
Time of Signature; 1945 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.W.F. 5 Inf Bde.
1 R.S. 6 Inf Bde.
2 Norfolk. C.R.A. 2 Div.
1/8 L.F. 13 A.Tk. Regt.
D Coy 2 Manch. 4 A.Tk. Coy.
2 Manch File
2 Div War Diary
1 Camerons
APPENDIX ‘H’
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 7. Copy No …
Ref Maps ; 1/50,000. Sheets 63 & 64. 22May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
The enemy remain in CALONNE and appear to be consolidating their posns on the East bank of the R. ESCAUT. No further attacks have been made on 4 Inf Bde today.
2. Own Tps
1 R.S. have established a post towards CALONNE but are not in touch with 5 Inf Bde on the right.
Same tps remain in support and under comd 4 Inf Bde.
2 Div is withdrawing tonight to the ‘GORT’ Line where a defensive posn will be taken up.
INTENTION.
3. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will withdraw from present posns tonight and take up a defensive posn on the ‘GORT’ line from Frontier at 845259 - excl rd junc 849289.
METHOD.
4. Thinning out to commence at 0100 hrs ; F.D.Ls to be finally abandoned at 0300 hrs.
5 Routes.
Allotted to 4 Inf Bde:
ROUTE ‘Y’ – ERE – WILLEMEAU – Main rd TOURNAI – ORCHIES at 886282 – turn right in RUMES – SENTIER 857262 - SARTINE 847257 – BACHY – thence to Bn Areas.
6. Timings and S.P.
Bde S.P. – X Rds ERE 910292. H.Q. 4 Inf Bde will clear S.P. by 0130 hrs.
The rd will be clear for tpt and tps of fwd bns & one bty 16 Fd Regt. From 0130 hrs.
7. Guides.
Guides will be on rds at pts as under:
Will be found by 6 Inf Bde; they will deny line ERE – ST MAUR till 0700 hrs 23 May.
At 0200 hrs 23 May, 4/7 D.G. will be holding line GUIGNIES 9025 – TAINTIGNIES 8829 – excl FRIODMONT 8829, which they will deny till 1000 hrs.
9. Tps.
One Coy 1/8 L.F. remains under comd 1 R.S. till arrival new posn. One Pl 1/8 L.F. will withdraw with Bde H.Q.
10. Tsp.
As much tsp as possible will be infiltrated back to new areas as early as possible.
11. New posn.
A defensive posn will be taken up on the ‘GORT’ Line by 2 Div as under:
RIGHT……………..5 Inf Bde.
CENTRE…………..6 Inf Bde.
LEFT……………….4 Inf Bde.
4 Inf Bde will occupy a posn from incl Frontier at 845259 – ex rd junc 849629 ; the posn will be occupied as under:
RIGHT…………….1/8 L.F. – Area BACHY.
LEFT………………2 Norfolks – WANNEHEIM
RES………………..1 R.S.on original Div Res line.
12. F.D.Ls.
Will be on the French – Belgium Frontie ; posn likely to be occupied for 24 hrs.
13. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 6 Inf Bde excl 1/8 L.F. SARTINE 8426 - rd junc 833258 - thence to incl rd junc 820256 (junc pt 846259).
INTER Bn incl 1/8 L.F. Frontier 843271 – rd junc 830267 - Pt 63, 825267.
LEFT with 42 Div excl 849289 – incl BOURGHELLES (junc pt -rd junc 849289).
14. Arty.
One Bty 16 Fd Regt will answer S.O.S. up till 0300 hrs. 16 Fd Regt less one bty will withdraw under separate orders at 0100 hrs (Subject to C.R.A. orders).
15. M.Gs.
D Coy 2 Manch will start thinning out at 0215 hrs & R.V. BACHY where O.C. Coy will recce Bde Area.
16. A.Tk.
Bty will withdraw under separate orders.
Coy will withdraw so as to pass S.P. before 0001 hrs. R.V. BACHY. Recce daylight.
17. Recce Parties.
Units will have recce parties ready to move to new areas as soon as posn traces are issued.
18. Minefields.
Care must be taken of minefields laid in present posn; units have been informed of locations.
ADM.
19. A.D.S. closes 0300 hrs present location.
INTERCOMN.
20. Bde H.Q. closes present location 0215 hrs opens on main rd at Pt 34, 817273 at 2200 hrs.
21. S.O.S. ……………….GREEN RED GREEN.
22. Password………….. CHURCHILL.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Capt.,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Issued through Sigs.
Time of signature; 2145 hrs.
Distribution: 1 R.S. Coy 6 Fd. Amb.
2 Norfolk. 5 Inf Bde.
1/8 L.F. 6 Inf Bde.
4 A.Tk. Coy. 2 Div.
16 Fd Regt. Comd.
2 Bty 13 T.k. Regt. B.I.O.
D Coy 2 Manch. B.T.O.
File.
War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘J’
S E C R E T.
0 419.
23 May 40.
4 Inf Bde.
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
---------------------
The following are extracts from orders given at conference held at 2 Div H.Q. 1700 hrs 23 May 40.
1. 2 Div will be relieved in present sector tonight by 12 French Div, and then will move to the area ESTAIRES – LA BASSEE – BETHUNE – North of the Canal. No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy is placed under Comd 2 Div.
2. Relief will take place as follows;
French tps begin arriving fwd area at dusk and will occupy posts with British tps. When French tps are installed, British tps will withdraw, beginning as soon after 2300 hrs as possible, final evacuation by 0100 hrs, when comd passes to 12 French Div.
3. Movement will take place in accordance with block timings and route cards att.
4. Embussing of Marching Personnel of inf bdes.
Each inf bde will send back as soon as possible its res bn and enough additional tps to fill a sec of No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy to its maximum capacity.
Embussing pt Western edge Wood 7926.
The busses of No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy will make a second trip during the night 23/24 May, Collecting remainder of inf bdes early in morning 24 May. Arrangements for embussing to be made direct between inf bdes and comd No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy.
ADM.
5. Billeting.
Unit billeting parties will proceed well ahead of units to obtain billeting areas from D.A.A.G. R.V. PORT ARTHUR INN 490318 (in RICHEBOURG ST VAAST H.33 on 1/250,000 map). Billeting parties will provide guides to meet their units on Route X or Y. Their task will be to prevent congestion at pts where units leave Routes X and Y.
6. Pet.
Will be drawn direct from Pet Coy. Location ESTAIRES 4539 (H33 on 1/250,000 map)..
7. Amn.
Amn Coy will be located at ESTAIRES.
8. Sups.
Sup pt for 24 May for rations for 25 May; Pt where ry ARMENTIERES – MERVILLE crosses rd ESTAIRES – LA BASSEE (468381 on 1/50,000 map).
9. Pro.
D.A.P.M. is arranging to direct traffic on Routes X & Y under separate instructions. As routes are difficult, units are advised to arrange their own pointsmen in addition.
10. Blockhouse stores.
If French rations exist in Blockhouses, British preserved rations will be collected and taken away under bde arrangements. Surgical outfits will also be taken.
11. Distribution of Route Cards.
4 Inf Bde….30 5 Inf Bde……30 6 Inf Bde…..30
R.A……… .20 R.E………….15 Sigs………..15
2 Manch……5 13 Tp C. Coy.25 Camp……….5
R.A.S.C…..10 Med…………..6 Ord………….6
F.S.P……….1 Postal………...1
Sd. C. H. Dolphin Major,
for Lieut-Col.,
, G.S., 2 Div.
BLOCK TIMINGS. Speed…..12½ m.i.h. Density ……40 v.t.m.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route X (Northern) Route Y (Southern).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No 13. Tp Carrying 2000-2100 99 Fd Regt )
Coy (3 bns embussed) 61 Med Regt ) 2200 - 2300
2 Manch ( less 2 6 Inf Bde
Coys). 2130-2200 embussed. 0200-0300
10 Fd Regt ) 5 Inf Bde
One A.Tk. Bty.) 2230-2330 embussed. 0300-0400
4 Inf Bde 2300-0100
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remarks : Tp Carrying Coy reports to R.V. fixed by Inf Bdes
after return from first trip.
APPENDIX ‘K’
S E C R E T.
0 408.
23 May 40.
I M M E D I A T E.
4th Inf Bde
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
---------------------
1. The following will be prepared to move at half an hour’s notice after 1500 hrs:
16 Fd Regt.
13 A.Tk. Regt. (Less two Btys)
One Fd Coy R.E.
6 A & S.H.
7 King’s Own.
Carrier Pls 4 Inf Bde.
Det Fd Amb.
2. This force will be required to precede 2 Div into new area in res and will be commanded by C.R.A. 2 Div.
It will proceed to RICHEBOURG 4730. H.Q. at PORT ARTHUR INN.
3. 4 Inf Bde will appoint a comd for the Carriers.
4. All comds of the above units will report to Div H.Q. TEMPLEUVE 769243 at 1500 hrs.
Sd. C. H. Dolphin, Major,
for Lieut-Col.,
, G.S. 2 Div.
APPENDIX ‘L’
S E C R E T.
4 INF BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 8. Copy No..
Ref Map: 1/50,000 Sheet 62. 24 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. The enemy has a few A.F.Vs along the LA BASSEE Canal which are harassing this front in small bodies; they are said to have A.F.Vs in ST VENNALT 3337. A post near BETHUNE 3927 was lost to the enemy this afternoon.
2. We have formed a defensive line from ST OMER of which 2 Div is a part; they hold the line of the Canal from excl br at 2738 - LA BASSEE with:-
RIGHT …………….. 6 Inf Bde.
CENTRE…………... 4 Inf Bde.
LEFT………………..5 Inf Bde.
3. The following are in support 4 Inf Bde :-
293 Bty 74 Fd Regt.
. One Bty 93 Fd Regt.
One Bty 46 Div Arty.
4. The following are under comd 4 Inf Bde :-
1 R Ir F with under comd one sec 25 mm A.
Tk guns and two Coys French M.Gs.
Two Btys A.Tk. Guns.
D Coy 2 Manch.
5 Fd Coy.
4 Fd Amb.
INTENTION.
5. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will take up a defensive role on the line of the LA BASSEE Canal from incl br 367382 – grid line 43.
METHOD.
6. F.D. Ls ………………Line of Canal.
RIGHT………………2 Norfolk – junc pt 1 R Ir F br ARELETTE 3930.
LEFT……………… 1 R. Ir. F.
RES…………………1 R. S. and 1/8 L.F.
These will be the preliminary (sic) dispositions – to be known as the outpost posn
They will be occupied after dark 24 May.
7. Battle Dispositions.
RIGHT……………1 R.S.- junc with centre incl to rd at 383320.
CENTRE…………2 Norfolk junc incl to left bn at AVELETTE, 3930.
LEFT…………… 1 R.Ir.F.
RES………………1/8 L.F. – area LE CORNET MALO 3933.
8. Junc Pts.
RIGHT…………….with 6 Inf Bde.
incl 4 Inf Bde - br at 367331. LEFT…………… with 5 Inf Bde
incl 4 Inf Bde - Canal xing Grid 43.
Boundaries will be issued later.
9. Arty.
Details of support later.
10. A.Tk.
A Tk one pdr guns are placed under comd bn comd in whose area they are sited. They will be sited to cover the F.D.Ls.
11. M.Gs.
One coy in area; details later.
12. Brs.
All brs over LA BASSEE canal are blown. All other brs over Canal de la LAWE have been prepared or blown.
13. Policy.
14. Right Flank. Outpost Posn.
6 Inf Bde are arranging to sweep the area VENNANT 3337 and Southwards prior to occupying F.D.Ls.
15. Moves.
The following moves will take place:
1 R.S. ……..from ESSERS 4128 – CALONNE SUR LA LYS 3837.
2 Norfolk…..LE HAMEL 4229 – PARADIS 4034.
1/8 L.F…….to LE CORNET A LEUX 3936.
ADM.
16. Tpt.
Will remain bn areas for tonight; B Ech tpt lines will be notified later.
INTERCOM.
17. Bde H.Q. at present at MESPLAUX 4230 will close present posn 2030 hrs and open same hr at EPINETTE 4136.
Line will be laid to bns on the outpost posn.
S.O.S. ………RED GREEN RED.
Password….. MACKAY.
ACK. Sd J.A. Grant Peterkin Capt.
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of Issue: Sigs.
Time of Signature 1920 hrs.
APPENDIX ‘M’.
MESSAGE FORM.
To: HOBO
From: DUGU
warning order (.) DUGU will occupy the line of CANAL from excl CANAL ry br 2738
SE of AIRE to incl LA BASSEE 5026 (.)
DUGU is taking over comd all tps at present operating on this front (.) in the meantime bdes will be prepared to move as soon as possible after having arrived and had a meal in present billeting areas (.) all tp carrying vehs now with bdes will be retained by them (.) probable moves of bdes will be as follows (.) GOPI remains in approx present area (.) HOBO to area BETHUNE – LOCON 4131 – ESTAIRES 4539 (.) FITU to ST VENANT 3337 – MERVILLE 3939 (.) bdes will send reps to DUGU HQ who will be in possession of the latest information of their own bdes together with the earliest times by which bdes having fed will be in a posn to move (.) other arms will be grouped with bde groups.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note : HOBO was 4 Inf Bde code name.
APPENDIX ‘N’
SECRET.
Copy No.1.
2 DIV 4 OPERATION ORDER No. 8.
Ref Map: 1/50,000, Sheets 50, 51, 62. 24 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Allied tps are to hold a line, mostly covered by a water obstacle, from the sea West of DUNKERQUE to ST OMER – AIRE – BETHUNE – LA BASSEE – CARVIN – ORCHIES.
2. 2 Div has on its right 44 Div and on its left POLFORCE.
Boundaries right excl 2 Div ry LILLERS 2831 – HAZEBROUCK.
Junc pt – ry br 273388.
Left with POLFORCE excl 2 Div – Wood 5225 – PIETRE 5032 - X Rds 483359 - NOUVEAU MONDE 4738.
Junc pt – bend in river 522255.
3. The following tps in 2 Div sector under comd:-
210 Bty 53 A.Tk. Regt.
Bty 98 Fd Regt.
293 Bty 74 Fd Regt.
7 King’s Own.
R.Ir. F.
7 Queen’s.
2/5 West Yorks.
13 Tp Carrying Coy.
Two Bns French inf.
Two Coys French M.G.
4. A det from 2 Div under comd Brig FINDLAY, has been placed under POLFORCE and is in posn on our immediate left and consists of :-
H.Q.
16 Fd Regt.
13 A.Tk. Regt. (less two btys).
6 A & S.H.
One Fd Coy.
Carrier Pls 4 Inf Bde.
5. Enemy is threatening the line mentioned in para 1 with armd forces from the West. He has effected a breakthrough North of BETHUNE and it is thought that some elements have crossed the area EPINETTE 3135 and are working Northwards. Enemy and at least one M.G. have been reliably reported firing on the Southern exits of MERVILLE 3939.
INTENTION.
6. 2 Div will hold the LA BASSEE Canal posn from excl br 273388 to excl Wood 5225 against attack from the West.
METHOD.
7. F.D.L ……………… N.E. bank of Canal.
8. Organisation of Div Sector.
RIGHT Sector. CENTRE Sector. LEFT Sector.
Comd - Comd - Comd -
Comd 6 Inf Bde. Comd 4 Inf Bde. Comd 5 Inf Bde.
Tps - Tps - Tps -
6 Inf Bde 4 Inf Bde (less carriers) 5 Inf Bde.
99 Fd Regt. 210 A.Tk. Bty. 10 Fd Regt.
44 A.Tk. Bty. R. Ir F. One A.Tk. Bty.
One Fd Coy R.E. One Coy R.E. (to arrive shortly)
2/5 W. Yorks. One Coy 2 Manch One Coy 2
Manch
One Coy 2 Manch. Two Coys French MGs 7 Queen’s.
6 Fd Amb. 4 Fd Amb. Two bns French
Inf.
5 Fd Amb.
9. Method of occupation
Inter-Bde boundaries.
Between 6 and 4 Inf Bdes: incl 4 Inf Bde br 367331 thence rd RIEZ DU VINAGE 3734 – CALONNE SUR LA LYS 3837, excl MERVILLE 3939.Between 4 and 5 Inf Bdes:
excl 4 Inf Bde rd junc 424270 - incl MESPLAUX 4230 - CANAL DE LA LAWE.
10. Tactical Occupation.
First bound…………MERVILLE.
Second bound……..R. LYS, HAVERSKERQUE 3239 – ST
VENANT 3337.
Third bound………..LA BASSEE Canal from incl br 303364 to
incl br 350335.
4 Inf Bde will occupy its sector with not more than one inf bn on the front. It will form a defensive flank on the general line of its right boundary and will patrol fwd to ST VENANT and ROBECQ 3434.
5 Inf Bde will hold one bn in readiness to occupy ESTAIRES in conjunction with operation of 6 Inf Bde. One Bn 5 Inf Bde will be situated in rear of French sector.
11. Div Res.
7 King’s Own and 2 Manch (less three coys) will remain in present locations until receipt of further orders.
12. Arty
All 18 prs and 25 prs will be sited for all-round A.F.V. defence and with A.Tk. defence their primary role. C.R.A. will be responsible for their siting, thereafter these guns will be under comd sector comds for battle purposes.
13. Demolitions.
If not already done, all brs within bde sectors over LA BASSEE Canal will be blown under orders of sector comds. Br 350335 reported NOT blown.
14. Counter attack policy.
Enemy will not be allowed to cross the LA BASSEE Canal. Local res will be held within sectors for immediate counter attack.
15. The posn will be occupied as soon as possible.
INTERCOM.
16. H.Q. 2 Div remains present location until further orders.
H.Q. POLFORCE – SAILLY SUR LA LYS 4940.
H.Q. ‘X’ Force (Brig Findlay) – CARNIN 6124.
H.Q. 4 Inf Bde – 427305.
H.Q. 5 Inf Bde – 467286.
H.Q. 6 Inf Bde – VIEILLE CHAPELLE 4333.
ACK.
Issued through Sigs. Sd. C.H. Dolphin, Major,
G.S. 2 Div.
Time of Signature: 1810 hrs.
Distribution : 4 Inf Bde.
X.X.X.X.X.X.
X.X.X.X.X.X.
See maps 3 and 4 below
APPENDIX ‘Q’.
SECRET.
2 DIV INSTRUCTION. 0444.
25 May 40.
SITUATION.
1. Situation on right of 2 Div is obscure. 6 Inf Bde have reached ST FLORIS 3437 and are continuing adv towards HAVERSKERQUE 3239 with a view to reaching the LYS Canal and subsequently the LA BASSEE Canal. On the right of 2 Div 44 Div is reaching its front and is moving by rd to ESTAIRES – NEUVE BERQUIN 4241 and by rd MERVILLE – LA MOTTE 3543 to clear up the situation North of the FORET DE NIEPPE and to adv onto its frontage on the AIRE – LA BASSEE Canal.
2. 137 Inf Bde (Brig Gawthorpe) is holding line to North of FORET DE NIEPPE with H.Q. at LA MOTTE AU BOIS 3543 until relieved by 132 Inf Bde (Brig Steele), 44 Div.
3. 2 Div has taken over the responsibility for defence of its sector. All tps French and British within the sector have come under 2 Div comd. During 25 May steps will be taken to relieve units of 25 Inf. Bde. Liaison Officer for French tps on Canal line West of BETHUNE reports H.Q. 4 Inf Bde.
4. French arty (one gp 75 mm (9 guns) one gp 155 mm (12 guns) ) , is disposed to support 2 Div right and front. French R.A. H.Q. are at LE TOURET 4430.
5. 6 King’s Own will be responsible for the close protection of MERVILLE and will be disposed to control all entrances into the village, with a central res. 7 King’s Own will be similarly responsible for ESTAIRES and 2 Div H.Q. gd on arrival.
6. As from 0300 hrs today, Armd Recce Bde, re-organised as a Div Cav Regt comes under comd 2 Div and will be located in CROIX DU BAC 5042. A liaison offr will report to and remain with 2 Div H.Q.
7. Enemy continues to infiltrate into our lines in the guise of civilians. All male civilians of apparent fighting age will be liquidated without hesitation should it be impossible to arrest and examine them without submitting our own tps to danger. Tps in rear of the fwd area will be particularly careful to curtail movement of civilians in their areas.
8. Tp Carrying Coys have been ordered away from 2 Div and reverted to G.H.Q.
9 Adv Div H.Q.is closing at present location and opening at BOUT DELVILLE 4535 at 1600 hrs. Rear H.Q. opens at SAILLY SUR LA LYS 4940 at same hr.
Sd C.H. Dolphin, Major,
for Lieut-Col.
G.S. 2 Div.
Distribution as per 2 Div O.O. No. 8 plus Armd Recce Bde.
APPENDIX ‘R’
0 561. 25 May 40.
2 DIV SITUATION REPORT 2000 hrs 25 MAY.
Enemy.
The enemy has maintained his pressure on the line of the Canal between AIRE and LA BASSEE. He has been held on this front and has been prevented from making any but very minor crossings.
Enemy arty has been increasingly active.
Own Tps.
Composite Div Cav Regt has today been placed under comd 2 Div.
Air.
Frequent convoys of enemy aircraft have passed over NEUVE CHAPELLE flying N.W. and S.E. In most cases these convoys consisted of large bomber or troop carrying aircraft escorted by fighters. At 1600 hrs four or five large aircraft flew over NEUVE CHAPELLE at a height of about 50 feet using M.Gs.
6 Inf Bde.
Enemy has been generally active along the whole bde front, especially S.W. of ST VENANT. Our fwd tps were prevented from reaching the line of the canal by intense arty and M.G. fire, especially from factory at 281379 . Our fwd posts are now on general line rd juncs 299386 and 303383 – just North of HAMET BILLET 3136- rd junc 338357.
4 Inf Bde.
Enemy has been active along the whole of Bde front most of the day. He succeeded in crossing the canal at SEVELINGUE 4029 and North of BEUVRY 4225. These attacks were made by inf supported by arty and mortars. Fire from the latter was reported as particularly accurate. Enemy recce aircraft were frequently over our lines throughout the day, and several parachutists were reported to have dropped.
Several Austrians were taken prisoner.
5 Inf Bde.
There has been little change on this bde front today. The line has been held by the French and 7 Queen’s but these are being relieved by units of 5 Inf Bde by 2330 hrs tonight.
Sd ?????
Major for Lt-Col.
G.S. 2 Div.
Distribution as for operation orders.
APPENDIX ‘S’.
M E S S A G E F O R M.
To : HOBO
From : DUGU A98 26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECRET (.) certain offrs will be sent to UK forthwith from BEF of following categories (.) (A) unnecessary offrs on staff (B) unit offrs with experience required for training at home on scale of two offrs per bn or equivalent (.) four WOs or NCOs per bn or equivalent selected for their experience and value for training (.) above parties will be despatched today to report camp comdt DUNKERQUE (.) they will take only what equipment they can carry (.) unit tpt will be used (.)
ACK (.) all informed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
See map 5 below
APPENDIX ‘U’.
2 DIV OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 11.
1. 2 Div will withdraw behind canal de la LYS as soon as possible but will maintain touch with right French 32 Div through 5 D.G. covering force in co-operation with 7 Recce Gp (French) near LA BASSEE.
2. 5 D.G. will relieve 25 Inf Bde (less R Ir F and Queens) along area fwd of general line LA COUTURE 4452 – RUE DU BAS CHEMIN 4632 – NEUVE CHAPELLE 4932 by 1630 hrs and will deny that line to the enemy until 2200 hrs after which it will withdraw via ESTAIRES into res about LE DOULIEU 4543, but leaving patrols out to keep touch with the French.
3. 25 Inf Bde will assume responsibility for defence CANAL DE LA LYS from incl ry 3939 West of MERVILLE to incl ESTAIRES as soon as possible.
4. R.Ir F will remain present posn to cover withdrawal 4 Inf Bde after dark.
Bn will be finally ordered to withdraw by Comd 4 Inf Bde – H.Q. LESTREM
4336.
5. Queens with Coy ‘I’ Tanks come under comd 5 Inf Bde forthwith:-
(a) to clear up situation 5 Bde front.
(b) to assist this bde to withdraw.
6. All tps 6 & 7 K.O.R.R. (MERVILLE, ESTAIRES respectively) on 25 Inf Bde front, come under comd 25 Inf Bde.
7. 4/7 D.G., dismounted wing, is being ordered to hold CANAL DE LA LYS incl br 467388 to bend in canal 478388.
8. 5 Inf Bde will withdraw through 5 D.G.as soon as it can be disengaged and will R.V. NEUF BERQUIN 4248 and come into res.
9. 4 Inf Bde on withdrawal will R.V. LA NOUVELLE FRANCE 4430 and come into res.
10. 6 Inf Bde on withdrawal will continue right 5 Inf Bde on general line of ry NE about LE PRE 3642 - where efforts will be made to gain touch with 44 Div.
11. Arty.
12. M.Gs.
Will remain under comd as at present. H.Qs will report to this H.Q. locations North of LYS.
13. Demolitions.
25 Bde will be responsible for ordering demolitions all brs across the LYS.
5 D.G. will place an offr at the two brs ESTAIRES 458388, 467389 to report when all tps are clear.
14 Tps Carrying.
One sec will remain LAVENTIE area and come under comd 5 Inf Bde. Sec Comds will report that Bde about 480356.
All lorries Tp Carrying Coy not in use R.V. LE VERRIES 4644 forthwith.
15. Div H.Q. closes present location forthwith. Opens Report Centre 445416 at 1700 hrs.
Sd B de Fonblanque.
Lieut-Col G. S. 2 Div.
1615 hrs.
NOTE: All WITHDRAWALS will be through ESTAIRES or to the EAST.
See map 6 below
APPENDIX ‘X’.
To : 4, 5, 6 Inf Bdes RA. 5 D.G.
From : 2 Div 30/5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There will be no further destruction of any type of equipment (.) all fighting and other vehs in possession or guns and any other equipment which can NOT be embarked will be handed over or left in their posns (.) to meet the latter case accurate location statements of weapons and vehs will be forwarded to this HQ forthwith (.) during the day active steps will be taken to salvage serviceable equipment of all natures into dumps within formation or unit areas.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘Y’
To : 4 Inf Bde.
From : 2 Div.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
comd and staff 4 inf bde and two drivers will report forthwith to beach headquarters MALO LES BAINS to take over control of A beach (.) brigadier should report to area HQ the bastion DUNKERQUE immediately (.) offrs already detailed by 3 corps as MLO are remaining temporarily to clear beach (.) any further offrs or Ors required will be detailed from those coming fwd for embarkation (.) two cars without drivers are available at MALO LES BAINS for 4 inf bde staff.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROLL OF OFFICERS - 1st BN THE ROYAL SCOTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Lieut- Col Money H.D.K. Wounded.
Major Winchester C.C. (M.C.) Killed.
Major Byam Shaw G. Killed.
Capt A/Major Watson R.G. Killed.
Capt Bt/Major Mitchell-Innes A.T. Wounded.
Capt Bucher F.M. Wounded.
Capt Dickson S.G. Wounded.
Lieut A/Capt Thorburn W.I.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut A/Capt Kerr F.R.N. Wounded.
Lieut Haldane A.N. Back. ADC at Div.
Lieut McKinnon L.J. Missing.
Lieut Barker (RAMC) P.B. Prisoner.
2/Lieut Kyle W.E. Wounded
2/Lieut Errington C.J.R. Missing.
2/Lieut MacDuff Duncan C.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut McGregor J.A. With unit.
2/Lieut Liddell L.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut Turcan R.S. Wounded.
2/Lieut Cruikshank J. Missing.
2/Lieut Anderson J.F. Missing.
2/Lieut Drysdale J.F.W. Killed.
2/Lieut Page D. Missing.
2/Lieut Walker W.E. Wounded & Missing.
2/Lieut Gallie R.E. Killed.
2/Lieut Thorne W.R.L. Missing.
2/Lieut Elliott E.I.C. Missing.
2/Lieut Edie F.M.W. With unit.
Lieut Adjt A/Capt Bruce J. Missing.
Capt (QM) Read G.W. With unit.
Attached.
Rev McLean N. Wounded- prisoner.
French Liaison Offr MARTELL Prisoner.
2/Lieut Carpenter Missing.
ROLL OF OFFICERS – 2nd BN THE ROYAL NORFOLK REGIMENT.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Lieut-Col de Wilton G.P. St C. Evacuated Sick.
A/Lieut-Col Charlton N.P. Wounded.
A/Major Marshall F.R. Wounded.
A/Major Richardson J.C.C. Missing.
Major Ryder L.C.D. Missing.
Capt Elwes J.H. Missing.
Capt Allen G.H. Wounded.
Capt Barclay F.P. (M.C.) Wounded.
Capt Gordon A.L. Missing.
Capt Long C.W.H. Missing.
Lieut Hallett J.N.R. Missing.
Lieut Yallop C.E. Killed.
Lieut Edgeworth C.E. Missing.
2/Lieut Woodwark J.G. Missing.
2/Lieut Buchanan J.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Swainson C.C. With unit.
2/Lieut Elson C.E. Killed.
2/Lieut Fulton C.E.N.C. With unit.
2/Lieut Jones D.E. With unit.
2/Lieut Merritt N.F.H. With unit.
2/Lieut Slater T.J.K. Missing.
2/Lieut Simpson T.P.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Potter K.A.S. Missing.
2/Lieut Willison C.A. Missing.
Lieut (QM) Grant A.E. With unit.
Lieut Draffin (RAMC) D.A. Missing.
Attached.
Capt R.J. Hastings 2 Oxs & Bucks L.I. Missing.
Rev G.A.B. Lee, C.F. With unit.
ROLL OF OFFICERS – 1/8th BN THE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Stayner D.J.P.P. Missing.
Major Gardner A.H. Wounded.
A/Major Eaton F.S. Missing.
Capt Haworth R.L.G. Missing.
Capt Lutyens P.G.T. Missing.
Capt Haig W.G. Wounded.
Capt Style D.C.W. Wounded.
Capt Moon A.J. With unit.
Lieut Martin A.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Wilman J.H. Missing.
2/Lieut Noden G.C. Missing.
2/Lieut Hoyle J.D. Missing.
2/Lieut Ward D.R. Missing.
2/Lieut Verity P.L. Missing.
2/Lieut Brown K.A. Missing.
2/Lieut Carmichael L.T. With unit.
2/Lieut Taylor G.R. Missing.
2/Lieut Komrower A.G. Wounded.
2/Lieut Entwistle P.K. Missing
2/Lieut Spiers D.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Hammersley G.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Broadhead J.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Walton D.T. Wounded.
2/Lieut Clarke N.S. Missing.
2/Lieut Crossland F.S. Wounded.
2/Lieut Wilson C.J. With unit.
Lieut (QM) Christie J.L. With unit.
Lieut Sillar (RAMC) W. Missing.
Attached.
Rev Passmore C.F. W.A. With unit.
TO ALL RANKS
4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
In the hope that many of those who are not yet with us might return, that in the confusion of the withdrawal and evacuation of DUNKIRK there might still be men of the Brigade in reception camps and assembly areas in England who might rejoin, I have refrained until now from expressing to you my admiration, my deep appreciation and my pride in the magnificent deeds performed by ALL RANKS of the Brigade from May 10th to May 31st.
You have acquitted yourselves, as I expected you would do, with devotion, with courage and in keeping with the very highest traditions of the regiments to which you belong.
When history comes to be written, it will be recorded that the part played by the 4th Infantry Brigade was second to none in valour, dauntless courage and tenacity. Its refusal to give an inch to the enemy contributed tremendously to the successful withdrawal of the three hundred and thirty thousand British and French troops to this country. It was an optimistic hope that perhaps thirty thousand might be got away; three hundred thousand was considered an impossibility; but deeds such as yours made impossible possible.
The Brigade went into Belgium on May 10th 90 Officers and 2430 Other Ranks strong, today its known strength is 25 officers and 697 Other ranks. You have indeed given of your best, but not in vain, and if called upon I know you will do the same again.
I am indeed proud to have had the honour of Commanding you and leading the 4th Infantry Brigade in battle.
Well done and God bless you.
*E.G. WARREN, Brigadier,
15th June 1940. Commander, 4th Infantry Brigade.
*Brigadier E. G. Warren's official title was Brigade Commander.
THE BRIGADE MAPS
The following are the Brigade Diaries and notes taken from the Campaign in France 10th May 1940 – 31st May 1940. We are extremely grateful to Kate Thaxton and the Royal Norfolk Regimental Museum for allowing us access and allowing to transcribe the diaries.
GLOSSARY
We have not been able to decipher all of the Army anacronyms but these are the main ones
1 R.S. The 1st Battalion The Royal Scots
1/8 L.F. 1/8th Battalion The Lancashire Fusiliers
2.D.I.N.A. 2nd Division d’infanterie nord-africaine
2.Norfolks. The Second Battalion The Royal Norfolk Regiment
2/5 W. Yorks 2/5th Battalion West Yorkshire Regiment.
4/7 DG. 4/7th Dragoon Guards
A.A. Anti-Aircraft
ACK. Acknowledgement
ADC. Aide-De-Camp (a military officer acting as a confidential assistant to a senior officer)
A.F.V (s). Armoured Fighting Vehicle (s)
A.Tk. Anti-Tank
A.D.S. Advance Dressing Station
A.& S. H. Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders
Adjt. Adjutant
Amn. Ammunition
Armd. Armoured
Att. Attached
B.E.F. British Expeditionary Force
Bde. Brigade
Bg.(s) Bridge (s)
Bn.(s) Battalion (s)
Brig. Brigadier
Bse Base
C.R.A. Commander Royal Artillery
C.R.E. Commander Royal Engineers
Cav. Cavalry
Comd Commander
Comdt Commandant
Coy. (s) Company (ies)
C.P. Command Points
D.A.A.G. Deputy Assistant Adjutant General
D.A.P.M. Deputy Assistant Provost Marshal
D.F. Defensive Fire
D.L.M. Division Légère Mecanique (Light Mechanical Division)
D.R. Dispatch Rider
Det. Detachment
Drs. Drivers
F.D.L.(s) First Defence Line (s)
Fd. Field
Fwd Forward
G.I. Part of the framework of the British Army which ensures the force is staffed appropriately and that personnel are supported effectively
GII Part of the framework of the British Army responsible for gathering and analysing intelligence to support operational planning
Gd. Guard
Gp Group
G.Q.C. Believe Central Command HWQ Brussels
INTERCOMN Internal Communications
Junc Junction
K.O.R.R. King’s Own Royal Regiment (Lancaster)
L.A.D. Light Aid Detachment
L.O. Liaison Officer
M.C.(s) Motor Cycle (s)
M.D.S. Main Dressing Station
M.G (s) Machine Gun (s)
M.G.R.A. Major General Royal Artillery
M.L.O (s). Military liaison Officer (s)
OME Ordnance Munitions and Explosives
O.C. Officer Commanding
O.O Operation Order
O.R. Other Ranks
O.P. Observation Post
Offr(s). Officer (s)
POLFORCE. Assembled under command of Major General Curtis. It defended the sector between St Omer and Pont Maudit and took its name from St Pol where its units were initially stationed.
Pdrs. Pounders
Pet. Petrol
Picquet (ed.) Small unit of soldiers placed on a defensive line forward of a friendly position to provide warning and screening against enemy advance
Pl(s). Platoon (s)
Posn. Position
Pro. Provost (Military Policing)
Prs. Pounders
Q.M. Quartermaster
Q.M.G Quartermaster General
R.A. Royal Artillery
R.A.S.C. Royal Army Service Corp
R.E. Royal Engineers
R. Ir. F. Royal Irish Fusiliers
R.O.A.C. Royal Army Ordnance Corps
R.V. Rendezvous
R.W.F. Royal Welch Fusiliers
Res. Reserve
Rd. (s) Road (s)
Ry. (s) Railway (s)
Recce Reconnaissance
S.C. Possibly Section Commanders (Sec Comds)
S.O.S. Extreme Distress Signal (Save Our Souls)
S.P. Start Point
Sgt (s) Sergeant (s)
Sup (s) Supply(ies)
T.C.P. Transport Control Point
Tps. Troops
Tpt. Transport
Vehs. Vehicles
V.t.m. Vehicles to the mile
W.O. Warrant Officer
CODE NAMES
HOBO: 4th Infantry Brigade
DUGU Assumed 2nd Division
SUMMARY OF MOVEMENTS OF HEADQUARTERS 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE.
10th MAY to 31st MAY 1940
10th MAY
In billets on ‘GORT’ Line at ROSULT. Commenced to move forward in BELGIUM in accordance with Plan ‘D’ at 2130 hrs.
11th MAY
At TOMBEEK on the R. DYLE
12th to 15th MAY
Moved to CHAMPLES. Defence of R. DYLE – WAVRE-GASTUCHE.
Battle of WAVRE 14th and 15th May.
16th MAY
Arrived at BAEKENBOSCH 0300 hrs. Temporary defence of LA LASNE – night withdrawal.
17th MAY
Arrived at LOTH en route for R. DENDRE (GRAMMONT).
Arrived in billets at GEOFFERDINGE, preparatory to denying line of
R. DENDRE.
18th MAY
Moved to EVERBECQ. Withdrawal to FROIDMONT ordered this afternoon.
19th MAY
Moved back via RENAIX and TOURNAI to FROIDMONT preparatory to denying line of R. ESCAUT.
20th MAY
Defence of R. ESCAUT – CALONNE – excl TOURNAI. Headquarters at BARGES near ERE.
21st MAY
Battle of R.ESCAUT
22nd MAY
Defence of R.ESCAUT. Headquarters moved to Cement Factory. Orders to withdraw to ‘GORT’ Line.
23rd MAY
Moved to BACHY. Temporary defence of ‘GORT’ Line BACHY – BOURGHELLES. Relieved by French and withdrew to G.H.Q reserve at AUBERS.
24th MAY
Arrive at MESPLAUX. Units to billeting aera for 3 hours. Defence of LA BASSEE Canal. Headquarters moved to I’EPINETTE.
25th to 27th MAY
Battle of LA BASSEE Canal (BOIS DE PAQUEAUT – LE CORNET MALO - LES GATIGNIES). Headquarters at I’EPINETTE till 1100 hrs 27th MAY, when it moved to LESTREM, thence North of R. LYS to North of ESTAIRES.
28th MAY
a.m. – Withdrawal to line POPERINGHE – WATOU.
p.m. - Withdrawal on to DUNKIRK.
29th to 30th MAY
At TETEGHEM collecting remnants for the defence of ‘Last Ditch’.
31st MAY
0330 hrs – Embarked for England in H.M.S ‘IVANHOE’. Arrived DOVER 0800 hrs and dispersed to collecting area camps.
ORDER OF BATTLE 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE.
10th to 30th MAY.
OFFICERS.
Brigade Commander Brigadier E.G. Warren
Brigade Major Captain J.A. Grant Peterkin, The Queen’s Own Cameron Highlanders.
Staff Captain Captain R.M. Allen, The Royal Norfolk Regiment
Comd.4 A. Tk.Coy Captain P.L.H. Stragham, The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
Bde Signal Offr Captain A.W. Damon, Royal Corps of Signals.
Bde Tpt Offr Captain J.D. Gibbon, The Border Regiment.
Bde Int. Offr Captain F. Fitch, (Missing from 27/5), Royal Norfolk Regiment
Bde R.A.S.C. Offr Captain C.L.A. Hall, Royal Army Service Corps.
Bde O.M.E. Lieut. J.G. Johnstone- Hall, Royal Army Ordnance Corp.
French L.Os Lieut. Mousset, 13i eme Tirailleurs. Agent de Liaison F. Gazelle. Agent de Liaison D. Dreyfus.
Battalion L.Os Lieut. Carpenter, (Missing from 27/5), The Royal Scots.
2/Lieut. C.C. Swainson, 2nd Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
2/Lieut. N.S. Clarke, (Missing 27/5). 1/8 Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers.
W.Os and N.C.Os
Bde Ord, W.O S/Cdr. Francis, Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
Chief Clerk S/Sgt. H. Ayrton, Royal Army Service Corps.
Intelligence Sgt Sgt. D. Risdon, The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
Transport Sergeant Sgt. A. J. Wearing, The Border Regiment.
Commanding Officers and Adjts of Bns in 4th Infantry Brigade.
1st Bn. The Royal Scots.
Commanding Officer Lieut-Col. H.D.K. Money, (Wounded 27/5).
Adjutant Captain (A/Major) J. Bruce, (Missing 27/5).
2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment
Commanding Officer Lieut-Col. G.P. St C. de Wilton, (Returned U.K. sick 18/5).
Lieut-Col. N.P. Charlton. (Wounded 20/5).
Major L.C.D. Ryder. (Missing 27/5).
Adjutant. Major F.R. Marshall. (Wounded 20/5).
Captain C.W.H. Long. (Missing 27/5).
1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers.
Commanding Officer Major Gardiner - till 13May.
Lieut-Col. Stayner from 2nd Bn.
The Dorsetshire Regiment. (Missing 27/5).
Adjutant Major F.S. Eaton (Missing 27/5).
HEADQUARTERS, 4th INFANTRY BRIGADE. WAR DIARY.
ROSULT.
1st MAY.
Normal routine. 1st Bn. The Border Regiment played 1st Bn The Royal Scots at Rugby; the former won 9-0. A farewell match, after which officers of The Border Regiment entertained other officers of the Brigade.
2nd MAY.
Advance party of 1/8th Lancashire Fusiliers arrived to take over from the 1st Bn The Border Regiment . Brigade Commander sited reserve A,Tk. ditch with Os. C. 16th Field Regiment and 13th A. Tk. Regiment, R.A.
3rd MAY.
Major-General H.C. Loyd, D.S.O. ; M.C. ; Commander, 2nd Division, addressed The Border Regiment on leaving the Division,; the Brigade Commander attended . The officers of The Border Regiment were entertained by the Brigade Staff in the Brigade Mess in the evening. The Divisional Commander with the G.1., and the A.A. & Q.M.G. and many other officers attended.
4th MAY.
The Border Regiment left ROSULT station for COMINES where they were to join 42nd Division (125th Infantry Brigade). Pipers of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and many officers saw them off. 1/8th Bn. The Lancashire Fusiliers (Lieut. Colonel Bird) arrived at ROSULT station at 1950 hrs and marched to their billets. The road party (complete transport) arrived at 1400 hrs.
5th MAY
Nothing to report.
6th MAY
The Commander- in- Chief, Lord Gort, visited the Headquarters and discussed various matters with the Brigade Commander. He afterwards visited the forward battalion areas where he met both C.Os. Normal routine was maintained. In the evening, the Brigade Commander addressed officers, W.Os & Sgts of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, welcoming them to 4th Infantry Brigade.
7th MAY .
Nothing to report.
8th MAY.
The Brigade Commander visited 2nd Bn. The Royal Norfolk Regiment to watch embussing exercise near BERSEE. He also visited a guard found by the same unit at BOUVIGNIES.
The Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major attended a conference at Headquarters, 2nd Division in the evening. The proposed move of 2nd Division to the ARMENTIERES area was discussed.
9th MAY.
Nothing to report.
10th MAY.
At 0415 hrs Air Raid Warning ‘RED’ was followed by the sound of A.A. firing from the direction of DOUAI. Later, German planes were seen heading from BELGIUM. At 0445 hrs the warning ‘DAVID’ was received, this meant that a precautionary period had begun and that the Brigade was at 6 hrs notice to move. It was announced on the wireless that HOLLAND and BELGIUM had both been invaded by GERMANY. Action was immediately taken for the putting into operation of Plan ‘D’, and at 1100 hrs, a zero hr of 1300 hrs was given from 2 Div. This was the hour at which the leading troops were to cross the frontier. The head of the Brigade was timed to cross some 8½ hours later. The day was spent destroying all papers and documents, etc., no longer required and making final preparations.
The preparations for this project worked out well and the Brigade was soon ready to move, except that the troop carrying Coy allotted to the Brigade was held up by delay-action bombs at DOULLENS on its way from AMIENS area and it was not until 2000 hrs that definite news that they were to be in time, reached the Brigade Commander.
The Brigadier, the Brigade Int. Offr. and the Bn Commanders, left Brigade Headquarters at 2115 hrs and crossed the frontier at 2145 hrs. There was considerable air activity in the area of the S.P. but no bombs were dropped in the immediate vicinity. One GERMAN plane was brought down within 500 yds of the S.P. There was very little moon and in spite of a very black night, the Brigade ‘R’ Group, reached the R. DYLE by 0430 hrs and the Brigade Commander started to make his recce.
The Brigade followed behind, crossing the S.P. at PONT CAILLOUX at 2330 hrs. The move throughout was well organised and everything went according to plan. The success of the ‘Police Lights’ on the side of the road at every corner made movement simple and it was difficult for anyone to lose his way.
The distance from ROSULT to the R. DYLE was about 67 miles and all transport arrived safely with the exception of two M.Cs.
The Belgium people throughout the advance showed all outward signs of enthusiasm and appeared to welcome the British troops.
11th MAY. – TOMBEEK.
The Brigade moved up during the night and took up position covering the whole of the Divisional front with three battalions forward in accordance with Plan ‘D’ – 1st Bn The Royal Scots …RIGHT; 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers …CENTRE; 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment … LEFT. (4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 1 issued at 1230 hrs attached at Appx. ‘A’ and trace). The Brigadier held a conference at 2100 hrs and Operation Order No. 2 was issued. This operation order covered the handing over of the LEFT half of the Divisional front to 6th Infantry Brigade and the sidestepping of 2 Norfolk to Brigade Reserve (Appx ‘B’ and trace attached). This was according to Plan ‘D ‘. At this conference the Brigadier announced that he had received a report that the Germans had reached TONGRES and were advancing towards HANNUT and that the Belgium Corps H.Q. had not been heard of. During the whole of this day, the Brigade tried to make contact with the French on our right but were not successful. It was afterwards discovered that the French move forward of the 2 D.I.N.A. had been delayed. Their advanced elements did not reach the R. DYLE till next day. It was reported later in the evening that the D.L.M. were at HUPPAYE. There was considerable air activity throughout the day and one bomb fell within 70 yds of Brigade Headquarters which was temporarily established in a large Chateau close to TOMBEEK, an excellent Headquarters but too obvious a target. Towards evening the roads through WAVRE became crowded with refugees among whom was a very large proportion of Belgium soldiers in lorries.
12th MAY. – CHAMPLES.
6th Infantry Brigade took over, according to plan, and left sector of the Divisional front; 4th Infantry Brigade took over the right sector with 1st Bn The Royal Scots.. RIGHT; 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers .. LEFT ..2 Norfolk went into Brigade reserve. Brigade Headquarters moved to CHAMPLES. 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers both contracted their fronts so that each hold half of the Brigade front. There was considerable air activity throughout the day and bombs were dropped in front of the F.D.Ls and at X Rds in the rear; there were no casualties. The situation, although very obscure in front, seemed to improve during the day. Contact with the enemy was not made and little information was obtainable.
A bomb struck the Headquarter office of the H.Q. Coy of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots but beyond minor wounds, no casualties resulted.
There was a scare of gas during the afternoon but no confirmation was obtainable. It was reported later, that the scare was caused through an ammonia factory catching fire. Work during the day was carried on as quickly as possible to strengthen the existing defences made by the Belgians. They consisted chiefly of isolated pillboxes for which great difficulty was found in getting keys and many of them had to be broken open.
Contact with 2 D.I.N.A. on the right was made and two international posts were established, containing British and French personnel, each being commanded by an officer. The Brigade Liaison Agents formed part of the garrison. British personnel were provided by 1st Bn The Royal Scots.
The position could have been made very strong given time, and although the enemy had good observation from the high ground on the far side, the heights on our side gave our artillery excellent O.Ps.
All bridges were prepared for demolition and some minor ones were blown during the evening. Patrols were active during the night from AISEMONT to GASTUCHE in front of the large wood at BOIS DE LONGCHAMPS. No sign of the enemy was seen..
13th MAY.
Digging and consolidation proceeded. Wire and other R.E. stores had been received during the night. All the bridges in WAVRE with the exception of two which were prepared but were to be left till last until 4/7 D.G. had retired over them, were blown. The Divisional Commander visited the front and asked for the town of WAVRE to be more strongly prepared. Little air activity. One bomber circled over the area but dropped no bombs. At 2230 hrs, the Divisional Liaison Officer reported that 4/7 D.G. would be crossing the R. DYLE through WAVRE and that the French D.L.M. wished to come through as well. No information was known about the enemy. The result of this was that on the bridges in the Brigade sector, all of which were ready for demolition, and R.E. and an infantry officer were posted with a French Liaison Officer and were ordered to stand by to blow up the bridges as soon as 4/7 D.G. had passed and any of the D.L.M. which were immediately behind them. That night all outposts were withdrawn and only one section of Carriers left in front of the bridges to give warning of enemy approach. Patrols were again active along the front but contact was not made.
Owing to the evacuation of the civil population, much livestock was to be seen in the fields in a pitiful condition. No plans for the collection of the stranded animals were made and much valuable livestock was left to the enemy. No attempt was made as far as could be seen to utilise the civilian resources of the country which might have been more useful had the campaign lasted a little longer.
There was increased rearward movement of both armed and unarmed Belgian troops through the sector. No organised attempt was made to collect those with arms, chiefly because their officers seemed to have a semblance of an order to take their troops to the North of BRUSSELS where the shattered 7th Belgian Corps was to reform.
14th MAY
Lieut-Col H.D.K. Money, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, reported that one Sqn of 4/7 D.Gs passed over his bridge instead of the bridge in 6th Infantry Brigade area. The Sqn Commander told Lieut-Col Money that as far as he knew, the other two Sqns had passed over the other bridge and all the vehicles were over the river. He said he had seen an officer of the D.L.M. who said all D.L.M. were over the river. It was reported that the whole of the 12th Lancers had reached this side of the river. The 4/7 D.G. had not been in contact with the enemy, but whose near approach was now confirmed by a Liaison Officer from the 12th Lancers who came in from them on his way to G.H.Q. The authority to blow bridges had by this time, delegated to Brigade Commanders; on the Brigade front, the Brigadier further delegated the authority to the forward Bn Commanders. As it was obvious that enemy mechanised forces in considerable strength were approaching, O.C., 1st Bn The Royal Scots decided to blow up the bridge at WAVRE. Meanwhile, orders from the Corps Commander were given to the Brigade Commander by the G.1. that aerial recce having shown that there were no enemy advancing in this sector, outposts would be re-established and bridges would not be blown. Before this message could be sent to the 1st Bn The Royal Scots, the bridge at WAVRE had been blown. The 4/7 D.G were ordered to send a Sqn back over the river to re-establish the outpost line about DION LEVAL. 4/7 D.G. crossed over the bridge at Bse WAVRE which was the only bridge not blown, to carry out a recce of the other side, at about 1400 hrs. During the afternoon, intercepted wireless messages showed that the 4/7 D.G. had made contact and were being slowly driven back . At about 1900 hrs. the D.Gs returned over the bridge less one vehicle which had to be abandoned, and the bridge was blown. That evening, considerable enemy concentrations of light armoured vehicles were seen but no attempt was made to approach in strength until about 2228 hrs. An enemy attack was launched and the S.O.S. was fired by 1/8 Bn Lancashire Fusiliers. 16th Field Regiment, brought down D.F. fire at 2230 hrs which neutralised a mortar post, and by 2345 hrs, the attack ceased. There was no reply to our artillery fire, except the Mortars which were silenced, WAVRE was set on fire by incendiary bombs and two A.Tk. gun positions had to be abandoned and alternative positions taken up. After the attack had been repulsed, the rest of the night was fairly quiet. The enemy attack was launched between the posts held by the two forward Bns.
Major D.J.P.P. Stayner, Dorsetshire Regiment, was selected to command 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers. He reported for duty this evening. He took over from Major Gardiner, who had commanded since Lieut-Col. Bird left for the U.K.
15th MAY.
During the day, enemy were seen on the Brigade front but no attack was made. The enemy, however, attacked the French on our right and 6th Infantry Brigade on our left. They lost two forward positions at the South end of the BOIS DE LAURENSART, as a result of which a Platoon of the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were ordered to move to the left flank to hold the high ground at BOIS DIT LE BOOK. 6th Infantry Brigade counter-attacked and re-established two posts about 1300 hrs. This second attack was launched between Brigades but the brunt was taken by 6th Infantry Brigade. The third attack was launched between the French and the British. This attack was greater in strength and as the 2 D.I.N.A. had by this time moved back off the line of the R. DYLE to the high ground about LA HAIE it was clear that the right flank of the Brigade was in danger. The artillery kept up a practically continuous fire both on our front and also on that of the French, so as to assist them. During the afternoon a report was received that BIERGES had been over-run and that the French were retreating. All arrangements were made to cover the right flank and Brigade Headquarters was organised for defence. Lieut-Col Money sent an officer in a Carrier to investigate. This officer, Captain Kerr, reported that all was quiet and that the French were not even being attacked in that area. There was continual aerial activity throughout the day but no bombing. At 1930 hr. orders were received to withdraw. A conference was held at 2100 hrs and bns received their orders for taking up a defensive position on the R. LASNE, the forward bns withdrew through the reserve Bn which held itself in readiness in case there was an attack through the right flank. ‘C’ Company, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reinforced by the Brigade carriers and two D.G. vehicles, retired last. These two vehicles were a section of the 4/7 D.G. that had become detached. As the present whereabouts of the Divisional Cavalry Regiment was not known, they were retained in the case of emergency. The other vehicle of the section was ditched and had to be destroyed.
The withdrawal was carried out successfully, though the Brigade was in close contact with the enemy when it started to withdraw. As soon as the last troops were over the R. DENDRE, the bridges at TOMBEEK and ROSIERES were blown. ROSIERES bridge was not wholly demolished but it was covered by fire from the Brigade Anti-tank Company and finished off later in the day.
A Brigade reserve ammunition dump had been formed whilst holding this position. It was unfortunately sited on the forward side of the R. LASNE and a very large quantity of the ammunition and stores had to be abandoned.
16th MAY. - BAEKENBOSCH
The orders for the occupation of the position on the R. LASNE are at Appx. ‘C’.
The enemy did not appear until 1400 hrs.in front of the R. LASNE and the day was spent digging in and making positions secure. Throughout the day there was constant rumours and reports of a break-through on the right but no confirmation could be obtained. There was some aerial activity but no bombs were dropped. The Germans engaged several of our lone recce planes and at least three were brought down.
The position was a very bad one for a defensive battle, the enemy having complete observation of the obstacle which was not of much value. Once again there was difficulty over the blowing of the bridges. The one at ROSIERES in the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers area was not destroyed by the initial charge and it was not until 1930 hrs. that an R.E. officer arrived to arrange its destruction. Unfortunately, his truck with tools, men and explosives got lost and so this bridge was not, in fact, ever properly destroyed.
At 1730 hrs orders were received to withdraw again, this time to take up a position behind the HAL-BRUSSELS Canal. The Brigade Commander attended a conference at Division and when he returned he held a conference at which he informed the Bns that the Brigade would not halt on this canal, but would be taken after crossing the canal, in busses to a billeting area near GRAMMONT. Notes for the withdrawal were immediately amended to cover the entire distance to be travelled. It was normally the case that there was no time to issue written orders. Attemps (sic attempts) were always made to issue route cards to each driver but the instructions (Note 1 to Appx ‘C’), seemed to help Bns although they were not always absolutely correct, as they were typed during the time the Brigade Commander was at the conference. The Brigade once again withdrew under enemy fire and observation and there was much enemy shelling when the Brigade commenced to withdraw at about 2230 hrs. The Brigade moved by march route through the FORET DE SOIGNES where the Brigade Commander waited to see all Bns safely through. Marching columns and transport were all mixed up together and in the complete blackness of the forest, many men and vehicles got lost. It was quite impossible to follow the route on the map as many new roads had been made.
17th MAY.
All Brigade columns became very mixed and in varying degrees lost. The Brigade Commander himself was taken nearly as far as BRUSSELS and finally crossed the canal at RUYS-BROECK instead of LOTH which was to be the Brigade R.V. At the X Rds just over the bridge, an indescribable mass of transport was mixed up - particularly complicated because it was on a main road out of BRUSSELS which was being evacuated next morning. The Brigadier and the Brigade Major spent most of the day acting as traffic policemen and collecting the Brigade as it arrived. The Bns were put into three orchards where a hot meal was issued to them.
At about 1500 hrs enough busses were collected to take the Brigade back to GRAMMONT. The Brigade moved by Bns and after escaping considerable enemy bombing, reached GEOFFERDINGE where they had a good night’s rest, the Bns being extremely tired after a long and tiring march the day and night previous.
Late that night, the Divisional Commander and the G.1. arrived with the orders for the occupation of the R. DENDRE position. Brigade Operation Order No.3 (Appx ‘D’) was issued under considerable difficulty, as all ranks of the Brigade Staff were extremely tired and continually dropped off to sleep.
Bns were to find post on all the Brs in the area at once and the Commanding Officers to have completed the recce of their areas by 0600 hrs, when they were to meet the Brigade Commander.
Major N.P Charlton, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment took over command of his Bn, vice Lt Lieut-Col G.P. St. C. de Wilton, who was evacuated sick.
18th MAY- GEOFFERDINGE.
The Brigade Commander started his recce at 0430 hrs and met the Divisional Commander at 0700 hrs. The Brigade had occupied the position by 1030 hrs and had started to dig in. A confirmatory Operation Order was issued that morning (Appx ‘E’).
All bridges were prepared for demolition.
Brigade Headquarters moved to EVERBECQ.
Grammont throughout the day was undefended except for three section posts found by 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment on the bridges and it was not until about 1300 hrs that information was received that the 6th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders under Co. Stewart were being sent up to garrison the town. They took over the posts at about 1730 hrs.
At 1530 hrs, orders were received that a further withdrawal was to take place that night and at 1930 hrs the Brigade Major was ordered to attend a Divisional conference for orders. Brigadier Davidson, C.R.A. 1 Corps, was now acting as Divisional Commander, General Loyd having been evacuated sick. Orders were not completed by 2100 hrs, when it was decided Brigadiers should meet at Headquarters 5th Infantry Brigade for a further conference from which the Brigade Commander did not return until nearly 0010 hrs. Reports had been received that enemy infantry and A.F.Vs had been seen on the right of the Brigade front.
No attack was made and the forward Bns reported all quiet. This position was a very strong defensive position and the troops of the Brigade were at a loss to understand why they were once again being withdrawn, without showing the enemy what they were made of.
During the evening a report was received from the 6th Bn The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders that the bridges in GRAMMONT were not properly demolished. This was verified and it was found that one bridge – a newly built one and very strong – was still open for traffic of all kinds. As it was vital that this bridge should be demolished prior to the withdrawal, Lieut-Col. Tyler, Commanding 16th Field Regiment, R.A., ordered one of his guns to be taken forward to destroy the bridge by direct fire. 50 rounds were fired from a distance of 80 yds; 47 hits were registered and the bridge was rendered useless.
A rear-guard under Lieut-Col. Lumsden, Commanding, 12th Lancers, was formed to cover the Divisional front. The Carriers of the Brigade together with ‘D’ Company, 2nd Bn. The Manchester Regiment (under Captain Wolsley who was severely wounded in the withdrawal next morning), and a Sqn of the 4/7 D.Gs was to hold the Brigade front until noon the next day.
The Brigade once more withdrew in the face of the enemy, again without loss.
Strange to relate, the rear-guard also did not have much difficulty next morning. The enemy did not appear to realise that only a small force was holding him.
There were a large number of parachute scares this day: one man captured reported to have been seen by “someone else” was clothed as a priest. He was found in suspicious circumstances and was sent to Headquarters, 2nd Division.
What his fate was, was never heard.
19th MAY – FROIDMONT.
The withdrawal from R. DENDRE was successfully carried out. Transport moved away very slowly as at least three Divisions were using the same road, and one Brigade of another Division actually embussed on the road, holding up all traffic for at least 35 minutes.
Owing to the congestion in RENAIX caused by refugees, the column was held up for several hours. Busses which were returning to pick up the Brigade were very late in arriving and Bns started the withdrawal on foot. The Brigade Commander commandeered 10 busses, the drivers of which did not know where they had to report, and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were picked up by them and taken as far as RENAIX. The busses then returned and with the Brigade Commander as guide, picked up the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and took them to FROIDMONT; whilst embussing, 1st Bn The Royal Scots were spotted and heavily bombed by some 50 enemy planes who scored no hits. By this time, the busses which should have lifted the Brigade had been found and the rest of the Brigade was taken to FROIDMONT.
The Brigade passed through or in fact round TOURNAI which had been heavily bombed by the Germans. It was, in parts in flames, and great damage had been done. The centre of the city was impassible.
On arrival, the Brigade went into billets and had a good night’s rest which was well appreciated. The transport lines were bomb but nothing was hit.
Late that evening, the G.1 spoke on the wireless to the Brigade Major, saying that a Bn was required from the Brigade to search for snipers who had been firing at the D.Rs.As the country was thickly populated with civilians, and very many troops billeted there, it was not considered possible. The Brigade Major was sent to Divisional Headquarters to inform them of the difficulties and whilst he was there, three shots rang out. The instant arrival of enemy snipers was expected but it turned out to be the officer’s mess cook killing a young suckling pig for the officer’s dinner!
No further search for snipers took place!
20th MAY.
During the morning orders were received that the Brigade was to take over a defensive position on the line of the R. ESCAUT from 48th Division.
A recce was to be made as far as possible, without disclosing the relief, and with this object in view, the Brigadier and the Brigade Major, together with the Commanding Officers of all Company and Platoon Commanders, rendezvous’d at ST MAUR to see in daylight what they were to take over.
There was considerable difficulty in determining the actual areas to be taken over as the boundaries of 2nd Division and 48th Division did not coincide, further it was obvious that no detailed recce in daylight was possible.
The 143rd Infantry Brigade whom the 4th Infantry Brigade were to relieve, had been attacking during the morning and had received some casualties; their Headquarters at ST MAUR was heavily shelled.
Several stragglers of the units of this Brigade were kept to assist the 1st Bn The Royal Scots when discovered next morning.
The Brigade Commander issued orders for the relief which was to commence at 2115 hrs and to be completed by 0300 hrs. This in fact, was achieved, as no serious interference was met whilst taking over this position. 4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 5 (Appx ‘F’) gives details of the position.
At 1600 hrs a report was received that 70 civilians had crossed the river at CALONNE and had barricaded themselves into some houses and fired on anyone approaching. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment were ordered forward at short notice to check any further infiltrations if necessary and with this in view, they marched out of FROIDMONT and took up position of assembly in a wood behind ST MAUR. The 5th Infantry Brigade also sent one Bn (The Cameron Highlanders) but their assistance was not called for by the 48th Division.
By 2359 hrs, the Brigade was in position with all three Bns in the line – RIGHT …1st Bn The Royal Scots at WARNAFFLES FM; CENTRE … 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers at ring contour 20; LEFT … 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment at CHATEAU DE COUCOU.
Brigade Headquarters moved from FROIDMONT to BARGES where a very suitable Headquarters in some cottages was set up. There was much enemy bombing over the villages surrounding TOURNAI – in all cases they were attempting to block the roads but only in one place where a direct hit smashed a house on to a road, had any clearance work to be done.
Considerable difficulty was also experienced by the Signal Section in keeping line communications through on the position owing to the continual breaks caused by enemy shelling.
The Brigade Commander was informed that night that it was the intension of the B.E.F. to “stand and fight” on this position.
21st MAY – BARGES.
The enemy attacked from across the canal on the whole front at 0440 hrs; the S.O.S. was fired by the right Coy of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and artillery fire was immediately brought to bear. The enemy used shrapnel and mortar fire very effectively and followed this up with intense M.G. fire. A report was received that the enemy had broken through in the centre, and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment immediately organised a counter-attack which was successful. A Platoon of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers combed the whole area where the enemy were reported to be, immediately after the counter-attack. The enemy also crossed the river beyond CALONNE at ANTOING where they found little opposition. They established themselves and threatened the right flank of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots. A counter-attack was made but without success; two further counter-attacks were made by 1st Bn The Royal Scots and Carrier Pls of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment; they were unsuccessful. It was not possible to do more as 1st Bn The Royal Scots had suffered large casualties. In spite of being hard pressed and considerably weakened, both flank Bns were able to hold out. A Bn of the 6th Infantry Brigade (Royal Welch Fusiliers) was placed under command of 4th Infantry Brigade at about 1400 hrs with the object of a night counter-attack to clear this position. Recce was made and an order issued but the attack was cancelled by 2nd Division at about 2130 hrs. A copy of this order is attached at Appx ‘G’. Throughout this day, The Royal Scots were continually in action and at all times gave a good account of themselves. They were throughout, heavily shelled and “mortared” and had considerable difficulty in getting casualties away.
Their stand on the right flank, simplified the task of 6th Infantry Brigade and on the right where the Cameron Highlanders were working up the side of the river in order to cut off the enemy in CALONNE.
Early that morning, about 0630 hrs, the mess that the Staff Captain had found – a most suitable cottage with all the necessary equipment – was wrecked by a direct hit, luckily the mess staff were none the worse. The mess was then changed to a more healthy surrounding. Two men of the Brigade staff were injured that morning as a result of the heavy shelling. It was perhaps a good lesson as all ranks were most casual about the way in which they went about the Headquarters whilst aeroplanes were up.
Nearly all the casualties during the day had been caused by mortar fire. The enemy continued to attack throughout the day and intensified the attack after nightfall. It was reported that the enemy had broken through between the 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers front; re-enforcements were called for from The Durham Light Infantry but owing to the effective artillery barrage laid down, were not committed and by morning the situation was well in hand.
Once again, rumours and exaggerated reports were to the fore. All reports that the enemy had broken through were proved to be false, and on the situation being cleared up, no enemy casualties were discovered, though much firing had taken place.
From reports received at Brigade Headquarters, it was possible to expect the enemy at close quarters at any moment. In fact they were never within a thousand yards.
22nd MAY.
Brigadier N.M.S. Irwin, D.S.O., M.C., Commander, 6th Infantry Brigade took over the command of the 2nd Division vice Brigadier Davidson who had been acting temporarily since the evacuation of General Loyd.
The morning was very quiet, the enemy being content to sit and watch. He was evidently concentrating his efforts against the French on our right. A certain amount of movement could be seen but no attempt at any infiltration forward was made.
Brigade Headquarters, owing to spasmodic shelling, moved 500 yds forward into a disused cement factory where ample protection against shelling was to be found.
The enemy was still active in CALONNE but were kept subjected to heavy fire from the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and The Cameron Highlanders on their right and by the 16th Field Regiment.
At about 1700 hrs an order was received, in spite of the “stand and fight” message, that the Division was to withdraw to the ‘GORT’ Line – the area allotted to 4th Infantry Brigade being BACHY-BOURGHELLES. As soon as it was dark, the withdrawal was to commence. It was to be by march route (14 miles) and this time, for the first time, no congestion of any kind occurred. The morale of the troops was very high though they had had ten days of hard fighting and continual movement.
They could not understand why they could not stand and fight on the good obstacles. There was a feeling that the British Army was running away.
4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No. 7 (Appx. ‘H’) was issued to cover this withdrawal. It was the only occasion during the withdrawal that there was time to issue a written order for the move; it is not considered in the light of previous experience, that a written order is necessary. Verbal instructions to commanders or their representatives on all occasions worked satisfactorily and at no time did a Commanding Officer require confirmation of instructions given at a conference.
Much office work can thus be avoided and therefore enables Commanders and staff to visit their troops more often. Every opportunity was taken for doing this.
The Brigade Commander waited at ERE to see the Brigade out. No enemy interference was encountered, thanks chiefly to the good work of the supporting artillery which kept up a continuous harassing fire to cover the withdrawal.
The route back to the Brigade to within three miles from where it had started only 12 days before – a withdrawal of 64 miles having been completed in six days.
It was about 0230 hrs when the last man passed through a rearguard of the 4/7 D.G. supported by the carriers of 6th Infantry Brigade.
The casualties in the Brigade up to this date, were 20 officers and 500 other ranks. The Royal Scots had the heaviest casualties as they were responsible for the defence of WAVRE and also encountered, stopped and counter-attacked the enemy opposite CALONNE.
23rd MAY.
The Brigade arrived in the early morning at BACHY and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers immediately manned the blockhouses on the ‘GORT’ Line on the part that which had been built by 1st Division, i.e., BACHY – HELL FIRE CORNER – BOURGHELLES. 1st Bn The Royal Scots were in position on the Divisional reserve line about GORIEUX. Headquarters was established one mile East of BOURGHELLES.
It was discovered on arrival that a section of machine guns from ‘D’ ‘Coy. 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment did not receive the order to retire on the previous night. Their Coy Commander, Captain Churchill at once returned to the front to find them, which he did successfully, only being sniped at at long range. This was about 0900 hrs and so the enemy had made no attempt to follow up the withdrawal. The rear-guard was not molested in any way.
This was a temporary move only as it was known that during the night the French were to take over this line and that the Brigade was to go back into reserve, having been in the front line ever since the move forward to the R. DYLE.
At 1400 hrs the French Regiment of Zouavres commenced to take over this line and orders were received from 2nd Division at 1700 hrs for the Brigade to move back into the area around AUBERS. A bus column of 26 lorries was placed at the disposal of the Brigade and it was arranged that the 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1 Coy each of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers and the transport of Brigade Headquarters under Lieut-Col Money, should move first, the busses returning to pick up the remainder of the Brigade at midnight. As was usual, congestion on the road delayed the return of the busses and it was daylight on the 24th May before the busses returned for the remainder of the Brigade, the position being evacuated without any enemy interference. The Divisional Instruction is attached at Appx. ‘J’.
At approximately 1700 hrs, the Carrier Pls of 4th Infantry Brigade under 2/Lieut Edie, 1st Bn The Royal Scots were taken to augment POLFORCE, a force under Brigadier Findlay, C.R.A., 2nd Division , which had been got together rapidly to occupy a portion of the LA BASSEE Canal , which was to be held against any further enemy penetration to the North. 2nd Division Instructions at Appx. ‘K’.
N.B. Up to this point in the narrative, notes written by the Intelligence Officer daily, were available; they have been expanded from the memories of individual officers. From 24th May to the embarkation at DUNKIRK, the narrative has been compiled from the memory and Appendices which the Brigade Major managed to bring home.
24th MAY.
The bus column largely owing to the lack of large scale maps in possession of the officers and other ranks, very soon became split up among the other columns on the road, and it was actually about 1100 hrs before the Brigade began to concentrate in the area around NEUVE CHAPPELLE, where the India War Memorial had been badly damaged by German bombing. The Brigade Headquarters concentration area was MESPLAUX; 1st Bn The Royal Scots …ESSARS; 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment….LESGATIGNIES; 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers…RUE d’EPINETTE.
The column was bombed during periods of congestion but luckily no damage was done to any of the Brigade transport. Practically before the Brigade was in billets, an order came that 2nd Division, as soon as it had had its mid-day meal, was to take up and prepare a position on the Canal AIRE – LA BASSEE. Notwithstanding the fact that the Brigade was expecting a short rest, the Bns quickly moved up to their sectors of the Canal and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, who were on the right, very quickly reported that they were in position. On the left 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers. were in position, having been attached to 4th Infantry Brigade from 25th Infantry Brigade. They held the salient opposite BETHUNE from SEVELINGUE to GORRE. 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers were in reserve respectively at CALONNE and EPINETTE. Brigade Headquarters was established in a farm at MESPLAUX. (4th Infantry Brigade Operation Order No.8 attached at Appx ‘L’.) The Divisional Warning Order and the Operation Order issued at 1810 hrs that evening are at Appendices ‘M’ and ‘N’. They show that 2nd Division was to hold a front of 21 miles of which the 4th Infantry Brigade had 6 miles, including the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT and the BETHUNE Salient.
Late in the afternoon, 1st Bn The Royal Scots reported that a post on the bridge in front of ESSARS had been captured, but Lieut-Col Money quickly reorganised a counter-attack, and although some losses were suffered, this post was recaptured and handed back to the 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers.
In the evening, the Brigade Commander decided that he would move his H.Q.to EPINETTE so as to be more centrally placed within the sector. The move was successfully carried out at 2300 hrs and Brigade Headquarters was established in a farm in this village.
The positions as occupied on the night 24/25 May are shown on the trace attached at Appx. ‘O’.
25th MAY.
Brigade Headquarters at l’EPINETTE was on the edge of MERVILLE Aerodrome on which were several burnt out British and French planes. There was also immense stores of abandoned ammunition and petrol, much of which was salved by the R.A.S.C.
At 0500 hrs 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 1st Bn Royal Irish Fusiliers reported contact with the enemy along the LA BASSEE Canal.
At 0800 hrs 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers reported that enemy had captured the bridge-head opposite BETHUNE, and much movement was observed opposite SEVELINGUE. Two Pls of reserve Company Royal Irish Fusiliers and Carriers of the Bn went forward to clarify the position but failed to drive the enemy back over the canal. Little flanking liaison had seemed as yet, to have been obtained, Bns and Coys being in most cases, still isolated bodies of troops. The difficulty of the ground, the lack of time for a proper recce and the scarcity of maps being responsible.
Situation was quiet except for signs of enemy recce.
There was intense aerial activity during the morning but little bombing or machine-gunning took place.
At 1300 hrs an Anti-tank gun position on the main road from BETHUNE was fired on by machine guns of 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment in the 1st Bn The Royal Scots area and it was seen that the gun crew was successfully put out of action. The situation in the afternoon became more complicated and Officer Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported that infiltrations were taking place in the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT and that he was not in touch with 6th Infantry Brigade on his right nor with 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers on his left.
At 1400 hrs information was received that the carriers attached to POLFORCE were returning. They reported back but were still more depleted, but yet a useful force.
At 1500 hrs a section of carriers from 1st Bn The Royal Scots and a Platoon of M.Gs from 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment were ordered to come in to support of 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment on the right flank, and the Brigade Commander warned Lieut-Col Money to order his Bn to be prepared to move out from CALONNE to PARADIS . The Brigadier also ordered Lieut-Col Stayner, 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers to be prepared to take up a position in the centre, covering CORNET ST MALO and gave orders that liaison with the flanks must be obtained. One Coy 1/8th The Lancashire Fusiliers was to move to CORNET ST MALO forthwith.
At 1745 hrs a liaison officer of 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers arrived and said that they were being relieved that evening. No official information of this move had been received at Brigade Headquarters but the G.1 at Division gave confirmation on the telephone that this was correct. Thus plans had to be changed. 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers were ordered to relieve 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers that evening, relief being actually completed next morning, 1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers reverting to 125th Infantry Brigade. 1st Bn The Royal Scots were ordered to move forward in reserve around PARADIS.
It was realised at this time that the situation on the 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk front was unstable. Reports came in that Companies were not in touch with each other and that there were gaps in the line. Major Ryder, now commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, went up to clear the situation but it was not until late in the night before touch between the Royal Norfolk Coys was satisfactorily gained.
It turned out that, probably owing to the lack of maps, a Coy had taken up position on the wrong canal. They were eventually shifted back, to play a large part in the battle which was to come.
A sample of the maps that were being used by Coy and Platoon Commanders is at Appx. ‘P’. This particular one was the only one a Platoon Commander of 1st Bn The Royal Scots had for the forthcoming battle.
Brigade Headquarters issued a tracing which it was hoped would help commanders – only four 1/25,000 were available for each Bn.
During the evening, the enemy was seen to be dropping supplies from the air and the aerial activity was maintained.
Many rumours and exaggerated reports were received at Brigade Headquarters throughout the day. All ranks were content to take reports of enemy activity from N.C.Os of other regiments and arms, without making any attempt to see if they were true. Many troops turned about because an N.C.O. of the Field Ambulance had been reported to say that the enemy were in VIEILLE CHAPELLE. No enemy were in fact within 2 miles of that place at the time.
In support of the Brigade in this position, owing to the fact that the 16th Field Regt had been taken away to join POLFORCE, was 61st Medium Regiment (Lieut-Col Fitzhughes); ‘D’ Coy 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment under Captain Churchill had one Pl with each forward Bn and one Pl in reserve in PARADIS.
The evening was quiet, the only item of importance being that lines of flame were thrown along the enemy lines at intervals of about 400 yds, from about 0001 to 0100 hrs. It appeared that these flames might have been guiding lights for aircraft which were still fairly active.
B Echelon was situated North of the Canal de la LYS and spent a comparatively quiet day.
At 1800 hrs, a Coy of French Tirailleurs who were resting at LESTREM volunteered to come to the assistance of 4th Infantry Brigade and moved that night to support 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers on the left. Actually, they took up a position in the 5th Infantry Brigade Area. The main difficulty experienced was to obtain ammunition for them.
The 2nd Division Instruction for this day and situation report for this night are attached at Appendices ‘Q’ and ‘R’.
The lights from the flames of ESTAIRES burning on this night must have been visible for miles.
26th MAY. - EPINETTE
Brigade Headquarters remained at EPINETTE.
A day of tension. Reports were continually coming in all day on enemy concentrations and movements and varied reports that enemy were in large numbers, small numbers, or not at all in the BOKS DE PAQUEAUT. In any case, when the enemy were definitely seen, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment saw that they did not make any progress on this front.
Owing to the length of front held by the Brigade (6 miles), the Brigade Commander decided to move up two Coys of 1st Bn The Royal Scots under Lieut-Col Money to assist 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment.
‘C’ Coy., 6th Bn Argyll & Southerland Highlanders was placed under command and the Coy commander reported to Brigade Headquarters for orders. One Pl was allotted to each forward Bn under command. The Argyll & Sutherland Highlanders Coy Headquarters joined Captain Churchill in EPINETTE.
At 1200 hrs, reports now confirmed that touch had been gained with all Coys within the Brigade and with 2nd Bn The Dorset Regiment at GORRE, but it was impossible to get in touch with 6th Infantry Brigade. It was discovered later, that owing to enemy action, 6th Infantry Brigade were 2 miles away on our right defending ST VENNANT, and there was a large gap through which enemy infiltrations were shortly to take place.
At 1400 hrs forward Coys of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, were in close contact, but all attempts on infiltrations through and around the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT were held up. It was reported at this time that enemy armoured cars had infiltrated on the right flank as far as MERVILLE, where 7th King’s Own, a Pioneer Bn, were finding the garrison.
At 1600 hrs a further French Detachment who were near VIEILLE CHAPELLE came and offered help although they had little or no ammunition. The Brigade Commander decided that they should garrison CALONNE so as to strengthen the right flank. Lieut. Mousset, the senior French Liaison Officer of the Brigade with Captain Gibbon, arranged the move of this French Detachment, which took up a position holding the bridges of CALONNE, that evening.
The Carriers of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment together with a Pl of M.Gs of 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment were moved to fill up the gap between 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment and 6th Infantry Brigade on the right of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT. They took up a flank guard position about RIEZ DE VINAGE.
1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers reported a heavy attack on SEVELINGUE which was partly successful. Local counter attacks failed to clear the enemy from increasing the size of this bridge-head. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported that the enemy could be seen digging in on the hill North of HINGES and artillery fire was brought to bear on them.
That evening, although wireless communication held, communication by line was continuously interrupted by direct and accurate shelling, particularly by Mortars.
There was considerable difficulty at Brigade Headquarters in assessing the actual situation. Reports that light armoured tanks had been seen were reported from 5th Infantry Brigade and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment reported much mechanised movement across the canal in front of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT. Leaflets were dropped in the Brigade area this morning – the text of which is as below (sic):
BRITISH SOLDIERS.
“Germans around! You are encircled! German Troupes invaded COURTRAI, TOURNAI, VALENCIENNES. LILLERS, AIRE, ST OMER are occupied. CALAIS will be taken immediately. Why do you fight further?
Do you really believes this nonsens, that Germans kill their prisoners? Come and see yourselves the contrary!
The match is finished! a fair enemy will be fairly treated.”
At 1800 hrs, the line held by the 4th Infantry Brigade was North edge of the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT – CORNET ST MALO – just North of LES CAULDRONS – GORRE. The situation was quiet that evening up to about 2200 hrs. The message attached at Appx ‘S’ was received at 1800 hrs but as all Bns were in close contact with the enemy, and several Coy Commanders had already become casualties, it was not possible for action to be taken upon it. Bns could not have competed had such personnel been withdrawn.
At 2100 hrs the Brigade Commander attended a conference at Division, as a result of which Officers Commanding all units were warned that a large scale attack was to be expected the following morning and that the Brigade was to hold its ground and fight.
At 2200 hrs a report was received from the 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers that the enemy had broken through their centre. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment also reported an attack through the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT but that they had successfully held it up. Many rumours from the left flank continued to come in and it would appear that the enemy were streaming through. Stragglers arrived at Brigade Headquarters with exaggerated reports, but beyond small infiltrations in the dark, the enemy in fact made little progress.
At 2330 hrs Lieut-Col Stayner, 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, reported by wireless that his Bn with the exception of one Coy with which he could not make contact, was still in position of holding its own.
From 2330 hrs to 0330 hrs the situation remained fairly stable.
The lack of sleep that commanders were getting was now becoming obvious. The necessity for each Headquarters to have its organised rest roster and a’ rest room’ to which officers could go without being disturbed except in the case of an emergency, was most needed.
A sketch of the positions held by the 4th Infantry Brigade and attached troops that evening is at Appx ‘T’.
27th MAY – BATTLE OF EPINETTE.
At 0445 hrs, Captain Churchill, ‘D’ Coy 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment, reported that one of his Pls and six Carriers had been over-run by an A.F.V. attack. This was the first intimation that a general attack with tanks and A.F.Vs over the Brigade front was starting; reports from all fwd Coys started to come in to Brigade Headquarters that heavy infantry attacks with accurate dive bombing were taking place.
From 0500 hrs to 0800 hrs, Bns reported frequently by wireless of the progress of the enemy attack. Because of the A.F.Vs and tanks, Coy localities were soon cut off from Bn Headquarters but all continued to fight on. Owing to the heavy shelling all line communications failed for this time. Enemy action made their maintenance quite impossible.
Lieut-Col Money reported that his Bn and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment were being repeatedly attacked from the BOIS DE PAQUEAUT while Lieut-Col Stayner reported at 0750 hrs that he was cut off from all his Coys except one. Heavy firing was heard at Brigade Headquarters and enemy aircraft were active.
At 0730 hrs, in response to a report on the situation, 2nd Division said that one Bn of the 25th Infantry Brigade were coming to the left of the Brigade area (1st Bn The Royal Irish Fusiliers) and that two 2- pdrs were coming up to PARADIS. Unfortunately, these arrived with little ammunition, but some was soon obtained thanks to the Staff Captain and Captain Hall, R.A.S.C. Some difficulty was experienced on wireless to 2nd Division this morning as they had just moved, and therefore were using ‘F’ procedure. There was also a report that a tank Bn was to arrive in the area shortly. This information was passed to Bns and may have raised their hopes in vain. The remnants of the Tank Bn was used later on the 5th Infantry Brigade front.
The general order was ‘hold on’ and the Brigade was doing this nobly and at no place was any ground given whatsoever.
At 0830 hrs a report came through that light tanks were passing round the right of 1st Bn The Royal Scots and shortly afterwards three were seen on the aerodrome 800 yds to the right of and beyond Brigade Headquarters. They were engaged by a Corporal of the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers Pl which was acting as Brigade Guard, with a Boys (sic Boyes) rifle. The effect of this fire could not be accurately seen. Soon after, three enemy troop-carrying planes landed on the Aerodrome. Machine-gun fire on Brigade Headquarters was also brought to bear from the right and one signal orderly was wounded.
Lieut-Col Money came in to Brigade Headquarters and reported the situation and then collapsed. He had been wounded in the back and was on his way to the A.D.S., having been ordered to leave his Bn by the Medical Officer. He was satisfied that all was as well as could be, though serious infiltrations had been made.
By 0930 hrs, the situation had become ‘hot’ round Brigade Headquarters with a distinct danger of being cut off.
The Brigade Commander ordered the withdrawal of Brigade Headquarters to behind the BETHUNE-ESTAIRES Canal at LESTREM.
Bns were still in continuous wireless touch with Brigade Headquarters and were all confident although by this time surrounded in their localities. Shortly afterwards Brigade Headquarters moved to LESTREM where it remained until the evening. Between 1000 and 1300 hrs, the enemy attack relaxed temporarily but no movement between forward Bns or Coys was possible. Much enemy movement, M.Cs., A.F.Vs., and infantry was observed.
Wireless communication first broke with 1st Bn The Royal Scots. The last message from the acting Commanding Officer, Major J Bruce (Adjt), to the Brigade Major was that his Bn was completely isolated in groups, no intercommunication being possible, but that they were all fighting strongly in their positions. Bn Headquarters was surrounded and they had received many casualties but were giving more than they got, although the enemy had tanks.
At 1430 hrs, the adjutant of 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, Major F.S. Eaton reported that their Bn Headquarters had been set on fire and that they had moved to the next house. Their situation was similar to that of the 1st Bn The Royal Scots., each Coy cut off and Bn Headquarters surrounded, and that they were being subjected to heavy shelling and accurate Mortar fire. They asked continuously for artillery support throughout the day, which the 61st Medium Regiment (Lieut-Col Fitzhughes) gave to their utmost.
Shortly after, Major Eaton reported that their new Headquarters was on fire and that things were very serious and that they were only hanging on with difficulty, and that no touch had been obtained with Coys. Heavy firing from 5th Infantry Brigade area left of GORRE was also reported. (This was the answer to the main tank attack by the enemy on 1st Bn The Cameron Highlanders and 2nd Bn The Dorset Regiment East of GORRE).
From this moment, no further signals from 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers were received, nor would they answer repeated calls from Brigade.
At 1300 hrs, the Brigade Commander got a permissive order from 2nd Division for withdrawal but no R.V. was given. Little or no hope of organised withdrawal in daylight was held out but at 1445 hrs and R.V. – LA NOUVELLE FRANCE – was received and communicated to 2 Norfolk who agreed that no withdrawal was possible till dark. 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment was asked to repeat this information to 1st Bn The Royal Scots, but it was doubtful whether, until it was dark, this could be done. The Brigade was to come into reserve on this aera. 2nd Division Instructions are Appx. ‘U’.
For the next hour, Major Ryder, Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment, kept the Brigade in touch with the situation at and around CORNET DE MALO. It was the same story – surrounded – every man fighting at fairly close quarters but inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
At 1530 hrs, the Divisional Commander with G.1. visited Brigade Headquarters and repeated the orders for a withdrawal across the R. LYS as soon as possible. The Brigade Commander gave the Bn Commanders views of this and it was agreed that very heavy casualties would ensue from a daylight withdrawal.
The Divisional Commander watched enemy movement on the EPINETTE Aerodrome whilst the 61st Medium Regiment shelled it heavily. Soldiers, guns, staff cars and many M.Cs were seen to be crossing making in the direction of MERVILLE.
About noon, 2 Coys of the 1st Royal Irish Fusiliers had reached VIEILLE CHAPELLE and they also had a Coy guarding the bridge at LESTREM. They were in action with parties of the enemy who had infiltrated past 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers.
Information re the withdrawal was sent to 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers by Captain Fitch, the Brigade Intelligence Officer, who volunteered to go. Two D.Rs accompanied him. As the 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers situation was very obscure at the time, it is doubtful whether the information reached them. As Captain Fitch and the D.Rs have not been seen or traced since, it is feared that they must have been killed while taking the message. The message was also sent through wireless via 2nd Division and the composite Calvary Regiment (5th Dragoon Guards) co-operating in that area. It is hoped that it reached them but no acknowledgement ever came.
At 1530 hrs Major Ryder, Commanding 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment rang up to the Brigade Major to say that their Bn Headquarters was on fire and that their wireless was in a cellar and could not be got out; they were going to break it up. He reported in this, his last courageous message, that the regiment was fighting on their ground surrounded by enemy A.F.Vs and M.Cs supported by most accurate mortar fire. He said he would bring his Bn to the R.V. given, after dark. From that moment no further news of the fighting Bns of the Brigade was heard.
In each case they broke communication in a similar manner -surrounded by superior numbers of the enemy who were in possession of superior equipment, yet each Bn was holding its ground and not giving an inch.
All this time, a strong post at EPINETTE; the Section of Captain Churchill’s M.Gs., two guns of Captain Straghan’s A.Tk. Coy and a Pl of 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers, together with remnants of Brigade Headquarters were closely embroiled.
They took a heavy toll of the enemy, suffering few casualties themselves. They fought throughout the day and thanks to the leadership of Captain Churchill and Captain Straghan, successfully managed under cover of the smoke of a heavy mortar attack to leave their positions to cross the R. LYS soon after 2130 hrs.
Brigade, now out of touch with all except ‘B’ Echelon which was still 2 miles N.W. of ESTAIRES, moved back to the R.V. – LA NOUVELLE FRANCE – having found a way through ESTAIRES with difficulty as it had been badly damaged by bombs.
En-route, a wireless message was received changing the R.V. to one 4 miles N.E. of ESTAIRES.
The Staff Captain was dropped to pick up ‘B’ Echelon and so a small party of 5 vehs, the Brigadier and the Brigade Major, the Signal Officer (Captain Damon), 2/Lieut. Swainson 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Liaison Officer, and a wireless set arrived at the R.V. to find it crowded with all manner of French troops making their way back. Guides were left for the Staff Captain at the R.V. whilst four farms were taken over. However, no sign of the transport was forthcoming at midnight, when the Brigade Major made a recce of the area without avail; it was a sad little party that tried to get some sleep that night. All touch with the Brigade was lost; stragglers, both British and French were everywhere and there were signs that the enemy was following up quickly the remnants of the Brigade, who it was hoped had succeeded in crossing the two waterways.
A sketch of the positions held by 4th Infantry Brigade at noon on this day is attached at Appx ‘V’.
28th MAY
At first light, the Brigade Major made a further search of the area but without meeting anyone of the 4th Infantry Brigade. ‘G’ Staff of 2nd Division were on the roads trying to collect stragglers but it was not until about 0830 hrs that any further connection was made with anyone of the Brigade.
At about 0900 hrs, the Brigade Commander and the Brigade Major still touring the area met Captain Read, Q.M. 1st Bn The Royal Scots who knew the R.V. of the various ‘B’ Echelons. Orders were quickly given to all available officers that a withdrawal behind the line POPERINGHE – WATOU was to be made that day, the orders having been given a short time before to the Brigadier by the Divisional staff.
Check points and Brigade R.V. were given and various columns set out under masses of enemy bombers, who bombed and machine-gunned many places but without damaging the Brigade transport.
The roads were one mass of transport and the conglomeration at the X Roads North of ST JAUS had to be seen to be believed. French tanks, French ambulances, French horse vehicles, British vehicles of all kinds, converging from three roads would have kept any T.C.P. extremely busy, yet no T.C.P. was established.
Having got through this traffic jam after a period of two hours, a wireless message was received from 2nd Division as follows:
“Situation West grid 44 obscure (.) keep to East (.) Discard all tpt (.) Walk (.) Inform all and order all RA to R.V. further East ……”
Luckily, movement down a side road was found possible, though perhaps dangerous, and Divisional Headquarters column under the G.II., Major Dolphin and Brigade Headquarter column, about 6 vehs, managed to get through to the R.V. without further difficulty. Others were not so lucky and it was many hours before the transport column arrived. A large part was still missing when the next move took place. The move so far had not been influenced by enemy action, except from the air and that appeared to have little effect.
At 1400 hrs a temporary Headquarters was set up 3 miles N.W. of POPERINGHE. The Brigade Major proceeded to Division for orders, but owing to a change of plan of III Corps under whom 2nd Division had now come, no orders were issued until after 1800 hrs.
Meanwhile the enemy had been following up quickly with A.F.Vs, and varied reports of actions were being received. Luckily a terrific thunder-storm came and this, although wetting all our troops, must have impeded the advance of the enemy A.F.Vs, etc. At this time, the first news of the default of King Leopold was known. It was difficult, however, in the present circumstances, to realise how this would effect (sic) the fate of the B.E.F.
At about 1630 hrs, orders were received by the Divisional Commander for the Division to take up a defensive position on the BERGUES Canal about 5 miles in front of DUNKIRK but as the strength of the Division was only reckoned to be a few hundred men, he ordered that Brigadier Warren should report the situation to III Corps in person. The remainder of the Brigade such as it was, was to make for DUNKIRK – all unnecessary kit and transport to be dumped.
Whilst the seriousness of the situation had not been realised by the regimental officer and the rank and file, it was evident that the B.E.F was now in difficulties. The roads were crammed with traffic, military British and French and a certain amount of French civilian refugees as well, all making for DUNKIRK at their best speed.
The Brigadier gave orders for the Staff Captain to arrange the destruction of papers, kits, transport, etc, and to move off to the R.V. at BERGUES bridge as soon as he could.
Meanwhile, the Brigade Commander with the Brigade Major and Captain Burns, 12th Lancers, a liaison officer from the late G.Q.C. at BRUSSELS attempted to reach Headquarters III Corps near TETEGHEM, which was inside the DUNKIRK perimeter.
Only by dint of some good driving did the column make the R.V. The road in places was four abreast, made worse by many abandoned vehs which had not been put off the road. One place was completely blocked by a string of lorries which had been bombed and caught fire.
Brigadier Warren arrived at Headquarters III Corps, where the acting Corps Commander, Major- General Sydney Wayson, M.G.R.A. III Corps was not in, but who was sent for. The position regards 2nd Division was explained and it was decided that it was impossible for 2nd Division to carry out this role of the defence of the BERGUES Canal that had been allotted to it.
The Divisional Commander had ordered the Brigade Commander to recce the canal and collect what remained of 2nd Division. At that moment, the known strength of the Brigade was just about 100 men, mostly transport drivers. That number had been seen to leave the R.V. that morning at BEAUVAIS FARM, though many did not connect up at BERGUES or DUNKIRK.
It was dark by the time the Brigade Commander arrived back at the Canal and it was impossible to sort out the odd men who were still crossing into DUNKIRK, a depressing sight, with the oil wells ablaze and a thick pall of smoke covering the sky.
The night was spent on the main X Rds so that stragglers could be collected.
29th MAY
However, very few of 2nd Division arrived at this bridge. In addition to the B.E.F. there were many French and much transport, causing indescribable confusion on the roads, as many were loath to abandon their transport containing all their personal kit etc. However, the order, thanks largely to Captain Burns, the liaison officer who tactfully dealt with the French, that no vehicles except guns were to enter the perimeter was obeyed.
At about 0900 hrs, the Staff Captain arrived and was seen to mount a stolid looking horse. He said he was off to complete the recce of the position which it was still thought 2nd Division might possibly have to take up – not to be seen again for many hours.
Shortly afterwards, the Germans started to shell the roads and all traffic stopped, vehicles having been abandoned where they stood in the traffic blocks. This fact was reported to Headquarters III Corps who said they hoped to clear the roads, but it was a task that would have taken many men many hours, if not days. It was never even attempted.
The sight of the abandoned vehicles, some still with horses in the traces, some ditched, some crashed in the deep canal, the majority still blocking the three approaches to the bridge, was one, once seen, that will never be forgotten.
No officers or men of the Bns of the 4th Infantry Brigade were seen during this morning and it was not until orders were received from Headquarters, 2nd Division that the Division was to hold the “last ditch”, the canal about 1 mile from the coast, when Brigade Headquarters was established in its concentration area, contact was regained.
Here, Captain Churchill, Lieut. Holt of the M.G. Coy attached, the Staff Captain, Captain Read, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, and 2/Lieuts Edie and Carmichael, 1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers, re-appeared with 25 other ranks all told, this party comprising the Brigade as it was then known.
Reports were to hand that some of the 2nd Division had already embarked and it was hoped that this included a large proportion of the part of 4th Infantry Brigade known to have set out for DUNKIRK.
Headquarters was established in two houses in TETEGHEM. Consequent on the orders for 2nd Division’s “last ditch” defence, it was decided to move back from this obstacle and behind the 2nd Division collecting centre, which had been set up at the bridges in front of ST MALO LES BAINS. The Divisional Commanders drawing of this area is attached at Appx. ‘W’.
The afternoon was spent by the Brigade staff collecting Bren guns and ammunition for the defence of the canal. About 20 were collected, cleaned and made ready and when later, the 4th Infantry Brigade were relieved of their part, they were handed over to the 5th Infantry Brigade. The amount of abandoned transport, stores, etc. was tragic for the British Army.
The original orders were for 5th Infantry Brigade to come under the orders of Brigadier Warren on this position but as Brigadier Gartlan arrived with a comparatively strong Brigade at about this moment, (about 400) and in view of the fact that 4th Infantry Brigade did not exist, these were cancelled, and the 4th Infantry Brigade were to, and could, take no part in the defence.
Brigade Headquarters remained as established except for a short move caused by local inhabitants in the shelled area in the East end of DUNKIRK.
The picture of the embarkation of the B.E.F. was first seen from here. The beaches filled with men as thick as Brighton beach on a bank holiday, both French and British, and the sea dotted about with vessels: large and small cruisers, destroyers, yachts; some out of action, others loading and departing for England; men wading waist deep in the water to get to the smaller boats. The sand dunes were littered with every sort of equipment, transport and military stores – a pitiful sight of waste and fruitless endeavour.
Enemy bombing attacks were frequent and it was cheering to see the British fighters in the sky.
That night was the first real sleep that many officers and men of Brigade Headquarters had had for many nights, only to be shattered by the sounds of heavy firing and shelling at 0330 hrs next morning, the cause of which was never ascertained.
30th MAY.
That night, duty officers and N.C.Os were out all the time trying to find the remnants of the 4th Infantry Brigade, but only about a dozen men came in.
Lieut-Col Moore, Commanding 2nd Bn The Manchester Regiment, of which Bn Captain Churchill’s Coy had done such good work to support the Brigade, with the remnant of this Bn attached himself to this small party and the next day – the date and the day of the week unknown and uncared for – was spent awaiting orders for the embarkation of the Division. Attempts were made to collect salvage but owing to the fact that the French were commandeering as much as they could see, and the few men available, little was accomplished (see Appx ‘X’).
Orders for embarkation came at about 1400 hrs when it was known that 2nd Division was to follow 44th and 46th Divisions who were going that night. Shortly afterwards, an order came from 2nd Division for the Commander 4th Infantry Brigade to report to the Embarkation Officer at ST MALO to take over embarkation duties. (see Appx. ‘Y’)
On the beach were thousands of men and more and more were always arriving; the Navy was taking them off at about 2,500 an hour, so they said.
Throughout the time 4th Infantry Brigade were on embarkation duty, DUNKIRK was shelled incessantly, the target being chiefly the Mole.
Men were marshalled into groups of 50 by use of a megaphone and a cornet. Each group of men was under an officer and passed through the cordons in an orderly manner to march to the DUNKIRK Mole, silhouetted in the evening darkness against the burning fires of the town and oil tanks. About 8000 – 9000 men were passed through and the beaches at about 1.00 a.m. on 31st May were cleared of men.
A thorough search was made by the Brigade Staff and the use of the cornet and the megaphone made. After being absolutely satisfied and convinced that no more troops were on the beach or in its vicinity, The Brigade Commander sounded the “gone away” on the cornet and with Colonel Hamilton and the Brigade Staff then proceeded to the Mole.
This was reached about 2½ hrs later, just as dawn was breaking and were lucky in getting aboard H.M.S. ’Ivanhoe’ one of H.M. destroyers, which quickly and without incident, except for unsuccessful bombing attacks, left DUNKIRK for DOVER where everyone was only too thankful to land.
One of the most re-assuring sights of this embarkation, was the sight of Captain Churchill passing down the beach with his bows and arrows! His actions in the SAAR with his arrows are known to many and his disappointment at not having had the chance to keep in practice, had tried him sorely. His high example and his great work with his machine guns was a great help to the 4th Infantry Brigade.
31st MAY.
Thus, this small part of the B.E.F. It had left England on 21st September, 1939, and had spent 8 months working on the defences of Northern France. Then on 10th May, it had advanced as the spear-head of the B.E.F. to the R. DYLE.
From then onwards, it had to bear the brunt of every attack….. the gallant defence of WAVRE on the R.DYLE by 1st Bn The Royal Scots; the defence on the R DENDRE South of GRAMMONT, by 1st Bn The Royal Scots and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment; the days of resistance by 1st Bn The Royal Scots at CALONNE (near ANTOING) and 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment at CHEROQ (sic CHERCQ) on the ESCAUT, then back to the LA BASSEE Canal, where the resistance of the three Bns of the 4th Infantry Brigade may have had a large bearing on the eventual success of the evacuation from DUNKIRK.
The Brigade started out about 90 Officers and 2500 Other Ranks; only approximately 650 of these returned.
Captain Fitch, the Brigade Intelligence Officer and a percentage of the Brigade Signal Section were missing, whilst all Bns suffered heavily. Lieut-Col. Money, 1st Bn The Royal Scots, was wounded on the LA BASSEE Canal; Lieut-Col. Charlton, 2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment was wounded on the ESCAUT, with his Adjt., Major Marshall, whilst Major Ryder, who took over, was not seen after the battle on the 27th. Major Stayner, 2nd Bn Dorsetshire Regiment came into command 1/8th Bn Lancashire Fusiliers on the 13th May and was last heard of in the middle of his Bn in LES GATIGNIES surrounded by enemy.
No Commanding Officer, 2nd -in -Command, Adjutant, nor any forward Company Commander of the three Battalions appeared from amongst the stragglers.
A list of the wounded and missing officers of 4th Infantry Brigade, as far as can be ascertained, is attached at Appx. ‘Z’.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Of the original Officers of the Brigade who marched into BELGIUM on May 10th, the following are the only ones who were left to reform with their units at BRADFORD on June 15th, all the remainder either being killed, wounded or missing:
Brigade Headquarters
Brigadier E.G. Warren, Brigade Commander.
Captain J.A. Grant Peterkin, Cameroons Brigade Major.
Captain R.M. Allen, R. Norfolk, Staff Captain.
Captain J.D. Gibbon, Border, Brigade Transport Officer.
Captain C.L.A. Hall, R.A.S.C, Supply Officer.
Captain A.W. Damon, R. Sigs., Brigade Signal Officer.
Lieut. J.G. Johnstone-Hall, R.A.O.C.. O.M.E.. L.A.D.
1st Bn The Royal Scots
2/Lieut J.A. McGregor, Bn Transport Officer .
2/Lieut F.M.W. Edie, a/Carrier Officer.
Captain G.W. Read, Quartermaster.
2nd Bn The Royal Norfolk Regiment
2/Lieut C.E.M.C. Fulton, Liaison Officer.
2/Lieut C.C. Swainson, Bde Liaison Officer to I.R.Ir. F.
2/Lieut N.F.H. Merritt, Bn Transport Officer.
2/Lieut D.E.Jones, Coy Officer.
Lieut A.E. Grant, Quartermaster.
1/8th Bn The Lancashire Fusiliers
Captain A.J. Moon, Bn Transport Officer.
2/Lieut L.T. Carmichael, Officer i/c Brigade H.Q.Guard.
Lieut J. L. Christie, Quartermaster.
4 Anti-Tank Coy: Chaplains to the Forces.
Captain P.L.H. Straghan. Captain G.A.B. Lee,
2/Lieut D.A. Hatch. attached 2 Norfolk.
2/Lieut A.K. McGeorge. Captain W.A. Passmore,
2/Lieut C.J. Wilson. attached 1/8 L.F.
-----------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘A’
SECRET.
4 INF BDE OPERATION ORDER NO. 1.
Copy No…Ref Map: France & Belgium, Sheet 56 – 1/50,000.
11th May 40.
INFORMATION.
1 Enemy.
Air activity continues.
2 Own Tps.
4/7 D.G. occupy line East of R. DYLE. Adv of 4 Inf Bde Gp is nearing completion. Groupe de Reconnaissance, 2. D.I.N.A. have reached line LA BARAQUE 8035 - WAVRE. 1 R.S. will liaise.
3. Att Tps.
Under comd as for move fwd.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl WAVRE 7940 - incl HALT 8244.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT……..1 R.S.
CENTRE …1/8 L.F.
LEFT……….2 Norfolk
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 2.D.I.N.A. incl to 1 R.S. JODOIGNE 9740. X Rds 798392 – rd & ry junc 788396.
Between Right & Centre Sector incl 1 R.S. Copse 819406 – Bse WAVRE 8040 - STADT 794414.
Between Centre & Left Sector incl 1/8 L.F. LES PRES. 833424 – Spur 820427 - LA TOMBE 8143.
LEFT with 1 Div incl 2 Norfolk BOSSUT GOTTECHAIN. 8544 – HALT 8244 – VET ZAAT 810455.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
Incl 1 R.S…………with 1/8 L.F. br 804406.
Incl 1/8 L.F……… with 2 Norfolk 823429.
Incl 2 Norfolk…… with 1 Div VET ZAAT.
8. Outposts.
Fwd bns will find outposts within sectors on general line 789392 –
Fme de CHEREMONT 795397 – track junc about 810410 – thence edge of wood at 812406 – Western edge BOIS DU LONG-CHAMP –
GASTUCHE – LES PRES – East end ARCHENNES Wood 8444.
9. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Observation from high ground by day. Extreme resistance.
1 R.S. will post outposts forthwith. 1/8 L.F. and 2 Norfolk by 1830 hrs.
Outposts will be withdrawn by order 4th Inf Bde.
No posts will be established between track junc 808402 and
Northern end BOIS DU LONG -CHAMP. This gap will be continuously and actively patrolled.
10. Main Posn.
Ground essential to hold…..line of F.D.Ls.
F.D.Ls to include X Rds 798392- X Rds 799398 – br 798400 – thence line of R. DYLE to junc pt with 1 Div.
11. Policy for Defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence; digging where necessary and occupation of houses permitted.
Priority of tasks – completion of defences on line of F.D.Ls.
Posn will be occupied as soon as possible.
12. R.A.
Defensive fire tasks – Trace later.
13. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk guns – One tp area S.W. BOIS DE BEAUMONT 7840. RIGHT one tp area WAVRE…one tp South of Fme RYS 7881. LEFT one tp South of VEEWIEDE 8244; one tp gap in sq 8142; one tp area LA TOMBE 8143.
4 Inf Bde A.Tk. Coy will take over approaches to brs of R. DYLE at 1500 hrs. Guns of this Coy come under comd sec comds.
14. R.E.
Priority of R.E. tasks. ) As in para 41 Pt II of 4
Minefields ) Inf Bde Operation Order
Brs. ) No. 8 dated 11 May apl 40.
15. M G…Posts as under:
(a) 789394. (b) 784403. (c) 797402. (d) 803405. (e) Roles.. all in front of F.D.Ls. One Pl will occupy pillbox at 799409, if suitable.
16. Forecast.
On arrival 6 Inf Bde, 2 Norfolk will come into Bde res in area ANGOUSART 770409 – rd & track junc 799420; 1/8 L/F. will side-step to their right.
17. Flank Protection.
1 R.S will site one Coy area East edge BOIS DE BEAUMONT 7839.
18. Patrolling.
Continuous patrols on outpost posn by night .
ADM.
19. Later.
INTERCOMN.
20. Location of H.Qs as follows;
Bde H.Q…………………………..CHATEAU 761445
1 R.S………………………..………Ho 789401.
2 Norfolk………………………….at 806436
I/8 L.F……………………………..Ho in BOIS DIT LE BOOK 816423.
16 Fd Regt………………………..H.Q. as for Bde H.Q.
21. Light Sigs.
S.O.S Outpost posn ) Two RED. Not to be delegated
S.O.S main posn. ) below Coy Comd.
22. Liaison.
Offrs remain Bde H.Q.
ACK. Sd J.A Grant Peterkin,
Capt.,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of issue: L.Os and Sigs.
Time of signature: 1230 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 4 A.Tk Coy.
2 Norfolk. 2.Div.
1/8.L.F. 1 Div.
16 Fd Regt. Comd.
13 A.Tk Regt. I.O.
2 Manch. B.T.O.
War Diary.
File.
See map one at bottom of page.
APPENDIX ‘B’
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 2. SECRET.
Ref Map: 1/50,000, Sheet 56 11 May 40.
INFORMATION.
1. Enemy.
Nothing of importance to report.
2. Own Tps
D.L.M. have progressed well fwd on right. Adv gd of 1 Div (3 Inf Bde) will take up posn on R.DYLE about 0400hrs 12 May. 6 Inf Bde will move up and take over front as previously arranged early 12 May. No handing over will take place. Comds 2 Norfolk and 1/8 L.F. will vacate posns after liaising with bn comds taking over.
3 Att Tps
‘D’ Coy 2 Manch & 4 Fd Amb under comd;
16 Fd Regt, 61 Med Regt and one Bty 10 Fd Regt, in support of 4 Inf Bde.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl X Rds 798392 to a mutually arranged junc pt on the line of the F.D.Ls about 817413.
METHOD.
5. Sectors
RIGHT………………1.R.S
LEFT………………...1/8 L.F.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 2 D.I.N.A. as in Operation Order No.1.
INTER Bn incl 1/8 L.F. track running from DION LEVAL 8239 -X Rds 8040 – thence to S.E.corner of Wood at 787412.
LEFT with 6 Inf Bde incl bend in rd 861416 – neck of wood 842417 -excl rd junc 825419 – thence rd to 818411 – all incl K in BOIS DIT LE BOOK 8141- Wood 803419 – Wood 7942 - Fme DU TEMPLIERS.
7. Junc pts on Boundaries.
Inter Bn incl 1/8 L.F. – X Rds 8040.
8. Outposts.
Fwd Bns will find outposts within sectors on general line as in Operation Order No.1. GASTUCHE 8241 will be occupied.
Pt of junc with 6 Inf Bde incl 6 Inf Bde T rd 825419.
9. R.A. Outpost Posn.
Later.
10. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Extreme resistance and if ordered to withdraw, you will resist without being seriously committed.
Outposts will be limited to one Coy. Carriers may be employed in support by day.
Outposts will be withdrawn by orders 4 Inf Bde.
11. Main Posn.
Ground essential to hold . As in Operation Order No. 1.
F.D.Ls. As in Operation Order No 1
All brs will be held whilst outposts are out. As in Operation Order No 1.
12. Policy for Defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks.
Improvement of defences.
Slit trenches for A.A. defence.
Posn to be occupied by 1300 hrs.
13. Bde Res Area
Ground essential to hold. To be decided after Comnds recce,
D.Ls. To be decided after Cmmds recce
Posn will be occupied by 1300 hrs.
junc pts – RIGHT with 2 D.I.N.A. BIERGES 7739. LEFT with 6 Inf Bde bend in rd 788409. Both excl 2 Norfolk.
14. R.A.
Later.
15. A.Tk Defence.
A.Tk. mines. Bns requiring A.Tk. mines will state location and number required as soon as possible.
A.Tk. Guns. Trace of A.Tk. defences will be issued later.
16. R.E.
Demolitions. Priority belt on and East of R. DYLE. First task, preparation of all brs over R. DYLE within Div boundaries. Subsidiary belt of rd demolitions on line CHAPELLE ST LAURENT 8941 - NODE BAIS 8945.
Stores. 6000 yds dannert allotted fwd bn. This will be erected as a triple fence.
17. M.G.
Tasks allotted to D Coy 2 Manch remain. Comd 2 Norfolk will recce tasks for further M.Gs on Bde res line.
18. Cav.
In the event of cav withdrawing across R. DYLE, brs at 823446 and 8040 will be used.
19. Res.
2 Norfolk. Location …. about line STADT 7941 -Fme de RYS 7841 - excl BIERGES.
20. A.A. Protection.
All bren guns not within 2000 yds of the line of F.D.Ls will be mounted and manned for A.A. Fire will not be opened at any enemy machine over 2000 ft. One gun per pl in fwd areas will be mounted and manned during the hrs of daylight.
21. Patrolling.
Area between 1 R.S. post at 807402 and GASTUSCHE will be patrolled continuously during hrs of darkness. Mutual arrangements to be made by bn comds concerned.
ADM.
22. A.D.S…..ROSIERES 7542.
INTERCOMN.
23. Location of H.Qs as follows :
Bde H.Q. closes present posn 0930 hrs approx. and reopens same hr at CHAMPLES 7641. H.Q. 6 Inf Bde OTTENBURG 8044. 4/7 DG GOEROUBIEZ 8641.
24. Light Sigs.
S.O.S. Outpost posn. Two RED Rockets.
S.O.S Main posn. Two red rockets
Not to be delegated below Coy Comd.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin
Method of Issue : SiGS. B.M. 4 Inf Bde. Capt.
Time of signature : 1930 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 2.Div.
2 Norfolk. 6 Inf Bde.
1/8.L.F. Comd.
16 Fd Regt. I.O.
13 A.Tk Regt. B.T.O.
2 Manch. File.
4 A.Tk Coy. War Diary.
See Map two below
APPENDIX ‘C’.
S E C R E T.
4 INF BDE OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 1. 16 May. 40.
INFORMATION.
1. 2 Div and att tps withdrew last night from the WAVRE posn successfully, suffering a few casualties
2 Div are taking up a defensive posn on the general line rd junc.6841 -rd and ry crossing 728411- thence West bank of R. LASNE incl TERLAENEN 7845.
The following are under comd 4 Inf Bde :
16 Fd Regt less one Bty.
One Coy & one Pl 2 Manch.
4 Fd Amb.
One Coy 6 A.& S.H.
INTENTION.
2. 4 Inf Bde will deny the West bank of the R. LASNE to the enemy from rd junc 717402 incl TOMBEEK 7644.
METHOD.
3. This line will be held as follows
RIGHT…..1 R. S.
LEFT…….1/8 L.F.
RES………2 Norfolk who will attach one coy to 1/8 L.F. for the defence of the Left sector.
4 Boundaries.
Between 1 R. S. and 5 Inf Bde – incl 1 R.S. ry GROENENDAEL -OTTIGNIES 7634.
Between B Coy 2 Norfolk and 6 Inf Bde incl to 6 Inf Bde – TOMBEEK -REUTEN 7444 – HAGAERDE BOSCHE 7245.
Mutual arrangements between tps already on the ground will be retained as far as boundaries are concerned.
5. Brs.
Orders have been issued for the immediate destruction of all brs in this sector and the defence of the crossings has priority.
6. Arty.
16 Fd Regt will support 4 Inf Bde on this posn.
7. A.Tk.
An A.Tk. Bty from 48 Div is in posn within the area. 4 A.Tk. Coy will detail Pls to be under comd as under ;
Two pls…….. 1 R.S.
One pl……… 1/8 L.F.
8. Outposts.
Outposts across the R. LASNE have been withdrawn as approaches have been mined. Observation will be kept upon the enemy from the high ground behind the F.D.Ls. No withdrawal from this posn is contemplated yet.
ADM.
9. A.D.S. established at Fme ROUGE 6943.
10. Tpt.
All B ech tpt and A ech if not required for tactical purposes, will R.V. at the rd ESPINETTE CENTRALE 6345 – X Rds 663463.
11. Amn.
Bde R.A.S.C. Offr has arranged for amn to be delivered to units as soon as possible.
INTERCOMN.
12. Bde H.Q. opened at 718440 at 0900 hrs today. Bde Sig Offr is arranging for a line to be laid to all bns.
13. S.O.S.
Three RED.
14. Password.
For 16-17 May…..HITLER.
15. Mines.
Mines are allotted to bns as under:
1 R.S……………..... 300.
2.Norfolk……………200.
1/8 L.F………………200.
A plan of minefields laid will be passed to this H.Q. as soon as possible.
ACK.
Sd. F. Fitch, Capt.,
for B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Distribution: 1.R.S.
2 Norfolk.
1/8.L.F.
4 A.Tk. Coy.
16 Fd Regt.
D Coy 2 Manch
6 A & S.H.
Comd.
War Diary.
NOTE 1 to APPX ‘C’.
NOTES FOR WITHDRAWAL, 16-17 MAY.
I. F.D.Ls.
F.D.Ls. will be abandoned at 2200 hrs. No thinning out before 2100 hrs. Fwd Coys of fwd bns to withdraw first. Rear Coys of fwd bns to withdraw through 2 Norfolk, who will remain in posn until 2300 hrs. B Coy 2 Norfolk will remain under comd 1/8 L.F. until passing ESPINETTE from where they will return to comd 2 Norfolk.
2. Patrols.
1 R.S. and 1/8 L.F. will provide a strong fighting patrol under an offr which will remain on the front to cover the withdrawal by active operations until ……. They will report back independently through MALAISE and thence direct route to …….. Suppers will be left for the patrols at unit supper places.
3. Movement.
Vehs will move without lights. Tps will march in file in Pl blocks so that tpt can get back at the same time. The route will be picqueted by the Pl of 2 Norfolk at present att Bde H.Q. The Coy comd of the last 2 Norfolk Coy to withdraw, will be responsible for withdrawing these picquets, who will be placed on all important corners, etc. from the Bde S.P. to the supper places.
4. Southern Route.
Bde R.V. bend in rd 706447. Bde supper places for marching personnel only.
5 Feeding.
Q.Ms have been warned and guides will be awaiting units.
6 Tpt.
10 v.t.m. and 40 yds between vehs. If tpt move is not completed at night, a day density of 10 v.t.m. must be maintained by all drs.
7. Breakdowns.
Vehs must be towed if possible.
8. Halts.
Marching personnel - as decided by unit comds.
--------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘D’.
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 3.
Copy No…..
17th May 40.
INFORMATION.
2 Div are taking up a defensive posn on the line of the R. DENDRE 2646 with:
RIGHT………………… 5 Inf Bde.
LEFT…………………… 4 Inf Bde.
RES……………………. 6 Inf Bde
Probable junc pt with 5 Inf Bde Ho 262444.
INTENTION.
2. 4 Inf Bde will take up a defensive posn to deny West bank of river from incl Right LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – ry & rd br 275480.
METHOD.
3. Tps…. RIGHT…..1 R. S.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
RES…… 1/8 L.F.
4 A.Tk Defence.
Posts will be placed at the following places, forthwith:
By 1/8 L.F. on approach to br at 273473.
By 1 R.S. “ “ “ “ “ 284482.
By 1 R.S. “ “ “ “ “ 286483.
By 2 Norfolk at 287487.
By 2 Norfolk at 284490.
Each post will consist of 2 N.C.Os and 6 men, with one A.Tk Rifle.
5. Br Heads.
Bri heads consisting of carriers are to be placed on all brs over the R. DENDRE at :
269448 to be found by 1 R.S.
272473 “ “ “ “ 1 R.S.
275446 “ “ “ “ 2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
Inter-bn boundaries will be fixed after recce. Probable junc pt fwd area PLANKEN 2546 incl 1 R.S.
7. Outposts.
Line of outposts will be decided after recce.
8. Posn will be occupied by 0800 hrs 18 May 40.
9. F.D.Ls.
The line of F.D.Ls will be generally the line of the R. DENDRE.
10. Arty.
10 and 16 Fd. Regts will support 4 Inf Bde.
11. A.Tk Guns.
O.C. 4 A.Tk. Coy will arrange for an A.Tk. gun to guard each crossing of the river within the Bde sector.
12. Recce.
Bn comds will recce their posn and be prepared to meet Comd 4 Inf Bde on br at 273473 having completed their recce of their areas including outposts, at 0600 hrs.
ADM.
13. Full details later.
INTERCOMN.
14. Bde H.Q. opens 0800 hrs EVERBECQ 2347.
ACK.
Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Time of signature.. 2306 hrs. B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Issued through Sigs.
Distribution :- As for 4 Inf Bde Operation No. 2.
APPENDIX ‘ E’
4th INF. BDE OPERATION INSTRUCTION NO. 4.
Ref Map 1/50,000 Sheet 54. S E C R E T.
18 May 40
INFORMATION.
1. Enemy.
Continues to adv in a S.E. direction; on the right there has been some penetration on the French front. The situation may be described as serious.
2. Own Tps.
2 Div with right 48 Div and left 1 Div are taking up a defensive line on R. DENDRE from incl GRAMMONT – incl LESSINES.
3. Att Tps.
16 and 27 Fd Regts are in support of 4 Inf Bde. D Coy 2 Manch; one Bty 13 A.Tk Regt are in support.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from incl LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – br 275480.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT…..1 R. S., with under comd one Coy 1/8 L.F.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde incl 4 Inf Bde neck in Wood 2842 – LES DEUX ACREN 2643 – T in LONGPONT 2444.
INTER Bn all incl 1 R.S. corner of wood 272458 -North edge cutting 262464 – North end of cutting 249419 – excl EVERBECQ 2347.
LEFT with 48 Div rd junc 276480 thence straight to Mill 229494.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
RIGHT ……..LES DEUX ACREN.
LEFT………..br 275480.
8. Outposts
Fwd bns will find outposts within sectors on general line thick contour 50, 2745 – ring contour 70/ in sqs 2746 and 2747.
9. R.A. Outpost posn.
Later.
10. Tasks of Outposts and Orders for Withdrawal.
Role watching and warning for R.E personnel on brs.
Outposts will be withdrawn by order of bn comds.
11. Main Posn
Ground essential to hold – line of R. DENDRE.
12. Policy for defence Main Posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks – preparation of F.D.Ls.
Posn was occupied by 0800 hrs.
13. R.A.
Later.
14. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk. mines – 600 available for issue; details later.
A.Tk. Guns. Will protect approaches to all brs and the rds leading into areas from the East.
15. R.E.
(a) Under orders C.R.E. – the preparation of all brs for demolition.
(b) Barges on R.DENDRE will be sunk forthwith or destroyed in such a way as to make their use impracticable.
(c) Brs to be blown under orders of bn comds. They will NOT be allowed to fall into enemy hands.
16. M.Gs.
One Pl area 250439
One Pl area just South GELEMBEKE 2546.
17. Refugees.
All refugees will be directed Northwards away from France – all rds must be kept clear.
18. Res.
1/8 L.F. less one Coy – GELEMBEKE – GEOFFERDINGE 2547.
19. Tpt.
Great care will be taken in parking of tpt. A v.t.m. of not more than 30 must be observed and all offrs using rds must be active to see that they are kept open.
ADM.
20. A.D.S………. EVERBECQ, 2347.
M.D.S……… MOTT 1847.
INTERCOMN.
21. Password … COURAGE.
22. Location of H.Qs as follows :
4 Inf Bde……229480.
5 Inf Bde……GHOY 2343.
1 R.S……… Ho at 252466.
2 Norfolk…... 254478.
1/8/ L.F……..CHATEAU 253479.
23. Main Sig Artery.
Lines will be laid to bns.
24. Light Sig.
S.O.S. outpost posn : Three REDS, Not to be delegated below Coy Comds
S.O.S. main posn: Three REDS. Not to be delegates below Cop Comds.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde Capt.
Method of issue: Sigs.
Time of signature 1153 hrs
Distribution: 1 R.S. 2 Div.
2 Norfolk. 5 Inf Bde.
1/8.L.F. Comd.
4 A.Tk. Coy. S.C.
16 Fd Regt. I.O.
2 Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt. B.T.O.
d Coy 2 Manch. File.
War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘F’
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 5.
Copy No ……..
20 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
The enemy have adv to the North bank of the R. ESCAUT:
2. Own Tps.
1 Corps are holding the line of the river and 2 Div are relieving 48 Div on the present fwd posn.
3. Att Tps.
Following under comd of 4 Inf Bde:
5 Fd Coy.
D Coy 2 Manch.
One Coy 7 King’s Own.
In support: -
One Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt.
INTENTION.
4. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will occupy a defensive posn from br excl 961287 to br incl 942307 tonight 20/21 May taking over from part of 48 Div.
METHOD.
5. Sectors.
RIGHT…..1 R. S.
CENTRE..1/8 L.F.
LEFT…….2 Norfolk.
6. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde incl 5 Inf Bde LE COUCOU 9628 - rd junc 956286 - rd- CALONNE – rd junc 944285 - WARNAFFLES FM – ST MAUR.
Between Right & centre sector incl 1/8 L.F. ry and track xing 962298 X Rys 954295 – rd and track junc 940289 – incl track junc 933287.
Between centre & Left sector incl 1/8 L.F. Ho at 20 contour 949302 – North edge Wood at 943298 excl Ho at LE CORNET 936297.
LEFT with 42 Div rd and ry xing 940305 – ry br 934302 - thence to X Rds 928300 – ERE 9028.
7. Junc Pts on Boundaries.
RIGHT with 5 Inf Bde br 961286.
LEFT with 42 Div br 942307.
8. Relief.
To commence from present billets at 2115 hrs and to be completed by 0300 hrs.
9. Main posn.
Ground essential to hold line of R. ESCAUT.
F.D.Ls. to include all crossings and approaches to brs.
10. Policy for Defence Main posn.
Posn will be prepared for protracted defence.
Priority of tasks. Improvement of F.D.Ls and cover from fire.
Posn to be occupied by 0300 hrs.
11. Move to Battle Area.
S.P…………. X Rds 885282
Route………. WILLEMEAU 8928 – ERE 9028 –
PONT A RIEU 9229 – thence Bn areas.
Timings S.P…1 R.S. 2120 hrs.
1/8 L.F. 2145 hrs.
Bde H.Q. & 2 Norfolk will move by separate route.
All moves by Pls - well spaced out.
12. R. A.
Defensive fire tasks : 16 Fd Regt & 99 Fd Regt and one tp 61 Med Regt will support 4 Inf Bde.
C Prep & Harassing Fire: details later.
13. A.Tk. Defence.
A.Tk mines as decided by comds. 50 allotted to each bn as a primary issue.
A.Tk guns will cover approaches to all brs.
14. R.E.
Under order 5 Fd Coy – improvement of defences. One sec will be under orders of each bn. They will report to bns prior to leaving present locations except for 2 Norfolk who will report to 2 Norfolk H.Q. at 0001 hrs.
15. M.G.
One Coy 2 Manch: One Pl area 2 Norfolk.
One Pl.) Details later.
One Pl)
16. Pioneers.
One Coy 7 King’s Own will be available for work in area. They will be billeted in Fm.
17. RES.
One Coy 2 Norfolk and one Coy 1/8 L.F. will be sited back near rd.
One Pl 1/8 L./F. will be att to Bde H.Q. for defence.
They will report to S.C. on arrival.
18. Tpt.
The minimum of tpt will be taken into fwd area. No lights will be used.
19. Patrolling.
Active patrolling of R. ESCAUT will take place throughout hrs of darkness.
ADM.
20. (a) Med. A.D.S ………WILLEMEAU CHURCH 896285.
C.Ps……… On rd about E in ERE 912288.
(b) Bde ‘T’ Gp.…………….. HAU d’HOTEL 835280.
(c) Pro. S.C. will arrange for guides to be on the routes fwd from 2115 to 2315 hrs.
INTERCOMN.
21. Location of H.Qs.
4 Inf Bde……Fme 922296.
Adv 2 Div… TAINTIGNIES 8826.
2 Norfolk…... CHATEAU 936304.
1/8/ L.F……..940295.
22. Main Sig Artery.
Cable, when available to all bns. Wireless will be manned and an offr available at all times.
23. Light Sigs.
S.O.S. Outpost Posn) Three RED. Not to be delegated below Coy Comds.
S.O.S. Main Posn. Three RED. Not to be delegated below Coy Comds
24. Password. – HOLDFAST.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Capt.
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of issue; Sigs.
Time of Signature; 1700 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.S. 5. Fd Coy.
2 Norfolk. D Coy 2 Manch.
1/8.L.F. 2 Div.
4 A.Tk. Coy. 5 Inf Bde.
16 Fd Regt. File.
2 Bty 13 A.Tk. Regt. War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘G’
S E C R E T.
Actions
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 6.
Ref Map ; 1/50,000, Sheet 64 21 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
Enemy still hold a small bridgehead about CALONNE 9528. 4 Inf Bde and in particular 1 R.S. have been in close contact with the enemy all day and a limited enemy retirement seems to have taken place from about 1800 hrs – perhaps due to adv of 1 Camerons from BRUYELLE 9526 in N.E. direction.
2. Own Tps
1 R.W.F. have been placed under comd of 4 Inf Bde from 2100 hrs 21 May, otherwise same tps remain in support and under comd 4 Inf Bde.
INTENTION.
3. 4 Inf Bde will attack and destroy enemy posns on West bank of R. ESCAUT in and about CALONNE 9528.
METHOD.
4. Tps.
The attack will be carried out by 1 R.W.F. under a barrage arranged by C.R.A. 2 Div.
5. Zero.
0300 hrs 22 May.
6. Approach Line.
MERLIN – Church 942269 – thence track Northwards to behind start line.
7. Start Line.
On rd BRUYELLE 9526 – TOURNAI from 947276 – 944278, i.e., 250 yds either side of track and rd junc 946277.
8. Check Line.
Track junc 955279 – Pt 42, 9528 – pt on rd at approx. 952285 (i.e where left boundary strikes the rd.) on which attack will pause for 1 min.
9. Objective.
Line of Canal from incl br 961286 North along Canal to excl Ferry 959292.
10. Boundaries of Attack.
250 yds S.E. and N.W. of track from 947277 running N.E. to CALONNE.
11. Support.
- Arty – Details of barrage will be given later. Rate of adv – 100 yds in 3 mins. Harassing fire – line of river and behind area CALONNE from 2100 hrs.
- Inf – 1 R.S will support left flank of attack from present posns.
1 Camerons will support right flank of attack and will take every opportunity to adv to assist 1 R.W.F. - M.Gs - will fire on harassing tasks into PERONNE 9626 from posns near MERLIN 9326 from Z plus 3 to Z plus 10.
R.W.F. on reaching line of canal will gain touch with:
RIGHT…….. 1 Camerons.
LEFT………. 1 R.S.
(Further details as to subsequent action follows).
ADM.
13. Med.
Casualties will be cleared through A.D.S. 5 Inf Bde if possible, if not, . A.D.S. 4 Inf Bde at WILLEMEAU 9028.
INTERCOMN.
14. One wireless set will be allotted to 1 R.W.F. by 6 Inf Bde.
Success signal …..RED WHITE RED WHITE.
Bde H.Q. remains present posn 921296.
A Liaison Offr from 1 R.W.F. will report H.Q. 4 Inf Bde at 2100 hrs; he should have a M.C.
Password …………. BUTTERFLY.
S.O.S………………. GREEN RED GREEN.
ACK.
Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin,
Method of issue: Sigs. B.M. 4 Inf Bde. Capt.
Time of Signature; 1945 hrs.
Distribution: 1.R.W.F. 5 Inf Bde.
1 R.S. 6 Inf Bde.
2 Norfolk. C.R.A. 2 Div.
1/8 L.F. 13 A.Tk. Regt.
D Coy 2 Manch. 4 A.Tk. Coy.
2 Manch File
2 Div War Diary
1 Camerons
APPENDIX ‘H’
S E C R E T.
4 INF. BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 7. Copy No …
Ref Maps ; 1/50,000. Sheets 63 & 64. 22May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Enemy.
The enemy remain in CALONNE and appear to be consolidating their posns on the East bank of the R. ESCAUT. No further attacks have been made on 4 Inf Bde today.
2. Own Tps
1 R.S. have established a post towards CALONNE but are not in touch with 5 Inf Bde on the right.
Same tps remain in support and under comd 4 Inf Bde.
2 Div is withdrawing tonight to the ‘GORT’ Line where a defensive posn will be taken up.
INTENTION.
3. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will withdraw from present posns tonight and take up a defensive posn on the ‘GORT’ line from Frontier at 845259 - excl rd junc 849289.
METHOD.
4. Thinning out to commence at 0100 hrs ; F.D.Ls to be finally abandoned at 0300 hrs.
5 Routes.
Allotted to 4 Inf Bde:
ROUTE ‘Y’ – ERE – WILLEMEAU – Main rd TOURNAI – ORCHIES at 886282 – turn right in RUMES – SENTIER 857262 - SARTINE 847257 – BACHY – thence to Bn Areas.
6. Timings and S.P.
Bde S.P. – X Rds ERE 910292. H.Q. 4 Inf Bde will clear S.P. by 0130 hrs.
The rd will be clear for tpt and tps of fwd bns & one bty 16 Fd Regt. From 0130 hrs.
7. Guides.
Guides will be on rds at pts as under:
- Main rd TOURNAI – ORCHIES at 886282.
- RUMES at (a) X Rds 863264. (b) junc 863268.
- Rd junc 835258.
Will be found by 6 Inf Bde; they will deny line ERE – ST MAUR till 0700 hrs 23 May.
At 0200 hrs 23 May, 4/7 D.G. will be holding line GUIGNIES 9025 – TAINTIGNIES 8829 – excl FRIODMONT 8829, which they will deny till 1000 hrs.
9. Tps.
One Coy 1/8 L.F. remains under comd 1 R.S. till arrival new posn. One Pl 1/8 L.F. will withdraw with Bde H.Q.
10. Tsp.
As much tsp as possible will be infiltrated back to new areas as early as possible.
11. New posn.
A defensive posn will be taken up on the ‘GORT’ Line by 2 Div as under:
RIGHT……………..5 Inf Bde.
CENTRE…………..6 Inf Bde.
LEFT……………….4 Inf Bde.
4 Inf Bde will occupy a posn from incl Frontier at 845259 – ex rd junc 849629 ; the posn will be occupied as under:
RIGHT…………….1/8 L.F. – Area BACHY.
LEFT………………2 Norfolks – WANNEHEIM
RES………………..1 R.S.on original Div Res line.
12. F.D.Ls.
Will be on the French – Belgium Frontie ; posn likely to be occupied for 24 hrs.
13. Boundaries.
RIGHT with 6 Inf Bde excl 1/8 L.F. SARTINE 8426 - rd junc 833258 - thence to incl rd junc 820256 (junc pt 846259).
INTER Bn incl 1/8 L.F. Frontier 843271 – rd junc 830267 - Pt 63, 825267.
LEFT with 42 Div excl 849289 – incl BOURGHELLES (junc pt -rd junc 849289).
14. Arty.
One Bty 16 Fd Regt will answer S.O.S. up till 0300 hrs. 16 Fd Regt less one bty will withdraw under separate orders at 0100 hrs (Subject to C.R.A. orders).
15. M.Gs.
D Coy 2 Manch will start thinning out at 0215 hrs & R.V. BACHY where O.C. Coy will recce Bde Area.
16. A.Tk.
Bty will withdraw under separate orders.
Coy will withdraw so as to pass S.P. before 0001 hrs. R.V. BACHY. Recce daylight.
17. Recce Parties.
Units will have recce parties ready to move to new areas as soon as posn traces are issued.
18. Minefields.
Care must be taken of minefields laid in present posn; units have been informed of locations.
ADM.
19. A.D.S. closes 0300 hrs present location.
INTERCOMN.
20. Bde H.Q. closes present location 0215 hrs opens on main rd at Pt 34, 817273 at 2200 hrs.
21. S.O.S. ……………….GREEN RED GREEN.
22. Password………….. CHURCHILL.
ACK. Sd. J.A. Grant Peterkin, Capt.,
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Issued through Sigs.
Time of signature; 2145 hrs.
Distribution: 1 R.S. Coy 6 Fd. Amb.
2 Norfolk. 5 Inf Bde.
1/8 L.F. 6 Inf Bde.
4 A.Tk. Coy. 2 Div.
16 Fd Regt. Comd.
2 Bty 13 T.k. Regt. B.I.O.
D Coy 2 Manch. B.T.O.
File.
War Diary.
APPENDIX ‘J’
S E C R E T.
0 419.
23 May 40.
4 Inf Bde.
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
---------------------
The following are extracts from orders given at conference held at 2 Div H.Q. 1700 hrs 23 May 40.
1. 2 Div will be relieved in present sector tonight by 12 French Div, and then will move to the area ESTAIRES – LA BASSEE – BETHUNE – North of the Canal. No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy is placed under Comd 2 Div.
2. Relief will take place as follows;
French tps begin arriving fwd area at dusk and will occupy posts with British tps. When French tps are installed, British tps will withdraw, beginning as soon after 2300 hrs as possible, final evacuation by 0100 hrs, when comd passes to 12 French Div.
3. Movement will take place in accordance with block timings and route cards att.
4. Embussing of Marching Personnel of inf bdes.
Each inf bde will send back as soon as possible its res bn and enough additional tps to fill a sec of No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy to its maximum capacity.
Embussing pt Western edge Wood 7926.
The busses of No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy will make a second trip during the night 23/24 May, Collecting remainder of inf bdes early in morning 24 May. Arrangements for embussing to be made direct between inf bdes and comd No. 13 Tp Carrying Coy.
ADM.
5. Billeting.
Unit billeting parties will proceed well ahead of units to obtain billeting areas from D.A.A.G. R.V. PORT ARTHUR INN 490318 (in RICHEBOURG ST VAAST H.33 on 1/250,000 map). Billeting parties will provide guides to meet their units on Route X or Y. Their task will be to prevent congestion at pts where units leave Routes X and Y.
6. Pet.
Will be drawn direct from Pet Coy. Location ESTAIRES 4539 (H33 on 1/250,000 map)..
7. Amn.
Amn Coy will be located at ESTAIRES.
8. Sups.
Sup pt for 24 May for rations for 25 May; Pt where ry ARMENTIERES – MERVILLE crosses rd ESTAIRES – LA BASSEE (468381 on 1/50,000 map).
9. Pro.
D.A.P.M. is arranging to direct traffic on Routes X & Y under separate instructions. As routes are difficult, units are advised to arrange their own pointsmen in addition.
10. Blockhouse stores.
If French rations exist in Blockhouses, British preserved rations will be collected and taken away under bde arrangements. Surgical outfits will also be taken.
11. Distribution of Route Cards.
4 Inf Bde….30 5 Inf Bde……30 6 Inf Bde…..30
R.A……… .20 R.E………….15 Sigs………..15
2 Manch……5 13 Tp C. Coy.25 Camp……….5
R.A.S.C…..10 Med…………..6 Ord………….6
F.S.P……….1 Postal………...1
Sd. C. H. Dolphin Major,
for Lieut-Col.,
, G.S., 2 Div.
BLOCK TIMINGS. Speed…..12½ m.i.h. Density ……40 v.t.m.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Route X (Northern) Route Y (Southern).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
No 13. Tp Carrying 2000-2100 99 Fd Regt )
Coy (3 bns embussed) 61 Med Regt ) 2200 - 2300
2 Manch ( less 2 6 Inf Bde
Coys). 2130-2200 embussed. 0200-0300
10 Fd Regt ) 5 Inf Bde
One A.Tk. Bty.) 2230-2330 embussed. 0300-0400
4 Inf Bde 2300-0100
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Remarks : Tp Carrying Coy reports to R.V. fixed by Inf Bdes
after return from first trip.
APPENDIX ‘K’
S E C R E T.
0 408.
23 May 40.
I M M E D I A T E.
4th Inf Bde
X X X X X X X
X X X X X X X
---------------------
1. The following will be prepared to move at half an hour’s notice after 1500 hrs:
16 Fd Regt.
13 A.Tk. Regt. (Less two Btys)
One Fd Coy R.E.
6 A & S.H.
7 King’s Own.
Carrier Pls 4 Inf Bde.
Det Fd Amb.
2. This force will be required to precede 2 Div into new area in res and will be commanded by C.R.A. 2 Div.
It will proceed to RICHEBOURG 4730. H.Q. at PORT ARTHUR INN.
3. 4 Inf Bde will appoint a comd for the Carriers.
4. All comds of the above units will report to Div H.Q. TEMPLEUVE 769243 at 1500 hrs.
Sd. C. H. Dolphin, Major,
for Lieut-Col.,
, G.S. 2 Div.
APPENDIX ‘L’
S E C R E T.
4 INF BDE OPERATION ORDER No. 8. Copy No..
Ref Map: 1/50,000 Sheet 62. 24 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. The enemy has a few A.F.Vs along the LA BASSEE Canal which are harassing this front in small bodies; they are said to have A.F.Vs in ST VENNALT 3337. A post near BETHUNE 3927 was lost to the enemy this afternoon.
2. We have formed a defensive line from ST OMER of which 2 Div is a part; they hold the line of the Canal from excl br at 2738 - LA BASSEE with:-
RIGHT …………….. 6 Inf Bde.
CENTRE…………... 4 Inf Bde.
LEFT………………..5 Inf Bde.
3. The following are in support 4 Inf Bde :-
293 Bty 74 Fd Regt.
. One Bty 93 Fd Regt.
One Bty 46 Div Arty.
4. The following are under comd 4 Inf Bde :-
1 R Ir F with under comd one sec 25 mm A.
Tk guns and two Coys French M.Gs.
Two Btys A.Tk. Guns.
D Coy 2 Manch.
5 Fd Coy.
4 Fd Amb.
INTENTION.
5. 4 Inf Bde and att tps will take up a defensive role on the line of the LA BASSEE Canal from incl br 367382 – grid line 43.
METHOD.
6. F.D. Ls ………………Line of Canal.
RIGHT………………2 Norfolk – junc pt 1 R Ir F br ARELETTE 3930.
LEFT……………… 1 R. Ir. F.
RES…………………1 R. S. and 1/8 L.F.
These will be the preliminary (sic) dispositions – to be known as the outpost posn
They will be occupied after dark 24 May.
7. Battle Dispositions.
RIGHT……………1 R.S.- junc with centre incl to rd at 383320.
CENTRE…………2 Norfolk junc incl to left bn at AVELETTE, 3930.
LEFT…………… 1 R.Ir.F.
RES………………1/8 L.F. – area LE CORNET MALO 3933.
8. Junc Pts.
RIGHT…………….with 6 Inf Bde.
incl 4 Inf Bde - br at 367331. LEFT…………… with 5 Inf Bde
incl 4 Inf Bde - Canal xing Grid 43.
Boundaries will be issued later.
9. Arty.
Details of support later.
10. A.Tk.
A Tk one pdr guns are placed under comd bn comd in whose area they are sited. They will be sited to cover the F.D.Ls.
11. M.Gs.
One coy in area; details later.
12. Brs.
All brs over LA BASSEE canal are blown. All other brs over Canal de la LAWE have been prepared or blown.
13. Policy.
- Any F.D.Ls lost will be counter-attacked and re-captured immediately.
- Res bns – one coy will be at ½ hrs notice to move, remainder one hr.
14. Right Flank. Outpost Posn.
6 Inf Bde are arranging to sweep the area VENNANT 3337 and Southwards prior to occupying F.D.Ls.
- 1 R.S. will, in conjunction with this move, patrol actively up to ST VENNANT 3337 and ROEBECQ 3433; they will gain touch with the enemy.
- 2 Norfolk will find a defensive flank from area Church 377362 – RIEZ DU VINAGE 3734. 1 R.S. will keep in close touch with this defensive flank prior to patrolling Westwards.
15. Moves.
The following moves will take place:
1 R.S. ……..from ESSERS 4128 – CALONNE SUR LA LYS 3837.
2 Norfolk…..LE HAMEL 4229 – PARADIS 4034.
1/8 L.F…….to LE CORNET A LEUX 3936.
ADM.
16. Tpt.
Will remain bn areas for tonight; B Ech tpt lines will be notified later.
INTERCOM.
17. Bde H.Q. at present at MESPLAUX 4230 will close present posn 2030 hrs and open same hr at EPINETTE 4136.
Line will be laid to bns on the outpost posn.
S.O.S. ………RED GREEN RED.
Password….. MACKAY.
ACK. Sd J.A. Grant Peterkin Capt.
B.M. 4 Inf Bde.
Method of Issue: Sigs.
Time of Signature 1920 hrs.
APPENDIX ‘M’.
MESSAGE FORM.
To: HOBO
From: DUGU
warning order (.) DUGU will occupy the line of CANAL from excl CANAL ry br 2738
SE of AIRE to incl LA BASSEE 5026 (.)
DUGU is taking over comd all tps at present operating on this front (.) in the meantime bdes will be prepared to move as soon as possible after having arrived and had a meal in present billeting areas (.) all tp carrying vehs now with bdes will be retained by them (.) probable moves of bdes will be as follows (.) GOPI remains in approx present area (.) HOBO to area BETHUNE – LOCON 4131 – ESTAIRES 4539 (.) FITU to ST VENANT 3337 – MERVILLE 3939 (.) bdes will send reps to DUGU HQ who will be in possession of the latest information of their own bdes together with the earliest times by which bdes having fed will be in a posn to move (.) other arms will be grouped with bde groups.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note : HOBO was 4 Inf Bde code name.
APPENDIX ‘N’
SECRET.
Copy No.1.
2 DIV 4 OPERATION ORDER No. 8.
Ref Map: 1/50,000, Sheets 50, 51, 62. 24 May 40.
INFORMATION
1. Allied tps are to hold a line, mostly covered by a water obstacle, from the sea West of DUNKERQUE to ST OMER – AIRE – BETHUNE – LA BASSEE – CARVIN – ORCHIES.
2. 2 Div has on its right 44 Div and on its left POLFORCE.
Boundaries right excl 2 Div ry LILLERS 2831 – HAZEBROUCK.
Junc pt – ry br 273388.
Left with POLFORCE excl 2 Div – Wood 5225 – PIETRE 5032 - X Rds 483359 - NOUVEAU MONDE 4738.
Junc pt – bend in river 522255.
3. The following tps in 2 Div sector under comd:-
210 Bty 53 A.Tk. Regt.
Bty 98 Fd Regt.
293 Bty 74 Fd Regt.
7 King’s Own.
R.Ir. F.
7 Queen’s.
2/5 West Yorks.
13 Tp Carrying Coy.
Two Bns French inf.
Two Coys French M.G.
4. A det from 2 Div under comd Brig FINDLAY, has been placed under POLFORCE and is in posn on our immediate left and consists of :-
H.Q.
16 Fd Regt.
13 A.Tk. Regt. (less two btys).
6 A & S.H.
One Fd Coy.
Carrier Pls 4 Inf Bde.
5. Enemy is threatening the line mentioned in para 1 with armd forces from the West. He has effected a breakthrough North of BETHUNE and it is thought that some elements have crossed the area EPINETTE 3135 and are working Northwards. Enemy and at least one M.G. have been reliably reported firing on the Southern exits of MERVILLE 3939.
INTENTION.
6. 2 Div will hold the LA BASSEE Canal posn from excl br 273388 to excl Wood 5225 against attack from the West.
METHOD.
7. F.D.L ……………… N.E. bank of Canal.
8. Organisation of Div Sector.
RIGHT Sector. CENTRE Sector. LEFT Sector.
Comd - Comd - Comd -
Comd 6 Inf Bde. Comd 4 Inf Bde. Comd 5 Inf Bde.
Tps - Tps - Tps -
6 Inf Bde 4 Inf Bde (less carriers) 5 Inf Bde.
99 Fd Regt. 210 A.Tk. Bty. 10 Fd Regt.
44 A.Tk. Bty. R. Ir F. One A.Tk. Bty.
One Fd Coy R.E. One Coy R.E. (to arrive shortly)
2/5 W. Yorks. One Coy 2 Manch One Coy 2
Manch
One Coy 2 Manch. Two Coys French MGs 7 Queen’s.
6 Fd Amb. 4 Fd Amb. Two bns French
Inf.
5 Fd Amb.
9. Method of occupation
Inter-Bde boundaries.
Between 6 and 4 Inf Bdes: incl 4 Inf Bde br 367331 thence rd RIEZ DU VINAGE 3734 – CALONNE SUR LA LYS 3837, excl MERVILLE 3939.Between 4 and 5 Inf Bdes:
excl 4 Inf Bde rd junc 424270 - incl MESPLAUX 4230 - CANAL DE LA LAWE.
10. Tactical Occupation.
- 6 Inf Bde.
- 6 Inf Bde will undertake a recce in force with carrier pls and A.Tk. guns to discover in what strength the enemy may be in the sector which 6 Inf Bde is to occupy.
First bound…………MERVILLE.
Second bound……..R. LYS, HAVERSKERQUE 3239 – ST
VENANT 3337.
Third bound………..LA BASSEE Canal from incl br 303364 to
incl br 350335.
- A.Tk guns will by zero hr be covering approaches to ESTAIRES 4539 from the North and West, and will then cover the front and right flank of the carrier adv from threat of enemy tanks.
- The adv will be continuously covered by one Fd Regt and a further Fd Regt will be deployed ready to engage by observation targets about MERVILLE.
- C.R.A. will co-ordinate arty plan.
- Inf will move embussed, by bounds, in accordance with progress of carrier adv.
- R.E. dets will accompany adv and prepare brs at MERVILLE, HAVERSKERQUE & ST VENANT for destruction.
- On re-establishing line of Canal 6 Inf Bde will protect its rear by throwing out protective dets along line of CANAL DE NIEPPES from incl LA MOTTE AU BOIS 3544 to canal junc 277405.
- 4 Inf Bde.
4 Inf Bde will occupy its sector with not more than one inf bn on the front. It will form a defensive flank on the general line of its right boundary and will patrol fwd to ST VENANT and ROBECQ 3434.
- 5 Inf Bde.
5 Inf Bde will hold one bn in readiness to occupy ESTAIRES in conjunction with operation of 6 Inf Bde. One Bn 5 Inf Bde will be situated in rear of French sector.
11. Div Res.
7 King’s Own and 2 Manch (less three coys) will remain in present locations until receipt of further orders.
12. Arty
All 18 prs and 25 prs will be sited for all-round A.F.V. defence and with A.Tk. defence their primary role. C.R.A. will be responsible for their siting, thereafter these guns will be under comd sector comds for battle purposes.
13. Demolitions.
If not already done, all brs within bde sectors over LA BASSEE Canal will be blown under orders of sector comds. Br 350335 reported NOT blown.
- CANAL DE LA LAWE. All brs will be prepared for demolition and those other than those on the main approaches, may be blown under orders sector comds.
- CANAL DE LA LYS. Para (b) applies.
14. Counter attack policy.
Enemy will not be allowed to cross the LA BASSEE Canal. Local res will be held within sectors for immediate counter attack.
15. The posn will be occupied as soon as possible.
INTERCOM.
16. H.Q. 2 Div remains present location until further orders.
H.Q. POLFORCE – SAILLY SUR LA LYS 4940.
H.Q. ‘X’ Force (Brig Findlay) – CARNIN 6124.
H.Q. 4 Inf Bde – 427305.
H.Q. 5 Inf Bde – 467286.
H.Q. 6 Inf Bde – VIEILLE CHAPELLE 4333.
ACK.
Issued through Sigs. Sd. C.H. Dolphin, Major,
G.S. 2 Div.
Time of Signature: 1810 hrs.
Distribution : 4 Inf Bde.
X.X.X.X.X.X.
X.X.X.X.X.X.
See maps 3 and 4 below
APPENDIX ‘Q’.
SECRET.
2 DIV INSTRUCTION. 0444.
25 May 40.
SITUATION.
1. Situation on right of 2 Div is obscure. 6 Inf Bde have reached ST FLORIS 3437 and are continuing adv towards HAVERSKERQUE 3239 with a view to reaching the LYS Canal and subsequently the LA BASSEE Canal. On the right of 2 Div 44 Div is reaching its front and is moving by rd to ESTAIRES – NEUVE BERQUIN 4241 and by rd MERVILLE – LA MOTTE 3543 to clear up the situation North of the FORET DE NIEPPE and to adv onto its frontage on the AIRE – LA BASSEE Canal.
2. 137 Inf Bde (Brig Gawthorpe) is holding line to North of FORET DE NIEPPE with H.Q. at LA MOTTE AU BOIS 3543 until relieved by 132 Inf Bde (Brig Steele), 44 Div.
3. 2 Div has taken over the responsibility for defence of its sector. All tps French and British within the sector have come under 2 Div comd. During 25 May steps will be taken to relieve units of 25 Inf. Bde. Liaison Officer for French tps on Canal line West of BETHUNE reports H.Q. 4 Inf Bde.
4. French arty (one gp 75 mm (9 guns) one gp 155 mm (12 guns) ) , is disposed to support 2 Div right and front. French R.A. H.Q. are at LE TOURET 4430.
5. 6 King’s Own will be responsible for the close protection of MERVILLE and will be disposed to control all entrances into the village, with a central res. 7 King’s Own will be similarly responsible for ESTAIRES and 2 Div H.Q. gd on arrival.
6. As from 0300 hrs today, Armd Recce Bde, re-organised as a Div Cav Regt comes under comd 2 Div and will be located in CROIX DU BAC 5042. A liaison offr will report to and remain with 2 Div H.Q.
7. Enemy continues to infiltrate into our lines in the guise of civilians. All male civilians of apparent fighting age will be liquidated without hesitation should it be impossible to arrest and examine them without submitting our own tps to danger. Tps in rear of the fwd area will be particularly careful to curtail movement of civilians in their areas.
8. Tp Carrying Coys have been ordered away from 2 Div and reverted to G.H.Q.
9 Adv Div H.Q.is closing at present location and opening at BOUT DELVILLE 4535 at 1600 hrs. Rear H.Q. opens at SAILLY SUR LA LYS 4940 at same hr.
Sd C.H. Dolphin, Major,
for Lieut-Col.
G.S. 2 Div.
Distribution as per 2 Div O.O. No. 8 plus Armd Recce Bde.
APPENDIX ‘R’
0 561. 25 May 40.
2 DIV SITUATION REPORT 2000 hrs 25 MAY.
Enemy.
The enemy has maintained his pressure on the line of the Canal between AIRE and LA BASSEE. He has been held on this front and has been prevented from making any but very minor crossings.
Enemy arty has been increasingly active.
Own Tps.
Composite Div Cav Regt has today been placed under comd 2 Div.
Air.
Frequent convoys of enemy aircraft have passed over NEUVE CHAPELLE flying N.W. and S.E. In most cases these convoys consisted of large bomber or troop carrying aircraft escorted by fighters. At 1600 hrs four or five large aircraft flew over NEUVE CHAPELLE at a height of about 50 feet using M.Gs.
6 Inf Bde.
Enemy has been generally active along the whole bde front, especially S.W. of ST VENANT. Our fwd tps were prevented from reaching the line of the canal by intense arty and M.G. fire, especially from factory at 281379 . Our fwd posts are now on general line rd juncs 299386 and 303383 – just North of HAMET BILLET 3136- rd junc 338357.
4 Inf Bde.
Enemy has been active along the whole of Bde front most of the day. He succeeded in crossing the canal at SEVELINGUE 4029 and North of BEUVRY 4225. These attacks were made by inf supported by arty and mortars. Fire from the latter was reported as particularly accurate. Enemy recce aircraft were frequently over our lines throughout the day, and several parachutists were reported to have dropped.
Several Austrians were taken prisoner.
5 Inf Bde.
There has been little change on this bde front today. The line has been held by the French and 7 Queen’s but these are being relieved by units of 5 Inf Bde by 2330 hrs tonight.
Sd ?????
Major for Lt-Col.
G.S. 2 Div.
Distribution as for operation orders.
APPENDIX ‘S’.
M E S S A G E F O R M.
To : HOBO
From : DUGU A98 26
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
SECRET (.) certain offrs will be sent to UK forthwith from BEF of following categories (.) (A) unnecessary offrs on staff (B) unit offrs with experience required for training at home on scale of two offrs per bn or equivalent (.) four WOs or NCOs per bn or equivalent selected for their experience and value for training (.) above parties will be despatched today to report camp comdt DUNKERQUE (.) they will take only what equipment they can carry (.) unit tpt will be used (.)
ACK (.) all informed.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
See map 5 below
APPENDIX ‘U’.
2 DIV OPERATION INSTRUCTION No. 11.
1. 2 Div will withdraw behind canal de la LYS as soon as possible but will maintain touch with right French 32 Div through 5 D.G. covering force in co-operation with 7 Recce Gp (French) near LA BASSEE.
2. 5 D.G. will relieve 25 Inf Bde (less R Ir F and Queens) along area fwd of general line LA COUTURE 4452 – RUE DU BAS CHEMIN 4632 – NEUVE CHAPELLE 4932 by 1630 hrs and will deny that line to the enemy until 2200 hrs after which it will withdraw via ESTAIRES into res about LE DOULIEU 4543, but leaving patrols out to keep touch with the French.
3. 25 Inf Bde will assume responsibility for defence CANAL DE LA LYS from incl ry 3939 West of MERVILLE to incl ESTAIRES as soon as possible.
4. R.Ir F will remain present posn to cover withdrawal 4 Inf Bde after dark.
Bn will be finally ordered to withdraw by Comd 4 Inf Bde – H.Q. LESTREM
4336.
5. Queens with Coy ‘I’ Tanks come under comd 5 Inf Bde forthwith:-
(a) to clear up situation 5 Bde front.
(b) to assist this bde to withdraw.
6. All tps 6 & 7 K.O.R.R. (MERVILLE, ESTAIRES respectively) on 25 Inf Bde front, come under comd 25 Inf Bde.
7. 4/7 D.G., dismounted wing, is being ordered to hold CANAL DE LA LYS incl br 467388 to bend in canal 478388.
8. 5 Inf Bde will withdraw through 5 D.G.as soon as it can be disengaged and will R.V. NEUF BERQUIN 4248 and come into res.
9. 4 Inf Bde on withdrawal will R.V. LA NOUVELLE FRANCE 4430 and come into res.
10. 6 Inf Bde on withdrawal will continue right 5 Inf Bde on general line of ry NE about LE PRE 3642 - where efforts will be made to gain touch with 44 Div.
11. Arty.
- On withdrawal 5 Inf Bde, 10 Fd Regt comes under comd 5 D.G. – H.Q. PONT DU HEM (believed) 4735. All other arty withdraws under comd of 5 Inf Brigs concerned.
- On arrival new posn 99 Gp will support 6 Inf Bde , 10 Fd Gp will support 25 Inf Bde and 4/7 D.G.
12. M.Gs.
Will remain under comd as at present. H.Qs will report to this H.Q. locations North of LYS.
13. Demolitions.
25 Bde will be responsible for ordering demolitions all brs across the LYS.
5 D.G. will place an offr at the two brs ESTAIRES 458388, 467389 to report when all tps are clear.
14 Tps Carrying.
One sec will remain LAVENTIE area and come under comd 5 Inf Bde. Sec Comds will report that Bde about 480356.
All lorries Tp Carrying Coy not in use R.V. LE VERRIES 4644 forthwith.
15. Div H.Q. closes present location forthwith. Opens Report Centre 445416 at 1700 hrs.
Sd B de Fonblanque.
Lieut-Col G. S. 2 Div.
1615 hrs.
NOTE: All WITHDRAWALS will be through ESTAIRES or to the EAST.
See map 6 below
APPENDIX ‘X’.
To : 4, 5, 6 Inf Bdes RA. 5 D.G.
From : 2 Div 30/5
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
There will be no further destruction of any type of equipment (.) all fighting and other vehs in possession or guns and any other equipment which can NOT be embarked will be handed over or left in their posns (.) to meet the latter case accurate location statements of weapons and vehs will be forwarded to this HQ forthwith (.) during the day active steps will be taken to salvage serviceable equipment of all natures into dumps within formation or unit areas.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
APPENDIX ‘Y’
To : 4 Inf Bde.
From : 2 Div.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
comd and staff 4 inf bde and two drivers will report forthwith to beach headquarters MALO LES BAINS to take over control of A beach (.) brigadier should report to area HQ the bastion DUNKERQUE immediately (.) offrs already detailed by 3 corps as MLO are remaining temporarily to clear beach (.) any further offrs or Ors required will be detailed from those coming fwd for embarkation (.) two cars without drivers are available at MALO LES BAINS for 4 inf bde staff.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
ROLL OF OFFICERS - 1st BN THE ROYAL SCOTS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Lieut- Col Money H.D.K. Wounded.
Major Winchester C.C. (M.C.) Killed.
Major Byam Shaw G. Killed.
Capt A/Major Watson R.G. Killed.
Capt Bt/Major Mitchell-Innes A.T. Wounded.
Capt Bucher F.M. Wounded.
Capt Dickson S.G. Wounded.
Lieut A/Capt Thorburn W.I.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut A/Capt Kerr F.R.N. Wounded.
Lieut Haldane A.N. Back. ADC at Div.
Lieut McKinnon L.J. Missing.
Lieut Barker (RAMC) P.B. Prisoner.
2/Lieut Kyle W.E. Wounded
2/Lieut Errington C.J.R. Missing.
2/Lieut MacDuff Duncan C.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut McGregor J.A. With unit.
2/Lieut Liddell L.E. Wounded.
2/Lieut Turcan R.S. Wounded.
2/Lieut Cruikshank J. Missing.
2/Lieut Anderson J.F. Missing.
2/Lieut Drysdale J.F.W. Killed.
2/Lieut Page D. Missing.
2/Lieut Walker W.E. Wounded & Missing.
2/Lieut Gallie R.E. Killed.
2/Lieut Thorne W.R.L. Missing.
2/Lieut Elliott E.I.C. Missing.
2/Lieut Edie F.M.W. With unit.
Lieut Adjt A/Capt Bruce J. Missing.
Capt (QM) Read G.W. With unit.
Attached.
Rev McLean N. Wounded- prisoner.
French Liaison Offr MARTELL Prisoner.
2/Lieut Carpenter Missing.
ROLL OF OFFICERS – 2nd BN THE ROYAL NORFOLK REGIMENT.
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
A/Lieut-Col de Wilton G.P. St C. Evacuated Sick.
A/Lieut-Col Charlton N.P. Wounded.
A/Major Marshall F.R. Wounded.
A/Major Richardson J.C.C. Missing.
Major Ryder L.C.D. Missing.
Capt Elwes J.H. Missing.
Capt Allen G.H. Wounded.
Capt Barclay F.P. (M.C.) Wounded.
Capt Gordon A.L. Missing.
Capt Long C.W.H. Missing.
Lieut Hallett J.N.R. Missing.
Lieut Yallop C.E. Killed.
Lieut Edgeworth C.E. Missing.
2/Lieut Woodwark J.G. Missing.
2/Lieut Buchanan J.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Swainson C.C. With unit.
2/Lieut Elson C.E. Killed.
2/Lieut Fulton C.E.N.C. With unit.
2/Lieut Jones D.E. With unit.
2/Lieut Merritt N.F.H. With unit.
2/Lieut Slater T.J.K. Missing.
2/Lieut Simpson T.P.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Potter K.A.S. Missing.
2/Lieut Willison C.A. Missing.
Lieut (QM) Grant A.E. With unit.
Lieut Draffin (RAMC) D.A. Missing.
Attached.
Capt R.J. Hastings 2 Oxs & Bucks L.I. Missing.
Rev G.A.B. Lee, C.F. With unit.
ROLL OF OFFICERS – 1/8th BN THE LANCASHIRE FUSILIERS.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Major Stayner D.J.P.P. Missing.
Major Gardner A.H. Wounded.
A/Major Eaton F.S. Missing.
Capt Haworth R.L.G. Missing.
Capt Lutyens P.G.T. Missing.
Capt Haig W.G. Wounded.
Capt Style D.C.W. Wounded.
Capt Moon A.J. With unit.
Lieut Martin A.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Wilman J.H. Missing.
2/Lieut Noden G.C. Missing.
2/Lieut Hoyle J.D. Missing.
2/Lieut Ward D.R. Missing.
2/Lieut Verity P.L. Missing.
2/Lieut Brown K.A. Missing.
2/Lieut Carmichael L.T. With unit.
2/Lieut Taylor G.R. Missing.
2/Lieut Komrower A.G. Wounded.
2/Lieut Entwistle P.K. Missing
2/Lieut Spiers D.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Hammersley G.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Broadhead J.B. Missing.
2/Lieut Walton D.T. Wounded.
2/Lieut Clarke N.S. Missing.
2/Lieut Crossland F.S. Wounded.
2/Lieut Wilson C.J. With unit.
Lieut (QM) Christie J.L. With unit.
Lieut Sillar (RAMC) W. Missing.
Attached.
Rev Passmore C.F. W.A. With unit.
TO ALL RANKS
4TH INFANTRY BRIGADE.
In the hope that many of those who are not yet with us might return, that in the confusion of the withdrawal and evacuation of DUNKIRK there might still be men of the Brigade in reception camps and assembly areas in England who might rejoin, I have refrained until now from expressing to you my admiration, my deep appreciation and my pride in the magnificent deeds performed by ALL RANKS of the Brigade from May 10th to May 31st.
You have acquitted yourselves, as I expected you would do, with devotion, with courage and in keeping with the very highest traditions of the regiments to which you belong.
When history comes to be written, it will be recorded that the part played by the 4th Infantry Brigade was second to none in valour, dauntless courage and tenacity. Its refusal to give an inch to the enemy contributed tremendously to the successful withdrawal of the three hundred and thirty thousand British and French troops to this country. It was an optimistic hope that perhaps thirty thousand might be got away; three hundred thousand was considered an impossibility; but deeds such as yours made impossible possible.
The Brigade went into Belgium on May 10th 90 Officers and 2430 Other Ranks strong, today its known strength is 25 officers and 697 Other ranks. You have indeed given of your best, but not in vain, and if called upon I know you will do the same again.
I am indeed proud to have had the honour of Commanding you and leading the 4th Infantry Brigade in battle.
Well done and God bless you.
*E.G. WARREN, Brigadier,
15th June 1940. Commander, 4th Infantry Brigade.
*Brigadier E. G. Warren's official title was Brigade Commander.
THE BRIGADE MAPS
Map 1
Map 2
Map 3
Map 4
Map 5
Map 6