The historic perspective to the evacuation of Dunkirk as portrayed in numerous articles, magazines, newspapers, books, documentaries and films has always been the portrayal of a beleaguered force, heroically re-patriated through the bravery of many small ships and individuals.
Few articles etc, however, focus on those left behind to hold the German advance. Throughout our research into this web site we have come across many instances of the bravery and self-sacrifice of those left behind.
At times comments made contemporaneously question the course of history. On this page we will include comments written during the war which suggest that those involved in the rearguard action were not totally aware of the Dunkirk evacuation, nor did they receive the accolades that they deserved. Bill O'Callaghan,Bert Pooley, together with various regiments, were all part of this action and we feel they have never received the recognition they deserve.
Below are comments on this matter which can be found at various points of this site.
Captain Robert Hastings in his war diary alludes to ignorance over the Dunkirk operation (Operation Dynamo) on a number of occasions including the following:
"Our four companies were in positions covering the canal for the definite object of preventing it being crossed. From right to left our companies were in the order A. B. C. D. I can't remember the extent of the Battalion front in miles but it was an incredibly wide one for the size of our formation and in consequence was only thinly held. Our role, when we first went into our positions was described to us as "an outpost position with a defensive right flank". From time to time we received the encouraging news of an impending counter attack by the French and of support from a tank battalion. None of this support ever came and, in actual fact our position subtly changed its character and became in effect a rearguard to cover the embarkation about to take place at Dunkirk. We did not have this, for no information even reached us of the general situation. In fact, so great was our ignorance at this time, that if the name of Dunkirk had been mentioned to us, which it was not, we would have assumed as a matter of course that further British reinforcements were being landed at that port."
Further in his diary he talks of the lack of recognition for the fighting rearguard:
"We had been in captivity for almost a year before anything like the full story of Dunkirk began to filter through. This news was brought to us by newly arrived prisoners. We then heard of the great welcome accorded by the people of England to those who got home and this news slightly depressed us. It was not entirely that we envied these people their good fortune, though not unnaturally we did feel something of this. It was rather, I think, that we felt that if there was any honour in getting large British forces back to British soil such honour belonged least of all to those who were themselves got back. Such honour as there was, belonged rather to those who got them away in boats at Dunkirk and by those whose gallant and costly rear guards extending as far back as 40 miles behind Dunkirk enabled the evacuation to take place at all."
"The 2nd Battalion the Royal Norfolk Regiment, some of whose work I have endeavoured to describe, were amongst those who performed this very important task. If the effort made by a unit is proportional to the casualties sustained, and I think it must be considered so, then the effort made by this particular unit must be notable amongst the achievements in France in 1940, for I know of no unit that had a longer list of casualties in that campaign. I am aware that in the version of Lord Gort's report that was received here, much greater prominence was given to the importance of the resistance put up by the units that were at Calais. In fact no reference whatever was made to those units that necessarily had to be sacrificed behind Dunkirk. There may or may not have been political reasons for this misplacement of emphasis, as I personally think it to be, but whatever the reason, the fact remained that the German commentators, one of which I have quoted, did not fail to recognise the importance of the resistance at other places. But aside from the importance of a regiment's achievement which may always be a matter of opinion, and never perhaps wholly unbiased, the cold figures of dead and wounded are the sole means of measuring the extent of the efforts made.The numbers of killed and wounded amongst those units that operated at Calais were not high in comparison to the devastation suffered elsewhere. But it must not be thought that I wish in the slightest degree to detract from the value to the whole campaign of the achievement at Calais. That is very far removed from my intention. What I am endeavouring to do is to distinguish two factors (a) efforts put forth and (b) the value of the results achieved. I maintain that it is a grave error to suppose that these two elements are necessarily closely related."
Few articles etc, however, focus on those left behind to hold the German advance. Throughout our research into this web site we have come across many instances of the bravery and self-sacrifice of those left behind.
At times comments made contemporaneously question the course of history. On this page we will include comments written during the war which suggest that those involved in the rearguard action were not totally aware of the Dunkirk evacuation, nor did they receive the accolades that they deserved. Bill O'Callaghan,Bert Pooley, together with various regiments, were all part of this action and we feel they have never received the recognition they deserve.
Below are comments on this matter which can be found at various points of this site.
Captain Robert Hastings in his war diary alludes to ignorance over the Dunkirk operation (Operation Dynamo) on a number of occasions including the following:
"Our four companies were in positions covering the canal for the definite object of preventing it being crossed. From right to left our companies were in the order A. B. C. D. I can't remember the extent of the Battalion front in miles but it was an incredibly wide one for the size of our formation and in consequence was only thinly held. Our role, when we first went into our positions was described to us as "an outpost position with a defensive right flank". From time to time we received the encouraging news of an impending counter attack by the French and of support from a tank battalion. None of this support ever came and, in actual fact our position subtly changed its character and became in effect a rearguard to cover the embarkation about to take place at Dunkirk. We did not have this, for no information even reached us of the general situation. In fact, so great was our ignorance at this time, that if the name of Dunkirk had been mentioned to us, which it was not, we would have assumed as a matter of course that further British reinforcements were being landed at that port."
Further in his diary he talks of the lack of recognition for the fighting rearguard:
"We had been in captivity for almost a year before anything like the full story of Dunkirk began to filter through. This news was brought to us by newly arrived prisoners. We then heard of the great welcome accorded by the people of England to those who got home and this news slightly depressed us. It was not entirely that we envied these people their good fortune, though not unnaturally we did feel something of this. It was rather, I think, that we felt that if there was any honour in getting large British forces back to British soil such honour belonged least of all to those who were themselves got back. Such honour as there was, belonged rather to those who got them away in boats at Dunkirk and by those whose gallant and costly rear guards extending as far back as 40 miles behind Dunkirk enabled the evacuation to take place at all."
"The 2nd Battalion the Royal Norfolk Regiment, some of whose work I have endeavoured to describe, were amongst those who performed this very important task. If the effort made by a unit is proportional to the casualties sustained, and I think it must be considered so, then the effort made by this particular unit must be notable amongst the achievements in France in 1940, for I know of no unit that had a longer list of casualties in that campaign. I am aware that in the version of Lord Gort's report that was received here, much greater prominence was given to the importance of the resistance put up by the units that were at Calais. In fact no reference whatever was made to those units that necessarily had to be sacrificed behind Dunkirk. There may or may not have been political reasons for this misplacement of emphasis, as I personally think it to be, but whatever the reason, the fact remained that the German commentators, one of which I have quoted, did not fail to recognise the importance of the resistance at other places. But aside from the importance of a regiment's achievement which may always be a matter of opinion, and never perhaps wholly unbiased, the cold figures of dead and wounded are the sole means of measuring the extent of the efforts made.The numbers of killed and wounded amongst those units that operated at Calais were not high in comparison to the devastation suffered elsewhere. But it must not be thought that I wish in the slightest degree to detract from the value to the whole campaign of the achievement at Calais. That is very far removed from my intention. What I am endeavouring to do is to distinguish two factors (a) efforts put forth and (b) the value of the results achieved. I maintain that it is a grave error to suppose that these two elements are necessarily closely related."