Le Paradis Massacre (In Depth)
Lead-Up to the Massacre
*- Note - British ranks are used in description of German officers in order to enhance the understanding of their roles and ranks.
Below are details of the positions of the 2nd Battalion Royal Norfolk Regiment in the days leading to the massacre:
A TIMELINE
22nd May:
The Escaut Line is abandoned and there is a withdrawal to the Belgium frontline defences known as the Gort Line.
1100 hours: Having withdrawn from the Escaut Line the 2/Norfolks arrive at the Bois de Wannehain on the Gort Line covering a distance of eight miles on foot in nine hours. It is a quiet day for the 2/Norfolks who are now able to rest in their positions.
23rd May:
1400 hours: As part of 4th Brigade, the 2/Norfolks are instructed to hand over their position on the Gort Line to the French and ordered to man a 21 mile stretch of the Canal Line from the railway bridge south east of Aire to La Bassee.
1700 hours: the Brigade is ordered to move into an area around Aubers 20 miles to the west.
2100 hours: The move commences. The 2/Norfolks will face most of the action on and around the Canal Line.
Capt. Hastings (2/Norfolks) observes that lack of sleep and the need to be in a state of constant alert is beginning to take its toll, often causing reasonable officers to act out of character.
SS Totenkopf under Gen. Eicke reach the Canal Line sending men across La Bassee Canal without reconnaissance. These come under fire from British artillery and mortars. Gen. Eicke brings up his own artillery to help the stricken men.
24th May:
0700 hours: Having reached Aubers, Maj. Ryder is advised that the 2/Norfolks billets' are at Colon just north of Bethune. Capt. Hastings is sent to reconnoitre the sector. The remainder of the Battalion under Maj. Richardson arrive at Colon, battling through congested roads. A temporary HQ is established.
The 2/Norfolks rest and concentrate on concealment from the Luftwaffe. 4th Infantry Brigade advise there are no enemy troops in the area although French civilians tell otherwise. The Royal Scots are near Essar and the Lancashire Fusiliers are north of Le Touret. The 2/Norfolks are down to half strength comprising of 22 officers and 428 other ranks.
1400 hours: Maj. Ryder receives orders to organise reconnaissance of La Bassee Canal from a bridge outside Bethune to the Bois de Pacqueaut as 300 Germans and a few armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) have crossed and are engaged with some French units.
Capt. Hallett is left in charge as Maj. Ryder sets off with the reconnaissance party, which includes Capt. Long, in the direction along the canal from Bethune. This remains incident free until they reach the outskirts of Le Cornet Malo where they come under light machine gun fire from both sides of the Bios de Pacqueaut. This evidences that the enemy are over the canal. Maj. Ryder reports to Brig. Warren at l’Epinette (Brigade HQ) who suspected the Germans were over the canal but only in small numbers.
On leaving l’Epinette, German artillery open up between l’Epinette and Locon. Maj. Ryder finally reaches the Battalion area to find his own HQ and other buildings damaged by German artillery.
Whilst Maj. Ryder was away, acting Maj. Elwes and Capt. Long have formed the Battalion in a defensive position facing Bethune having received information about the German advance from French troops.
Maj. Ryder now intends to move Battalion HQ to Le Paradis and tasks Capt. Hastings to find a suitable site. Driving in the dark and with inadequate maps, Capt. Hastings finds himself near Le Cornet Malo. He retraces his steps to Colon where it was decided that a temporary Battalion HQ should be set up near C Company HQ at Locon.
The SS Totenkopf assault engineers complete a bridge over the canal and Gen. Eicke leads the first wave across. Again he is pinned down but a bridgehead is established. He is then thwarted and enraged by Hitler’s ‘Halt Order’ which means withdrawing across the canal with 42 dead, 121 wounded and five missing to be in compliance with the order. Until the ‘Halt Order’ is rescinded the SS Totenkopf can only regroup and prepare for a major assault. British mortar and artillery increase the toll causing Gen. Eicke to order a series of small SS squad raids over the canal line.
25th May :
Early Hours: all four 2/Royal Norfolk Companies move into their position by La Bassee Canal. The 2/Norfolks are now in the centre of 4th Brigade’s position. C Company on the left run into Germans but succeed in driving them back over the canal. A and C Companies confirm they are in position. Battalion HQ await news of B and D Companies. As nothing is heard, patrols from A and C Companies are sent out but fail to make contact.
0300 hours: the men from A and C Companies are stood to. The front is quiet but an increase in Luftwaffe activity is foreseen come daylight. German machine guns open up on C Company but A Company reports little activity.
0600 hours: Battalion HQ hears from D Company confirming they are in position and in touch with B Company. 2nd Lt. Willeson and runners are sent forward to investigate and establish B and D Companies are in the wrong position. Capt. Long notes that B and D Companies have taken up position on a branch line of the canal in error.
B Company is supposed to be on the right of the battalion line, then A and D Companies respectively forming the centre with C Company on the left flank. B and D Companies are presently facing Bethune and are too far forward, causing a gap that has to be filled temporarily until they can move back to the correct position. The Battalion’s Pioneer Platoon bridges this gap on the right of C Company until the necessary readjustment can take place under the cover of darkness.
Later in the morning: The Pioneers received some support from a unit of machine gunners from depleted Companies of the Manchester Regiment. C Company has been unable to locate any force on their left although the Lancashire Fusiliers are there and attempting to make contact with the 2/Norfolks.
Midday: Maj. Ryder sets out for Brigade HQ. Maj. Elwes takes command as Maj. Richardson is missing. Fighting continues along the front. D Company engages the enemy who has crossed the canal. C Company comes under frequent heavy attack as does Battalion HQ.
Whilst there is sufficient cable to connect with Brigade HQ at l-Epinette, there is insufficient to connect with the four companies especially as some of their positions at times are uncertain. Battalion HQ therefore has little idea what is happening in the company sectors.
Maj. Ryder leaves l-Epinette but instead of going to Battalion HQ goes to A Company to organise a counter attack against a German penetration at Bois de Pacqueaut. To bolster A Company a company from the Lancashire Fusiliers is brought in. The Norfolk Carrier Platoon under 2nd Lt. Elson gives further support. Had there been a cable link to A Company then Maj. Ryder’s prolonged absence from Battalion HQ would have been resolved.
1430 hours: 2nd Lt. Elson meets Maj Ryder on the crossroads outside Le Cornet Malo and an attack is planned to drive the Germans out of the wood (Bois de Pacqueaut) led by Acting Captain Yallop and the men of A Company supported by Lancashire Fusiliers under 2nd Lt Spears. They move into the wood with bayonets fixed. Through machine gun fire, the 2/Norfolks rush the enemy. There are many casualties but they meet the SS Totenkopf at close quarters and drive them out of the wood. Capt. Long reports ‘the enemy is unable to face the bayonet at close quarters’.
With Maj. Ryder directing operations, 2nd Lt. Elson’s carriers advance driving the Germans back towards the canal. German resistance stiffens and the 2/Norfolks cannot recapture the bridge.
The attack is at a price which leaves Acting Capt. Yallop killed and A Company losing half its strength. Two carriers are destroyed and 2nd Lt. Elson is missing (he later turns up at a POW camp to help Capt. Long compile the report of the Battle of La Bassee).
Dusk: Orders are issued for B and D Companies to commence moving into their correct positions. Capt. Hastings is sent out with a small party to reconnoitre a route to the new HQ at Le Paradis. The Germans continue to probe defences and attempt to repair one of the canal bridges. C Company report constant enemy activity and send out a patrol along that section of the canal. Company HQ also organises a patrol to try and make contact with patrols from A Company.
2330 hours: The area is confirmed clear of Germans but A Company cannot be located.
There is still an acute sleep shortage. Several attacks are put in on the 2/Norfolks section of the canal line and small bridgeheads are established on the north-east bank. The 2/Norfolks are still holding their own.
Maj. Ryder’s plan to move Battalion HQ to Le Paradis is thwarted by lack of maps and signage which causes Capt. Hastings, who is to select a site at Le Paradis, to get lost and end up with a new HQ near Le Cornet Malo.
Night of 25th-26th May: it is reaffirmed to move the H.Q. to Le Paradis. Under the cover of darkness the two errant companies move into the correct position and at first light D Company moves into the gap between A Company and C Company and B Company to the right of A Company around Le Cornet Malo. Maj. Ryder has now established a front line. From defending a 128 mile front the total line now being defended by the 2/Norfolks' depleted ranks is approximately two miles, from the Bois de Pacqueaut, just west of the road leading to from the canal, to Le Cornet Malo, along the canal north of Avelette.
Now in fox-holes the line is being machine gunned and mortar shelled.
Just before midnight: Maj. Ryder sets off to Le Paradis.
26th May:
0030 hours: The convoy reaches Duriez Farm and the last HQ is established.
0330 hours: The Germans launch an attack on C Company with small armed parties but a much heavier attack went in on A Company and B Company positioned near Le Cornet Malo.
The Germans repair a bridge close to area to allow tanks to cross. Supported by intense and accurate mortar fire along the whole front the Germans advance on Le Cornet Malo.
Fighting in the village is fierce. At Bois de Parqueaut the enemy is driven out by counter attacks from A Company and B Company supported by the Royal Scots. Mortars supporting this area is running low on ammunition and Brigade HQ is slow to order supplies.
Manpower at Le Cornet Malo is now critical and Battalion HQ Duriez Farm receives confirmation that A and B Company are no longer effective.
Establishing the front line now involves sending Capt. Hastings up to the crossroads at Le Cornet Malo to locate A Company on the 2/Norfolks' right. Capt.Hastings meets up with 2nd Lt. Slater, who has replaced 2nd Lt. Yallop (killed the previous day) with all that remains of A Company (seven) having been overrun by tanks further up the canal.
Lt. Edgeworth, commanding B Company, also arrives at the crossroads advising Capt. Hastings that he has been reduced to 19 men but is holding a line 200-300 yards in front of the crossroads. Although there appears to be no Panzers in the vicinity, Lt. Edgeworth thinks there are Germans in the village in front of his position.
Advising Maj. Ryder at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm, Capt. Hastings is ordered to take command at the Le Cornet Malo crossroads with both what is left of A and B Companies. The crossroads is to be held ‘at all costs to the last man and round’.
Capt. Hastings gets unexpected reinforcements at the crossroads from 50-60 Royal Scots from north of the canal. Capt. Hastings takes command of them advising them to hold the crossroads at all costs and there must be no withdrawal.
With 50-60 Royal Scots and about 25 2/Norfolks together with some extras brought up by Capt. Long they are now in excess of 75 to defend the line behind the hedge row (previously held by Lt. Edgeworth) and astride the road to the wood.
The area now becomes under heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Capt. Hastings and Lts. Willeson and Edgeworth (killed later in the day) remain with their companies to arrange the final defended posts. The 1/Scots take over the area between road and wood.
Capt. Long drives back to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm noting that many of the wounded are being evacuated from the forward positions. He reports to Maj. Ryder that the position at Le Cornet Malo has been consolidated.
Capt. Hastings is also ordered back to Battalion H.Q Duriez Farm leavings Capt. Hallett in command. Maj. Richardson, missing the previous day, arrives at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm shortly after Capt. Long. He had been cut off on patrol with D Company and reports that Germans appear to be present in large numbers.
1100 hours Brig. Warren arrives at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm and corroborates what Maj. Richardson has observed. He also orders ‘last man last round.’
The Royal Scots HQ is moved from Calonne and established in Le Paradis. The 1/Scots are deployed on the right of the 2/Norfolks manning the defences organised by Capt. Hastings and Capt. Long in the Le Cornet Malo and Bois de Pacqueaut area.
German Panzers have now pushed through a line between Robecq and St Venant and are bearing down on Merville two miles to the north of Le Paradis.
After Brig. Warren departs Battalion HQ Duriez Farm, Maj. Ryder reorganises his officers. Maj. Richardson is appointed 2nd in Command, Lt. Woodwark of C Company is placed in command of A Company, The Motor Transport Officer, Capt. Hallett, is to command what is left of B Company and 2nd Lt. Buchanan is to lead D Company. 2nd Lt. Jones of D Company assumes command of the carriers while 2nd Lt. Merritt takes over Capt. Hallett’s role as Motor Transport Officer. Capt. Hastings is to command HQ Company.
Capt. Hastings is to transform Battalion HQ at Duriez Farm into a stronghold capable of being defended from four sides albeit it is not able to withstand a long siege. Spirits are lifted by a message from 4th Brigade H.Q. (Brig. Warren) “counter attack from French imminent” and a tank battalion is on its way. Several messages similar to this are received before Germans release their attack the next day.
There is little respite from the SS Totenkopf and defence is fierce but German Panzers are kept at bay by A/T rifles (Anti-Tank Rifles) and LMG (Light Machine Guns).
Capt. Hallett takes a proactive approach to his command following Capt. Hastings' departure and leads a patrol from B Company forward to the southern side of Le Cornet Malo firing at Germans approaching from the direction of the canal. Sadly he does not have mortars but his rifles and Bren guns halt the Germans in their tracks. Capt. Hallett, unchallenged, advances again capturing one German (who is in a ditch) with other Germans surrendering without a fight. The prisoner advises Capt. Hallett that he is facing a German Division across the canal.
The Germans counter attack driving Capt. Hallett back from his forward posts. He sends out a patrol to identify the German positions on which he launches a mortar attack which has since become available. He is rewarded by what sounds like direct hits.
A Platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with machine guns arrive and take position behind A and D Companies. The Luftwaffe has a free rein.
1857 hours: OPERATION DYNAMO BEGINS.
At end of day there is an uneasy calm. Battalion numbers are approx. 250 which is equivalent of just over two manned companies. Maj. Ryder braces his men for a heavy attack on 27th May
27th May :
The SS Totenkopf is preparing to smash their way through stubborn resistance in order to reach Bailleul half way between Le Paradis and Ypres.
Within a loop of the Canal d’Aire, two fresh untried German SS Motorised Infantry Units have taken up position between Hinges and Mont Bernanchan. The SS Totenkopt Infantry Regiment 2 commanded by Col. Bertling and Totenkopt Infantry Regiment 3 led by Lt. Col. Goetz supported by 4th Panzer Division and an SS military regiment are to throw their full weight against what they initially thought were the Norfolk Grenadiers.
At nearby village of Riez du Vinage the 1st Battalion of Totenkopf 2 have crossed the canal by way of repaired bridge and immediate opposition is encountered. SS Sergeant Leitl, a platoon commander in No 3 Company Totenkopf 2, states the defence of houses held them up for long periods. Riez du Vintage is eventually taken and Totenkopf 2 take cover in Bois de Pacqueaut.
At Dawn: an assault is launched at Le Cornet Malo. No 3 Company, commanded by Capt. Fritz Knoechlein, is in the centre, No 2 Company under Capt. Stoeter on the right with Capt. Kaltofen’s No 1 Company in semi reserve.
Capt. Knoechlein states progress is slow fighting yard by yard through the villages. Losses are heavy with a platoon commander killed and No 2 Platoon suffering badly. There is a brief respite when they are joined by the arrival of other Totenkopf troops. Dead comrades are collected and Capt. Knoechlein takes a brief burial service. During the service it is alleged he has spoken of avenging their deaths.
Increasing numbers of Panzers are crossing the repaired canal bridges. Lorries are also used as bridges for Panzer usage.
0500 hours: tanks appear in B Company’s section. Capt. Hallett notifies Battalion HQ Duriez Farm of about a dozen before his line is cut. Signaller Bob Brown at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm confirms contact with B Company has been lost.
Despite falling back, the remnants of Capt. Hallett’s B Company defiantly face the Panzers placing Mills grenades in their tracks under their line of fire. Four tanks are abandoned and, with order restored, Capt. Hallett gets the LMG back into position and the A/T rifles mounted. With the SS Totenkopf infantry some way behind the Panzers (they will suffer from Capt. Hallett’s Bren guns when they arrive). Sadly Capt. Hallett’s B Company also suffer losses and, following the loss of his last rifleman, the injured Capt. Hallett is taken prisoner as he tries to escape.
There is a solitary mortar team which includes Sgt. Maj. Ireland and Privates Brough and Cockerel endeavouring to support the defence of Le Cornet Malo. They are finally eliminated.
1000 hours: a heavy counter attack is expected by a French infantry brigade supported by a British tank regiment. This message from Brigade HQ is met with optimism at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. This is relayed to all companies except B Company where contact had been lost. Had the attack occurred at 1000 hours it would still have been too late for the defenders of Le Cornet Malo as the village was occupied by this time.
Two hours before the capture of Le Cornet Malo, ten men from the Pioneer Platoon returned to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm having spent the night in a ruined cottage supporting D Company. A small number of them (volunteers including Ernie Farrow) are assigned to blow the bridge at Pont d’Avelette which had been left intact for the BEF to escape. Using Maj. Ryder’s car they become under intense machine gun fire. Sadly the bridge has already been taken by the enemy.
Back at Le Cornet Malo 1st Battalion Totenkopt 2 set up HQ. Capt. Knoechlein tries unsuccessfully to take control of wounded BEF servicemen.
The German troops suffer considerable casualties attacking across La Bassee Canal. The defenders, however, are being worn down, A company and D Company report heavy attacks by tank and infantry. Several enemy tanks are put out of action in A Company’s area by A/T rifles and Bren gun fire but their own losses are heavy. Lt. Willeson is wounded in the arm and out of action. Enemy troops and light artillery are on the right front of Battalion HQ and enemy mortar fire coming in from Bois de Pacqueaut.
As the SS Totenkopf move forward the 1/Scots are seen to fall back rapidly. Withdrawal is stopped as the 2/Norfolks right flank would be exposed.
Battalion HQ Duriez Farm comes under attack from two Panzers 400 yard away. The 2/Norfolks return fire with a hail of machine guns and anti-tank rounds halting their progress for the time being. There is no artillery or air support for the 2/Norfolks.
Contact with A Company ceases and C and D Companies are still not reporting back. There is considerable German movement along roads on left flank towards Locon. Maj. Ryder tries to carry out Brig. Warren’s ‘last man, last round’ orders.
A platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with ammunition, undamaged weapons and suffering only light casualties join up at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. They are advised of ‘last man, last round’ stance and ordered to return to their former position unless ordered by the 2/Norfolks to do otherwise. However, they are observed leaving their position and abandoning their weapons a few minutes later.
Crews from field guns return to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm as probably their position has become untenable – breach blocks are thrown into the pond and they are issued with rifles to defend the farm.
The fate of A Company is confirmed. Having been overrun, Lt Woodwark and six men, the only survivors of A Company, reach Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. Getting these men back to defend Duriez Farm is crucial and meets with Maj. Ryder’s approval. Private Albert Pooley is in the remnants of A Company.
Mortar bombs begin to rain onto the farmhouse and fires are extinguished. From his position Pooley observes the landscape along Rue du Paradis and enemy soldiers moving behind the farm. Ferocious defence of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm brings the inexperienced SS Totenkopf to a temporary standstill. In open countryside around Le Paradis, the Germans are still suffering severely (one battalion lost, together with all its company commanders, leaving only NCO’s in charge).
SS Sergeant Leitl states ‘the defence of houses held them up and they were very exposed as the British snipers were extremely skilful’.
As morning progresses: the defence stiffens and the SS Totenkopf attacks break down into a series of small vicious actions. Gen. Eicke begins to struggle to regain control of his troops.
By early afternoon: the attack has ground to a halt. Gen Eicke has to get the attack moving again as the taking of Le Paradis is essential for conformity of lines operational on the right and left. If the defence of Le Paradis is prolonged then the SS Totenkopf’s left flank would be vulnerable.
Eventually Gen Eicke orders instructions which reinforce that the taking of Le Paradis is essential and all available reserves are to be used to protect the Totenkopf’s left flank. German reports state that the centre of Le Paradis is strongly held by snipers especially around the church and Duriez Farm, the latter being defended like a fortress. With the 1st Battalion almost wiped out orders are issued for 3rd Battalion Totenkopf 2 together with elements of Totenkopf 3 to complete assault on Le Paradis.
Regimental Commander of Totenkopf 3, Lt. Col. Goetz, comes with his men to execute orders but is killed by a sniper bullet on reaching the crossroads close to Le Paradis.
An attack from the rear is now attempted by a German motor cycle unit. Heavy fire drives them into a farm building just across the road where they set up a defensive position. This unit now delivers a fusillade on Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. The 2/Norfolks find it difficult to close them down until Sgt. Maj. Cockaday grabs a Bren gun and charges into the open firing at the German position. Despite being wounded he keeps the enemy occupied while Maj. Ryder and a small party do a flanking attack, forcing the Germans to fall back. Capt. Long then organises the defences of this now advance post whist Maj. Ryder returns to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm to update Brigade HQ of the position.
Regardless of casualties, the SS Totenkopf press forward with mortar rounds and artillery shells. British artillery rounds start to land on Duriez Farm. Capt. Long, dodges through a hail of German bullets, to rectify the position by getting a message out of Battalion HQ to prevent this uncalled for attack continuing.
The enemy is now in force to the rear and the battalion is becoming isolated. C Company still reports tanks and enemy troop carriers moving around the left flank. Troop carriers are also moving around the right flank in Le Paradis. These are met with artillery and suffer heavy casualties.
The 2/Norfolk’s forward party retires to next house which is held to the end. The enemy begin working up the ditches towards the defended posts which are now:-
i) Houses on right and left of road (to the rear of Battalion HQ)
ii) Battalion HQ farmhouse, yard and ditches surrounding
iii) Houses left and right of the road and the road block (in front of Battalion HQ).
All houses are strongly fortified.
News comes through from D Company that only Lt. Buchanan and five men are left. They are driven back to their company HQ where they will stand and fight. This is the last that Battalion HQ Duriez Farm hears from them.
German fire intensifies on Battalion HQ Duriez Farm and C Company makes contact. Acting Maj. Elwes inform them that his position is surrounded and requests artillery support. This does not materialise. The lines fall silent and all companies are now cut off from Battalion HQ Duriez Farm.
1300 hours: War Diary of 4th infantry Brigade states 2nd Division issues a Permissive Order to Brig. Warren for withdrawal but no rendezvous given. There is hope for an organised withdrawal in daylight but at 1415 hours a rendezvous at La Nouvelle France is received and communicated to 2/Norfolks who agreed no withdrawal until dark. It is requested this be passed on to 1/Scots but this cannot be achieved until after dark.
1330 hours: Several more shells slam into the Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. HQ and Brigade War Diaries record the last courageous message from Maj. Ryder is received at this time. ‘HQ on fire, wireless in cellar could not be got out therefore it would be broken up”.
The Regiment is fighting on its own ground and is surrounded. Maj. Ryder’s final words are that “he would bring his Battalion to the rendezvous after dark”. No further communications are received.
The wireless is destroyed and Battalion paperwork including Capt. Hasting’s diary notes are placed in a sack and thrown into the pond. All other equipment, which could prove useful to the Germans, is destroyed including rifles and a remaining truck.
1600 hours: Capt. Long reports that the Battalion’s strength (including 50 in C Company) is estimated at 100 all ranks. C Company, although numerically strong, is without communications, completely isolated and outside the main movement of events. Capt. Long surmises the enemy can therefore hold C Company and deal with them later whilst concentrating on reducing key centres of resistance.
German units are still moving to rear of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm which provides good targets but too many for the available ammunition. Capt. Hastings collects rounds from the wounded and issues orders to fire only when certain.
1640 hours: This is the time 2/Norfolk’s records state that the permissive order from Brigade is received stating ‘hold position until dusk then if possible withdraw to North East to La Nouvelle France’. The message could not be relayed to 1/Scots and Lancs Fuseliers.
Maj. Ryder calls a conference with his available officers suggesting when darkness falls parties of men, each accompanied by an officer, should attempt to crawl out of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. This is a forlorn hope as darkness is several hours away and it would not take the Germans long to overwhelm the farm. Maj. Ryder concedes that it is unlikely that they could get away and he would later give the remaining men a stark choice.
With the farmhouse burning and the roof in danger of collapse Maj. Ryder orders everyone out.
Signaller O’Callaghan makes for the byre with bullets whining around him to join up with about 40 other men. Two shell bursts have wounded Capt. Long and Lt Woodwalk. They both manage to stumble outside the farmhouse. On returning to his post, Capt. Long is patched up by Maj. Ryder and then slips into unconsciousness for about 25 minutes.
Maj. Richardson and 2nd Lt. Willeson are unaccounted for and assumed killed when the roof collapsed (they are both remembered on the Allied Memorial to the Missing at Dunkirk).
Maj. Ryder seeks the opinion of his men – surrender or fight to the finish. He had earlier received mixed feedback around the farm but in the byre for the last time he asks them whether to fight or surrender. He is not ordering them one way or another, he is giving no more orders and would accept their decision. Reaction is mixed but the majority accept surrender.
A dirty towel is found which is tied to a rifle and displayed until the Germans stop firing. The first group of men walk out but only go a few paces before they are cut down by machine gun fire. Tense moments pass before they try again, this time no shots are fired.
1715 hours: the surrender is complete. The captured soldiers are marched to Louis Creton’s farm where they are massacred along with others by the S.S. Totenkopf Division’s 2nd Infantry Regiment (1 Bn TIR 2). The alleged motive is that the men in 3 Coy, 1 Bn TIR 2, who had spearheaded the attack on Le Cornet Malo, were ordered to bury their dead in that village. After the burial it is alleged Captain and assault leader, Fritz Knoechlein, called for revenge.
At same time as Maj. Ryder surrendered, Capt. Long regains consciousness in a ditch south of the farmhouse. He is with Lt. Draffin (Medical Officer), Capt. Hastings and a few other men. A white towel is produced by Capt. Hastings and the firing ceases. They are joined by 25 other captives and marched east to the crossroads at Le Paradis. Capt. Long is allowed to look for wounded.
Two miles south, 50 members of C Company are ready to fight on with communications lost between them and Company HQ at Locon and Battalion HQ at Le Paradis. Acting Maj. Elwes has therefore no knowledge of what is happening and can only follow the last order he received from Brig. Warren ‘last man, last round’. At night Maj. Elwes withdraws to Company HQ at Locon. Capt Long’s assessment had been right C Company could be mopped up by the Germans at leisure once Le Paradis had fallen.
28th May: German troop carriers close in on C Company’s HQ at Locon. Maj. Elwes carries out the last known orders and attacks them. He is killed but, to save unnecessary casualties, 2nd Lt Simpson surrenders. C Company’s is numbered at 40. Capt. Long is marched to Locon and counts about 70 officers and men upon arrival. Among them are Capt. Hastings, Lt. Draffin and Capt. Gordon, the latter being brought in with the remnants of the 1/Scots.
A Further Description:
The following details with regard to the lead up to the massacre at Le Paradis are taken from original documents written either at the time or just after the massacre, all of which are available on this site.
The fourth infantry brigade second division consisted of the Second Royal Norfolks, the First Royal Scots and the First and Eighth Lancashire Fusiliers. On the evening of May 23rd the brigade moved to the Bethune area in Northern France.
After a few hours rest the battalion was ordered to take up positions on the Bethune-Estaires Canal in the neighbourhood of Le Paradis. A, B and D Companies were forward with C in reserve, but at first light it was discovered that B Company, which should have been in the centre, was in position on the wrong angle of the canal, on the Bethune loop and at right angles to the battalion line. With it was D Company. This left a wide gap between A and C companies which was filled temporarily by Pioneer Platoon until the other two companies could move into their correct positions after dark.
All through the day of 25th May, the situation remained confusing. The enemy was reported to be in strength in the Bois de Pacqueaut on the right of the battalion positions, but a counter attack by A Company drove them out and they regained contact with the Royal Scots who were holding the sector on the battalion's right.
Although the four companies were very much reduced in strength, the length of the front held by the battalion was 5,000 yards and the gaps in between were covered by machine guns. All through the day the enemy made attempts to get across the canal using sunken barges as bridges, but they were held up at all points by the heavy small arms and machine gun fire of the front line companies.
During the night of 25th/26th May, B and D companies moved to their correct positions and were dug in at first light with B company on the right of A Company at Le Cornet Malo and D in the gap between A and C Companies. The first attack came at 3.30 am against B Company on the right with a lighter attack on C Company on the left flank. At the same time heavy and accurate mortar fire on the remainder of the front not only pinned the other two companies down but also caused heavy casualties.
The attack on the right gained a good deal of ground and, although B Company and a company of the Royal Scots made several counter-attacks, they were unable to completely restore the situation. The enemy pressure continued during the morning and casualties mounted and by noon A and B Companies reported to battalion headquarters that they had hardly any men left.
Captain Hastings and Captain Long were sent from battalion headquarters to re-organise the two companies into one unit. This was done and the company now numbered about 60 men and the defence of Le Cornet Malo continued. By early afternoon the situation on the canal was desperate but, in spite of the severity of the fighting and the heavy casualties, the morale was high and there was no sign of wavering.
By the late afternoon the enemy came across the canal in strength and both B and C Companies were engaged in hand to hand fighting. To add to the difficulties, the Germans managed to get some tanks across the bridge at Le Cornet Malo but many were knocked out by the anti-tank rifles. By the end of the day all enemy attacks had been held and driven back though at a terrible cost. Nevertheless the battalion line still held.
The holding up of the enemy on this canal front was facilitating, indeed permitting, the safe withdrawal to the coast of many units. It was a defence in itself to deny to the enemy the complete fruits of victory and to make possible the escape of so many British soldiers across the beaches of Dunkirk.
The night of the 26th/27th was quiet and it was possible to bring up hot meals for the troops. Dawn on 27th May saw the second battalion once more heavily engaged. A strongly re-inforced enemy mounted a full scale attack, preceded by a barrage at 3.30 am, crossing the canal by bridges repaired during the night. The main weight of the attack was on B Company at Le Cornet Malo which was quickly overrun. By 10 am B Company was out of touch with battalion headquarters and was presumed wiped out.
The three remaining companies were heavily attacked and, with the lack of air support and artillery, it was impossible to hold the enemy. D Company reported they were down to one officer and five men. C Company had been bypassed and had about 50 men left. A Company had one officer and six men and these made their way to battalion headquarters. The total strength of the battalion was now about 100 men.
During the afternoon the enemy worked its way round to the rear of battalion headquarters but was driven off by the action of the regimental sergeant major and a small party while Company Sergeant Major Whitlam and two men worked round their flank. The German casualties at this stage of the fighting were tremendous and for a short time the fire slackened.
The commanding officer spoke to the brigadier by radio and assured him that, although the situation was hopeless, all efforts would be made to hold on as long as possible. By 4.40 pm the last phase had begun. Battalion headquarters was surrounded and carried on with an all round defence loopholing (knocking bricks out to fire through) all the outbuildings.
The farm buildings were hit repeatedly by shells and mortar bombs and were soon on fire. The wounded were brought up from the cellars and, with the ammunition almost gone, the commanding officer ordered the surrender. The end came at 5.15pm.
The Massacre
A total of 97 soldiers were rounded up and, after being subjected to acts of brutality which included being spat at, kicked and beaten with rifle butts, were marched to a nearby field where a hole in the ground had already been dug, apparently in readiness. There they were mown down by two heavy machine guns.
The adjutant, the Medical Officer and three men went out of a different door onto the road and were taken prisoner by a different company of Germans and were treated in accordance with the rules of warfare as laid down by the Geneva Convention.
A number of British soldiers were shot as they went forward under the supposed safety of white flags.
Bill O'Callaghan who survived the massacre, later gave an account of the massacre for the trial of Fritz Knoechlein. These words are taken from his affidavit (you can read the full affidavit by clicking here).
"We hung a towel on the end of a rifle, and shortly afterwards all firing ceased. We opened the door and started to file out with our hands above our heads. The first dozen men out were mown down, then the firing ceased. We marched down to a field about 300 yards away, here we were searched. After we were searched the wounded were attended to and we were lined-up in threes and marched across a field. After we had been searched some high ranking German officer (I think he had red lapels on his greatcoat) came up and spoke to the other German officers there (I cannot remember how many there were) and waved his hand, whereupon we moved off.
"We halted on the road, about 200 yards from where we had been searched, to let some vehicles pass. We started off again to march along the road and met German troops who behaved in a very brutal manner towards us, hitting us with their rifles and pushing us about. On the march we halted once or twice, and it is possible that one of those halts occurred just before we turned off into a gateway leading into a farm. On passing through this gateway I noticed a pasture on our right and a farm building on our left.
"As I was turning into the gateway, I noticed a machine gun in front of us which appeared to be mounted in front of what I thought looked like a farm lavatory. After having passed through the gateway the gun was then on my right. The whole column continued to march forward along the side of the house, with their hands still behind their heads, when suddenly firing started. The men started falling from the front of the column. When I saw the men falling I threw myself forward and fell into a slight depression in the ground, and in falling stretched my arms out before me, and sustained a slight flesh wound in the left arm.
"After the firing stopped I heard my comrades shouting and shrieking in their agony. I then heard what sounded to me like the fixing of bayonets and, shortly afterwards, I heard moans and shrieks from more of my comrades, which sounded to me as if they were being bayoneted. I did not see this, since I did not lift my head, as I was afraid of being bayoneted myself. There was also pistol and rifle shots, which lasted for several minutes. The Germans left before long, after having made sure that there was no sign of life. After a while two Germans came and stood behind me and I heard them talking, but they left again without having done anything."
The other survivor, Private Bert Pooley, also gave a sworn affidavit to the war crimes trial and recalled the massacre in the following words:
"The first attempt to surrender was made by three men who walked into the open displaying a white cloth. They immediately came under heavy machine gun fire. The second attempt was then made by all of us running out into the open with our hands in the air. No further fire came from the enemy who stood up and cheered and a German officer ordered us to come forward with our hands in the air.
"We were lined-up and searched, our helmets were struck from our heads and our equipment and gas masks were forcibly removed. We had no weapons with us as these had been destroyed before we surrendered. Not one of us to my knowledge still possessed a weapon when we were searched by the Germans. We were told by an English speaking German NCO that any wounded could sit down, whereupon some of us did. I was one of those (I had been hit in the left arm and right hip, but not seriously wounded), but no sooner had I sat down then I received a brutal kick in the ribs from a German soldier and was ordered to stand up.
"During the march which then took place, several of us were struck because we did not answer questions or were not quick enough in obeying the orders of the Germans which naturally were unintelligible to us. During this time our wounded were being brought out of the farmhouse by our own stretcher bearers, but I do not know where they were taken.
"After some 15 minutes we were ordered to form up on the road with our hands clasped behind the backs of our heads. During this process some of us were struck with rifle butts while standing in the ranks. The guards who did this were not reprimanded by their officers or NCOs. While we were standing there our numbers must have been swollen by the addition of other prisoners because when I turned round I could see that the column had lengthened. I do not know where these additional men came from.
"At this time I estimate the number of prisoners in the column to have been 65 at the very least. We were then ordered to march along the road, all the time being struck and cuffed by the guards and any other Germans passing us. Our direction at this time appeared to be westerly across the road leading to Le Paradis until we came to the vicinity of another farm house with a field adjoining it on the western side.
"We halted on the road for two or three minutes. During this time a German took from my pocket a packet of cigarettes and when I turned to look at him he struck me with his rifle, knocking me through the ranks. An unbroken line of German transport was standing on the right hand side of the road facing us.
"We were then ordered to march again and it was at this moment that I saw what had apparently been prepared for us. At the far end of the field opposite the farm house I saw two machine guns, one of which was already in position and the other was in process of being set up. Some distance behind the guns there was a hedge.
"Standing just inside the gate leading into the field was a group of about a dozen Germans who seemed to be having a discussion. One of this group whom I saw at close quarters a few minutes later I identified as an officer by the silver cord on his peaked cap. He was about 5ft 10in tall, was of slim build, had a dark face with a prominent hooked nose and dark piercing eyes and was 35-40 years old. I am inclined to think that this group comprised officers and NCOs, but I cannot give the exact number of each. I cannot describe any of the other officers or NCOs and I do not think that I would be able to recognise any of them were I to see them again.
"At this moment the troops guarding us ordered us to continue the march. At this point we left the road and went into the field through the gate and I noticed at the foot of the wall of the farmhouse (which was then on our left) a large hole which was at least five feet deep, 15 to 20 feet long and about eight feet broad. When the first prisoners reached the far end of the hole firing commenced.
"I was then just entering the gate. It seemed that as the men were hit they fell into the hole. When I reached the hole the man nearest to me, Private Ward, was hit and I felt a sharp pain in my left knee and fell into the hole. I fell on top of some men who were already lying there and others fell on top of me. Firing continued for a few seconds during which time I noticed Major Ryder sitting inside the hole with his back to the side nearest to the wall. He seemed to me to be very badly hit.
"Groans were coming from men lying in the hole and it was at this point that three Germans jumped down into the hole near Major Ryder evidently for the purpose of finishing off any prisoners still alive with bayonets. These Germans evidently climbed out of the hole again because further shooting then started with revolvers and rifles from the edge of the hole. One of the men beneath me moved and two shots were fired into the heap of bodies, both of which hit me in the left leg. At the sound of a whistle firing ceased and all the Germans appeared to move away because I heard no further sound in my immediate vicinity. The shooting took place at approximately 15.30 hours."
Private Bob Brown was also with the Norfolk Regiment at Le Paradis but took a different option as he later explained:
"As late afternoon was approaching things were getting desperate, men were getting killed and wounded and the ammunition was almost finished. The CO Major Ryder got onto brigade by radio and told them the position, but he was told to hold on as long as possible and after dark make his way north. After another two hours there was no hope of lasting until dark as at the end of May we didn't get dark until late. The CO now made the decision to cease fighting and said that if any man thought he had a chance of getting away he could do so.
"Bill, John and myself thought that if we kept in the smoke from the burning house we might make it. We went out of the side door into a ditch beside the road. The remainder went out of the cowshed door onto the field. At first they were met by a hail of bullets. Then at the second attempt the Germans came rushing out shouting. They were knocked about by rifle butts and kicks, then taken across to some more buildings and searched.
"After a while they were marched across a road to a farm and, as they marched alongside a building, two machine guns opened fire and mowed them down. The Germans then went along and shot anybody that moved. By a stroke of luck Bert Pooley and Bill O'Callaghan, although wounded, survived underneath and eventually crawled away. "
The Aftermath
After the shooting, Bill O'Callaghan, feeling completely exhausted, fell asleep for something like five to six hours and was woken up by Bert Pooley shaking his leg. He later put this down to sheer exhaustion brought about by lack of sleep.
Together O'Callaghan and Pooley made their way across a field with O'Callaghan carrying and dragging Pooley despite the difference in their size (Pooley was well over six foot tall and O'Callaghan barely 5ft 6in). They found a barn and opened the door. Inside their saw a number of SS officers eating, drinking and celebrating. They made their way across to a farmhouse and found a pig sty which they made as comfortable as possible after chasing out pigs and chickens. They cleaned the place up and Pooley was laid on a bed of straw.
They lived in the barn for three days and nights, feeding on raw potatoes and drinking rancid water from puddles which made them ill.
On the fourth day they were discovered by Frenchwoman Madame Creton and were given their first food for days - egg, milk, bread and butter. Pooley had his wounds dressed. The French family were taking considerable risks in doing this as the Germans had threatened to execute any civilians supporting or helping Allied soldiers. Madame Creton and her son Victor continued to look after the two soldiers until it was agreed with them that they should be handed over to the German Wehrmacht.
Bill O'Callaghan recovered from his wounds and spent the rest of the war in Prisoner of War camps in Poland and Bavaria. Bert Pooley stayed in German hospitals until 1943 before being sent back to England in the first batch of repatriated prisoners thought to be of no threat to Germany.
Whilst in captivity neither Pooley nore O'Callaghan mentioned the massacre for fear of reprisals.
On returning to the UK, Bert Pooley related his story to the military authorities who refused to believe him. Pooley also refused to give O'Callaghan's name for corroborative evidence due to his concern about word getting back to Germany where Bill was still a prisoner.
Pooley told a magazine after the war that he began to believe that the massacre had been a delusion: "I couldn't eat or sleep and was in a perpetual state of nervous tension. In the end I began to think I might be suffering from delusions. I didn't even tell my own family the whole truth in case they didn't believe me."
At the end of the war, Bert Pooley decided to return to France to prove to himself that the massacre had indeed taken place. In September 1946, Pooley returned and saw the farmhouse and the site of the mass graves. By this time the bodies had been exhumed and re-buried in the village churchyard. He saw the bullet holes but more importantly met Madame Creton, the French woman who had helped him and Bill O'Callaghan. Bert this time reported what had happened to the French authorities.
The facts were relayed to the War Office in London and Bill O'Callaghan went to the capital to corroborate the details and, in a prisoner-of-war camp, the two soldiers identified Fritz Knoechlein as the man who had given the order to fire.
The Trial
The trial of Fritz Knoechlein took place in Hamburg on October 11th, 1948. This is covered in depth in other parts of this web site.
Postscript
In October 1964, Madame Creton and her son Victor travelled to Norwich to be reunited with Bill O'Callaghan. They met up in the Royal Hotel (now no longer an hotel) and were entertained to lunch by the Royal Norfolk Old Comrades' Association and the local branch of the Dunkirk Veterans' Association. Madame Creton and Bill had originally been re-united in 1954 at Le Paradis.
*- Note - British ranks are used in description of German officers in order to enhance the understanding of their roles and ranks.
Below are details of the positions of the 2nd Battalion Royal Norfolk Regiment in the days leading to the massacre:
A TIMELINE
22nd May:
The Escaut Line is abandoned and there is a withdrawal to the Belgium frontline defences known as the Gort Line.
1100 hours: Having withdrawn from the Escaut Line the 2/Norfolks arrive at the Bois de Wannehain on the Gort Line covering a distance of eight miles on foot in nine hours. It is a quiet day for the 2/Norfolks who are now able to rest in their positions.
23rd May:
1400 hours: As part of 4th Brigade, the 2/Norfolks are instructed to hand over their position on the Gort Line to the French and ordered to man a 21 mile stretch of the Canal Line from the railway bridge south east of Aire to La Bassee.
1700 hours: the Brigade is ordered to move into an area around Aubers 20 miles to the west.
2100 hours: The move commences. The 2/Norfolks will face most of the action on and around the Canal Line.
Capt. Hastings (2/Norfolks) observes that lack of sleep and the need to be in a state of constant alert is beginning to take its toll, often causing reasonable officers to act out of character.
SS Totenkopf under Gen. Eicke reach the Canal Line sending men across La Bassee Canal without reconnaissance. These come under fire from British artillery and mortars. Gen. Eicke brings up his own artillery to help the stricken men.
24th May:
0700 hours: Having reached Aubers, Maj. Ryder is advised that the 2/Norfolks billets' are at Colon just north of Bethune. Capt. Hastings is sent to reconnoitre the sector. The remainder of the Battalion under Maj. Richardson arrive at Colon, battling through congested roads. A temporary HQ is established.
The 2/Norfolks rest and concentrate on concealment from the Luftwaffe. 4th Infantry Brigade advise there are no enemy troops in the area although French civilians tell otherwise. The Royal Scots are near Essar and the Lancashire Fusiliers are north of Le Touret. The 2/Norfolks are down to half strength comprising of 22 officers and 428 other ranks.
1400 hours: Maj. Ryder receives orders to organise reconnaissance of La Bassee Canal from a bridge outside Bethune to the Bois de Pacqueaut as 300 Germans and a few armoured fighting vehicles (AFVs) have crossed and are engaged with some French units.
Capt. Hallett is left in charge as Maj. Ryder sets off with the reconnaissance party, which includes Capt. Long, in the direction along the canal from Bethune. This remains incident free until they reach the outskirts of Le Cornet Malo where they come under light machine gun fire from both sides of the Bios de Pacqueaut. This evidences that the enemy are over the canal. Maj. Ryder reports to Brig. Warren at l’Epinette (Brigade HQ) who suspected the Germans were over the canal but only in small numbers.
On leaving l’Epinette, German artillery open up between l’Epinette and Locon. Maj. Ryder finally reaches the Battalion area to find his own HQ and other buildings damaged by German artillery.
Whilst Maj. Ryder was away, acting Maj. Elwes and Capt. Long have formed the Battalion in a defensive position facing Bethune having received information about the German advance from French troops.
Maj. Ryder now intends to move Battalion HQ to Le Paradis and tasks Capt. Hastings to find a suitable site. Driving in the dark and with inadequate maps, Capt. Hastings finds himself near Le Cornet Malo. He retraces his steps to Colon where it was decided that a temporary Battalion HQ should be set up near C Company HQ at Locon.
The SS Totenkopf assault engineers complete a bridge over the canal and Gen. Eicke leads the first wave across. Again he is pinned down but a bridgehead is established. He is then thwarted and enraged by Hitler’s ‘Halt Order’ which means withdrawing across the canal with 42 dead, 121 wounded and five missing to be in compliance with the order. Until the ‘Halt Order’ is rescinded the SS Totenkopf can only regroup and prepare for a major assault. British mortar and artillery increase the toll causing Gen. Eicke to order a series of small SS squad raids over the canal line.
25th May :
Early Hours: all four 2/Royal Norfolk Companies move into their position by La Bassee Canal. The 2/Norfolks are now in the centre of 4th Brigade’s position. C Company on the left run into Germans but succeed in driving them back over the canal. A and C Companies confirm they are in position. Battalion HQ await news of B and D Companies. As nothing is heard, patrols from A and C Companies are sent out but fail to make contact.
0300 hours: the men from A and C Companies are stood to. The front is quiet but an increase in Luftwaffe activity is foreseen come daylight. German machine guns open up on C Company but A Company reports little activity.
0600 hours: Battalion HQ hears from D Company confirming they are in position and in touch with B Company. 2nd Lt. Willeson and runners are sent forward to investigate and establish B and D Companies are in the wrong position. Capt. Long notes that B and D Companies have taken up position on a branch line of the canal in error.
B Company is supposed to be on the right of the battalion line, then A and D Companies respectively forming the centre with C Company on the left flank. B and D Companies are presently facing Bethune and are too far forward, causing a gap that has to be filled temporarily until they can move back to the correct position. The Battalion’s Pioneer Platoon bridges this gap on the right of C Company until the necessary readjustment can take place under the cover of darkness.
Later in the morning: The Pioneers received some support from a unit of machine gunners from depleted Companies of the Manchester Regiment. C Company has been unable to locate any force on their left although the Lancashire Fusiliers are there and attempting to make contact with the 2/Norfolks.
Midday: Maj. Ryder sets out for Brigade HQ. Maj. Elwes takes command as Maj. Richardson is missing. Fighting continues along the front. D Company engages the enemy who has crossed the canal. C Company comes under frequent heavy attack as does Battalion HQ.
Whilst there is sufficient cable to connect with Brigade HQ at l-Epinette, there is insufficient to connect with the four companies especially as some of their positions at times are uncertain. Battalion HQ therefore has little idea what is happening in the company sectors.
Maj. Ryder leaves l-Epinette but instead of going to Battalion HQ goes to A Company to organise a counter attack against a German penetration at Bois de Pacqueaut. To bolster A Company a company from the Lancashire Fusiliers is brought in. The Norfolk Carrier Platoon under 2nd Lt. Elson gives further support. Had there been a cable link to A Company then Maj. Ryder’s prolonged absence from Battalion HQ would have been resolved.
1430 hours: 2nd Lt. Elson meets Maj Ryder on the crossroads outside Le Cornet Malo and an attack is planned to drive the Germans out of the wood (Bois de Pacqueaut) led by Acting Captain Yallop and the men of A Company supported by Lancashire Fusiliers under 2nd Lt Spears. They move into the wood with bayonets fixed. Through machine gun fire, the 2/Norfolks rush the enemy. There are many casualties but they meet the SS Totenkopf at close quarters and drive them out of the wood. Capt. Long reports ‘the enemy is unable to face the bayonet at close quarters’.
With Maj. Ryder directing operations, 2nd Lt. Elson’s carriers advance driving the Germans back towards the canal. German resistance stiffens and the 2/Norfolks cannot recapture the bridge.
The attack is at a price which leaves Acting Capt. Yallop killed and A Company losing half its strength. Two carriers are destroyed and 2nd Lt. Elson is missing (he later turns up at a POW camp to help Capt. Long compile the report of the Battle of La Bassee).
Dusk: Orders are issued for B and D Companies to commence moving into their correct positions. Capt. Hastings is sent out with a small party to reconnoitre a route to the new HQ at Le Paradis. The Germans continue to probe defences and attempt to repair one of the canal bridges. C Company report constant enemy activity and send out a patrol along that section of the canal. Company HQ also organises a patrol to try and make contact with patrols from A Company.
2330 hours: The area is confirmed clear of Germans but A Company cannot be located.
There is still an acute sleep shortage. Several attacks are put in on the 2/Norfolks section of the canal line and small bridgeheads are established on the north-east bank. The 2/Norfolks are still holding their own.
Maj. Ryder’s plan to move Battalion HQ to Le Paradis is thwarted by lack of maps and signage which causes Capt. Hastings, who is to select a site at Le Paradis, to get lost and end up with a new HQ near Le Cornet Malo.
Night of 25th-26th May: it is reaffirmed to move the H.Q. to Le Paradis. Under the cover of darkness the two errant companies move into the correct position and at first light D Company moves into the gap between A Company and C Company and B Company to the right of A Company around Le Cornet Malo. Maj. Ryder has now established a front line. From defending a 128 mile front the total line now being defended by the 2/Norfolks' depleted ranks is approximately two miles, from the Bois de Pacqueaut, just west of the road leading to from the canal, to Le Cornet Malo, along the canal north of Avelette.
Now in fox-holes the line is being machine gunned and mortar shelled.
Just before midnight: Maj. Ryder sets off to Le Paradis.
26th May:
0030 hours: The convoy reaches Duriez Farm and the last HQ is established.
0330 hours: The Germans launch an attack on C Company with small armed parties but a much heavier attack went in on A Company and B Company positioned near Le Cornet Malo.
The Germans repair a bridge close to area to allow tanks to cross. Supported by intense and accurate mortar fire along the whole front the Germans advance on Le Cornet Malo.
Fighting in the village is fierce. At Bois de Parqueaut the enemy is driven out by counter attacks from A Company and B Company supported by the Royal Scots. Mortars supporting this area is running low on ammunition and Brigade HQ is slow to order supplies.
Manpower at Le Cornet Malo is now critical and Battalion HQ Duriez Farm receives confirmation that A and B Company are no longer effective.
Establishing the front line now involves sending Capt. Hastings up to the crossroads at Le Cornet Malo to locate A Company on the 2/Norfolks' right. Capt.Hastings meets up with 2nd Lt. Slater, who has replaced 2nd Lt. Yallop (killed the previous day) with all that remains of A Company (seven) having been overrun by tanks further up the canal.
Lt. Edgeworth, commanding B Company, also arrives at the crossroads advising Capt. Hastings that he has been reduced to 19 men but is holding a line 200-300 yards in front of the crossroads. Although there appears to be no Panzers in the vicinity, Lt. Edgeworth thinks there are Germans in the village in front of his position.
Advising Maj. Ryder at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm, Capt. Hastings is ordered to take command at the Le Cornet Malo crossroads with both what is left of A and B Companies. The crossroads is to be held ‘at all costs to the last man and round’.
Capt. Hastings gets unexpected reinforcements at the crossroads from 50-60 Royal Scots from north of the canal. Capt. Hastings takes command of them advising them to hold the crossroads at all costs and there must be no withdrawal.
With 50-60 Royal Scots and about 25 2/Norfolks together with some extras brought up by Capt. Long they are now in excess of 75 to defend the line behind the hedge row (previously held by Lt. Edgeworth) and astride the road to the wood.
The area now becomes under heavy machine gun and mortar fire. Capt. Hastings and Lts. Willeson and Edgeworth (killed later in the day) remain with their companies to arrange the final defended posts. The 1/Scots take over the area between road and wood.
Capt. Long drives back to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm noting that many of the wounded are being evacuated from the forward positions. He reports to Maj. Ryder that the position at Le Cornet Malo has been consolidated.
Capt. Hastings is also ordered back to Battalion H.Q Duriez Farm leavings Capt. Hallett in command. Maj. Richardson, missing the previous day, arrives at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm shortly after Capt. Long. He had been cut off on patrol with D Company and reports that Germans appear to be present in large numbers.
1100 hours Brig. Warren arrives at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm and corroborates what Maj. Richardson has observed. He also orders ‘last man last round.’
The Royal Scots HQ is moved from Calonne and established in Le Paradis. The 1/Scots are deployed on the right of the 2/Norfolks manning the defences organised by Capt. Hastings and Capt. Long in the Le Cornet Malo and Bois de Pacqueaut area.
German Panzers have now pushed through a line between Robecq and St Venant and are bearing down on Merville two miles to the north of Le Paradis.
After Brig. Warren departs Battalion HQ Duriez Farm, Maj. Ryder reorganises his officers. Maj. Richardson is appointed 2nd in Command, Lt. Woodwark of C Company is placed in command of A Company, The Motor Transport Officer, Capt. Hallett, is to command what is left of B Company and 2nd Lt. Buchanan is to lead D Company. 2nd Lt. Jones of D Company assumes command of the carriers while 2nd Lt. Merritt takes over Capt. Hallett’s role as Motor Transport Officer. Capt. Hastings is to command HQ Company.
Capt. Hastings is to transform Battalion HQ at Duriez Farm into a stronghold capable of being defended from four sides albeit it is not able to withstand a long siege. Spirits are lifted by a message from 4th Brigade H.Q. (Brig. Warren) “counter attack from French imminent” and a tank battalion is on its way. Several messages similar to this are received before Germans release their attack the next day.
There is little respite from the SS Totenkopf and defence is fierce but German Panzers are kept at bay by A/T rifles (Anti-Tank Rifles) and LMG (Light Machine Guns).
Capt. Hallett takes a proactive approach to his command following Capt. Hastings' departure and leads a patrol from B Company forward to the southern side of Le Cornet Malo firing at Germans approaching from the direction of the canal. Sadly he does not have mortars but his rifles and Bren guns halt the Germans in their tracks. Capt. Hallett, unchallenged, advances again capturing one German (who is in a ditch) with other Germans surrendering without a fight. The prisoner advises Capt. Hallett that he is facing a German Division across the canal.
The Germans counter attack driving Capt. Hallett back from his forward posts. He sends out a patrol to identify the German positions on which he launches a mortar attack which has since become available. He is rewarded by what sounds like direct hits.
A Platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with machine guns arrive and take position behind A and D Companies. The Luftwaffe has a free rein.
1857 hours: OPERATION DYNAMO BEGINS.
At end of day there is an uneasy calm. Battalion numbers are approx. 250 which is equivalent of just over two manned companies. Maj. Ryder braces his men for a heavy attack on 27th May
27th May :
The SS Totenkopf is preparing to smash their way through stubborn resistance in order to reach Bailleul half way between Le Paradis and Ypres.
Within a loop of the Canal d’Aire, two fresh untried German SS Motorised Infantry Units have taken up position between Hinges and Mont Bernanchan. The SS Totenkopt Infantry Regiment 2 commanded by Col. Bertling and Totenkopt Infantry Regiment 3 led by Lt. Col. Goetz supported by 4th Panzer Division and an SS military regiment are to throw their full weight against what they initially thought were the Norfolk Grenadiers.
At nearby village of Riez du Vinage the 1st Battalion of Totenkopf 2 have crossed the canal by way of repaired bridge and immediate opposition is encountered. SS Sergeant Leitl, a platoon commander in No 3 Company Totenkopf 2, states the defence of houses held them up for long periods. Riez du Vintage is eventually taken and Totenkopf 2 take cover in Bois de Pacqueaut.
At Dawn: an assault is launched at Le Cornet Malo. No 3 Company, commanded by Capt. Fritz Knoechlein, is in the centre, No 2 Company under Capt. Stoeter on the right with Capt. Kaltofen’s No 1 Company in semi reserve.
Capt. Knoechlein states progress is slow fighting yard by yard through the villages. Losses are heavy with a platoon commander killed and No 2 Platoon suffering badly. There is a brief respite when they are joined by the arrival of other Totenkopf troops. Dead comrades are collected and Capt. Knoechlein takes a brief burial service. During the service it is alleged he has spoken of avenging their deaths.
Increasing numbers of Panzers are crossing the repaired canal bridges. Lorries are also used as bridges for Panzer usage.
0500 hours: tanks appear in B Company’s section. Capt. Hallett notifies Battalion HQ Duriez Farm of about a dozen before his line is cut. Signaller Bob Brown at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm confirms contact with B Company has been lost.
Despite falling back, the remnants of Capt. Hallett’s B Company defiantly face the Panzers placing Mills grenades in their tracks under their line of fire. Four tanks are abandoned and, with order restored, Capt. Hallett gets the LMG back into position and the A/T rifles mounted. With the SS Totenkopf infantry some way behind the Panzers (they will suffer from Capt. Hallett’s Bren guns when they arrive). Sadly Capt. Hallett’s B Company also suffer losses and, following the loss of his last rifleman, the injured Capt. Hallett is taken prisoner as he tries to escape.
There is a solitary mortar team which includes Sgt. Maj. Ireland and Privates Brough and Cockerel endeavouring to support the defence of Le Cornet Malo. They are finally eliminated.
1000 hours: a heavy counter attack is expected by a French infantry brigade supported by a British tank regiment. This message from Brigade HQ is met with optimism at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. This is relayed to all companies except B Company where contact had been lost. Had the attack occurred at 1000 hours it would still have been too late for the defenders of Le Cornet Malo as the village was occupied by this time.
Two hours before the capture of Le Cornet Malo, ten men from the Pioneer Platoon returned to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm having spent the night in a ruined cottage supporting D Company. A small number of them (volunteers including Ernie Farrow) are assigned to blow the bridge at Pont d’Avelette which had been left intact for the BEF to escape. Using Maj. Ryder’s car they become under intense machine gun fire. Sadly the bridge has already been taken by the enemy.
Back at Le Cornet Malo 1st Battalion Totenkopt 2 set up HQ. Capt. Knoechlein tries unsuccessfully to take control of wounded BEF servicemen.
The German troops suffer considerable casualties attacking across La Bassee Canal. The defenders, however, are being worn down, A company and D Company report heavy attacks by tank and infantry. Several enemy tanks are put out of action in A Company’s area by A/T rifles and Bren gun fire but their own losses are heavy. Lt. Willeson is wounded in the arm and out of action. Enemy troops and light artillery are on the right front of Battalion HQ and enemy mortar fire coming in from Bois de Pacqueaut.
As the SS Totenkopf move forward the 1/Scots are seen to fall back rapidly. Withdrawal is stopped as the 2/Norfolks right flank would be exposed.
Battalion HQ Duriez Farm comes under attack from two Panzers 400 yard away. The 2/Norfolks return fire with a hail of machine guns and anti-tank rounds halting their progress for the time being. There is no artillery or air support for the 2/Norfolks.
Contact with A Company ceases and C and D Companies are still not reporting back. There is considerable German movement along roads on left flank towards Locon. Maj. Ryder tries to carry out Brig. Warren’s ‘last man, last round’ orders.
A platoon of Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders with ammunition, undamaged weapons and suffering only light casualties join up at Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. They are advised of ‘last man, last round’ stance and ordered to return to their former position unless ordered by the 2/Norfolks to do otherwise. However, they are observed leaving their position and abandoning their weapons a few minutes later.
Crews from field guns return to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm as probably their position has become untenable – breach blocks are thrown into the pond and they are issued with rifles to defend the farm.
The fate of A Company is confirmed. Having been overrun, Lt Woodwark and six men, the only survivors of A Company, reach Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. Getting these men back to defend Duriez Farm is crucial and meets with Maj. Ryder’s approval. Private Albert Pooley is in the remnants of A Company.
Mortar bombs begin to rain onto the farmhouse and fires are extinguished. From his position Pooley observes the landscape along Rue du Paradis and enemy soldiers moving behind the farm. Ferocious defence of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm brings the inexperienced SS Totenkopf to a temporary standstill. In open countryside around Le Paradis, the Germans are still suffering severely (one battalion lost, together with all its company commanders, leaving only NCO’s in charge).
SS Sergeant Leitl states ‘the defence of houses held them up and they were very exposed as the British snipers were extremely skilful’.
As morning progresses: the defence stiffens and the SS Totenkopf attacks break down into a series of small vicious actions. Gen. Eicke begins to struggle to regain control of his troops.
By early afternoon: the attack has ground to a halt. Gen Eicke has to get the attack moving again as the taking of Le Paradis is essential for conformity of lines operational on the right and left. If the defence of Le Paradis is prolonged then the SS Totenkopf’s left flank would be vulnerable.
Eventually Gen Eicke orders instructions which reinforce that the taking of Le Paradis is essential and all available reserves are to be used to protect the Totenkopf’s left flank. German reports state that the centre of Le Paradis is strongly held by snipers especially around the church and Duriez Farm, the latter being defended like a fortress. With the 1st Battalion almost wiped out orders are issued for 3rd Battalion Totenkopf 2 together with elements of Totenkopf 3 to complete assault on Le Paradis.
Regimental Commander of Totenkopf 3, Lt. Col. Goetz, comes with his men to execute orders but is killed by a sniper bullet on reaching the crossroads close to Le Paradis.
An attack from the rear is now attempted by a German motor cycle unit. Heavy fire drives them into a farm building just across the road where they set up a defensive position. This unit now delivers a fusillade on Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. The 2/Norfolks find it difficult to close them down until Sgt. Maj. Cockaday grabs a Bren gun and charges into the open firing at the German position. Despite being wounded he keeps the enemy occupied while Maj. Ryder and a small party do a flanking attack, forcing the Germans to fall back. Capt. Long then organises the defences of this now advance post whist Maj. Ryder returns to Battalion HQ Duriez Farm to update Brigade HQ of the position.
Regardless of casualties, the SS Totenkopf press forward with mortar rounds and artillery shells. British artillery rounds start to land on Duriez Farm. Capt. Long, dodges through a hail of German bullets, to rectify the position by getting a message out of Battalion HQ to prevent this uncalled for attack continuing.
The enemy is now in force to the rear and the battalion is becoming isolated. C Company still reports tanks and enemy troop carriers moving around the left flank. Troop carriers are also moving around the right flank in Le Paradis. These are met with artillery and suffer heavy casualties.
The 2/Norfolk’s forward party retires to next house which is held to the end. The enemy begin working up the ditches towards the defended posts which are now:-
i) Houses on right and left of road (to the rear of Battalion HQ)
ii) Battalion HQ farmhouse, yard and ditches surrounding
iii) Houses left and right of the road and the road block (in front of Battalion HQ).
All houses are strongly fortified.
News comes through from D Company that only Lt. Buchanan and five men are left. They are driven back to their company HQ where they will stand and fight. This is the last that Battalion HQ Duriez Farm hears from them.
German fire intensifies on Battalion HQ Duriez Farm and C Company makes contact. Acting Maj. Elwes inform them that his position is surrounded and requests artillery support. This does not materialise. The lines fall silent and all companies are now cut off from Battalion HQ Duriez Farm.
1300 hours: War Diary of 4th infantry Brigade states 2nd Division issues a Permissive Order to Brig. Warren for withdrawal but no rendezvous given. There is hope for an organised withdrawal in daylight but at 1415 hours a rendezvous at La Nouvelle France is received and communicated to 2/Norfolks who agreed no withdrawal until dark. It is requested this be passed on to 1/Scots but this cannot be achieved until after dark.
1330 hours: Several more shells slam into the Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. HQ and Brigade War Diaries record the last courageous message from Maj. Ryder is received at this time. ‘HQ on fire, wireless in cellar could not be got out therefore it would be broken up”.
The Regiment is fighting on its own ground and is surrounded. Maj. Ryder’s final words are that “he would bring his Battalion to the rendezvous after dark”. No further communications are received.
The wireless is destroyed and Battalion paperwork including Capt. Hasting’s diary notes are placed in a sack and thrown into the pond. All other equipment, which could prove useful to the Germans, is destroyed including rifles and a remaining truck.
1600 hours: Capt. Long reports that the Battalion’s strength (including 50 in C Company) is estimated at 100 all ranks. C Company, although numerically strong, is without communications, completely isolated and outside the main movement of events. Capt. Long surmises the enemy can therefore hold C Company and deal with them later whilst concentrating on reducing key centres of resistance.
German units are still moving to rear of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm which provides good targets but too many for the available ammunition. Capt. Hastings collects rounds from the wounded and issues orders to fire only when certain.
1640 hours: This is the time 2/Norfolk’s records state that the permissive order from Brigade is received stating ‘hold position until dusk then if possible withdraw to North East to La Nouvelle France’. The message could not be relayed to 1/Scots and Lancs Fuseliers.
Maj. Ryder calls a conference with his available officers suggesting when darkness falls parties of men, each accompanied by an officer, should attempt to crawl out of Battalion HQ Duriez Farm. This is a forlorn hope as darkness is several hours away and it would not take the Germans long to overwhelm the farm. Maj. Ryder concedes that it is unlikely that they could get away and he would later give the remaining men a stark choice.
With the farmhouse burning and the roof in danger of collapse Maj. Ryder orders everyone out.
Signaller O’Callaghan makes for the byre with bullets whining around him to join up with about 40 other men. Two shell bursts have wounded Capt. Long and Lt Woodwalk. They both manage to stumble outside the farmhouse. On returning to his post, Capt. Long is patched up by Maj. Ryder and then slips into unconsciousness for about 25 minutes.
Maj. Richardson and 2nd Lt. Willeson are unaccounted for and assumed killed when the roof collapsed (they are both remembered on the Allied Memorial to the Missing at Dunkirk).
Maj. Ryder seeks the opinion of his men – surrender or fight to the finish. He had earlier received mixed feedback around the farm but in the byre for the last time he asks them whether to fight or surrender. He is not ordering them one way or another, he is giving no more orders and would accept their decision. Reaction is mixed but the majority accept surrender.
A dirty towel is found which is tied to a rifle and displayed until the Germans stop firing. The first group of men walk out but only go a few paces before they are cut down by machine gun fire. Tense moments pass before they try again, this time no shots are fired.
1715 hours: the surrender is complete. The captured soldiers are marched to Louis Creton’s farm where they are massacred along with others by the S.S. Totenkopf Division’s 2nd Infantry Regiment (1 Bn TIR 2). The alleged motive is that the men in 3 Coy, 1 Bn TIR 2, who had spearheaded the attack on Le Cornet Malo, were ordered to bury their dead in that village. After the burial it is alleged Captain and assault leader, Fritz Knoechlein, called for revenge.
At same time as Maj. Ryder surrendered, Capt. Long regains consciousness in a ditch south of the farmhouse. He is with Lt. Draffin (Medical Officer), Capt. Hastings and a few other men. A white towel is produced by Capt. Hastings and the firing ceases. They are joined by 25 other captives and marched east to the crossroads at Le Paradis. Capt. Long is allowed to look for wounded.
Two miles south, 50 members of C Company are ready to fight on with communications lost between them and Company HQ at Locon and Battalion HQ at Le Paradis. Acting Maj. Elwes has therefore no knowledge of what is happening and can only follow the last order he received from Brig. Warren ‘last man, last round’. At night Maj. Elwes withdraws to Company HQ at Locon. Capt Long’s assessment had been right C Company could be mopped up by the Germans at leisure once Le Paradis had fallen.
28th May: German troop carriers close in on C Company’s HQ at Locon. Maj. Elwes carries out the last known orders and attacks them. He is killed but, to save unnecessary casualties, 2nd Lt Simpson surrenders. C Company’s is numbered at 40. Capt. Long is marched to Locon and counts about 70 officers and men upon arrival. Among them are Capt. Hastings, Lt. Draffin and Capt. Gordon, the latter being brought in with the remnants of the 1/Scots.
A Further Description:
The following details with regard to the lead up to the massacre at Le Paradis are taken from original documents written either at the time or just after the massacre, all of which are available on this site.
The fourth infantry brigade second division consisted of the Second Royal Norfolks, the First Royal Scots and the First and Eighth Lancashire Fusiliers. On the evening of May 23rd the brigade moved to the Bethune area in Northern France.
After a few hours rest the battalion was ordered to take up positions on the Bethune-Estaires Canal in the neighbourhood of Le Paradis. A, B and D Companies were forward with C in reserve, but at first light it was discovered that B Company, which should have been in the centre, was in position on the wrong angle of the canal, on the Bethune loop and at right angles to the battalion line. With it was D Company. This left a wide gap between A and C companies which was filled temporarily by Pioneer Platoon until the other two companies could move into their correct positions after dark.
All through the day of 25th May, the situation remained confusing. The enemy was reported to be in strength in the Bois de Pacqueaut on the right of the battalion positions, but a counter attack by A Company drove them out and they regained contact with the Royal Scots who were holding the sector on the battalion's right.
Although the four companies were very much reduced in strength, the length of the front held by the battalion was 5,000 yards and the gaps in between were covered by machine guns. All through the day the enemy made attempts to get across the canal using sunken barges as bridges, but they were held up at all points by the heavy small arms and machine gun fire of the front line companies.
During the night of 25th/26th May, B and D companies moved to their correct positions and were dug in at first light with B company on the right of A Company at Le Cornet Malo and D in the gap between A and C Companies. The first attack came at 3.30 am against B Company on the right with a lighter attack on C Company on the left flank. At the same time heavy and accurate mortar fire on the remainder of the front not only pinned the other two companies down but also caused heavy casualties.
The attack on the right gained a good deal of ground and, although B Company and a company of the Royal Scots made several counter-attacks, they were unable to completely restore the situation. The enemy pressure continued during the morning and casualties mounted and by noon A and B Companies reported to battalion headquarters that they had hardly any men left.
Captain Hastings and Captain Long were sent from battalion headquarters to re-organise the two companies into one unit. This was done and the company now numbered about 60 men and the defence of Le Cornet Malo continued. By early afternoon the situation on the canal was desperate but, in spite of the severity of the fighting and the heavy casualties, the morale was high and there was no sign of wavering.
By the late afternoon the enemy came across the canal in strength and both B and C Companies were engaged in hand to hand fighting. To add to the difficulties, the Germans managed to get some tanks across the bridge at Le Cornet Malo but many were knocked out by the anti-tank rifles. By the end of the day all enemy attacks had been held and driven back though at a terrible cost. Nevertheless the battalion line still held.
The holding up of the enemy on this canal front was facilitating, indeed permitting, the safe withdrawal to the coast of many units. It was a defence in itself to deny to the enemy the complete fruits of victory and to make possible the escape of so many British soldiers across the beaches of Dunkirk.
The night of the 26th/27th was quiet and it was possible to bring up hot meals for the troops. Dawn on 27th May saw the second battalion once more heavily engaged. A strongly re-inforced enemy mounted a full scale attack, preceded by a barrage at 3.30 am, crossing the canal by bridges repaired during the night. The main weight of the attack was on B Company at Le Cornet Malo which was quickly overrun. By 10 am B Company was out of touch with battalion headquarters and was presumed wiped out.
The three remaining companies were heavily attacked and, with the lack of air support and artillery, it was impossible to hold the enemy. D Company reported they were down to one officer and five men. C Company had been bypassed and had about 50 men left. A Company had one officer and six men and these made their way to battalion headquarters. The total strength of the battalion was now about 100 men.
During the afternoon the enemy worked its way round to the rear of battalion headquarters but was driven off by the action of the regimental sergeant major and a small party while Company Sergeant Major Whitlam and two men worked round their flank. The German casualties at this stage of the fighting were tremendous and for a short time the fire slackened.
The commanding officer spoke to the brigadier by radio and assured him that, although the situation was hopeless, all efforts would be made to hold on as long as possible. By 4.40 pm the last phase had begun. Battalion headquarters was surrounded and carried on with an all round defence loopholing (knocking bricks out to fire through) all the outbuildings.
The farm buildings were hit repeatedly by shells and mortar bombs and were soon on fire. The wounded were brought up from the cellars and, with the ammunition almost gone, the commanding officer ordered the surrender. The end came at 5.15pm.
The Massacre
A total of 97 soldiers were rounded up and, after being subjected to acts of brutality which included being spat at, kicked and beaten with rifle butts, were marched to a nearby field where a hole in the ground had already been dug, apparently in readiness. There they were mown down by two heavy machine guns.
The adjutant, the Medical Officer and three men went out of a different door onto the road and were taken prisoner by a different company of Germans and were treated in accordance with the rules of warfare as laid down by the Geneva Convention.
A number of British soldiers were shot as they went forward under the supposed safety of white flags.
Bill O'Callaghan who survived the massacre, later gave an account of the massacre for the trial of Fritz Knoechlein. These words are taken from his affidavit (you can read the full affidavit by clicking here).
"We hung a towel on the end of a rifle, and shortly afterwards all firing ceased. We opened the door and started to file out with our hands above our heads. The first dozen men out were mown down, then the firing ceased. We marched down to a field about 300 yards away, here we were searched. After we were searched the wounded were attended to and we were lined-up in threes and marched across a field. After we had been searched some high ranking German officer (I think he had red lapels on his greatcoat) came up and spoke to the other German officers there (I cannot remember how many there were) and waved his hand, whereupon we moved off.
"We halted on the road, about 200 yards from where we had been searched, to let some vehicles pass. We started off again to march along the road and met German troops who behaved in a very brutal manner towards us, hitting us with their rifles and pushing us about. On the march we halted once or twice, and it is possible that one of those halts occurred just before we turned off into a gateway leading into a farm. On passing through this gateway I noticed a pasture on our right and a farm building on our left.
"As I was turning into the gateway, I noticed a machine gun in front of us which appeared to be mounted in front of what I thought looked like a farm lavatory. After having passed through the gateway the gun was then on my right. The whole column continued to march forward along the side of the house, with their hands still behind their heads, when suddenly firing started. The men started falling from the front of the column. When I saw the men falling I threw myself forward and fell into a slight depression in the ground, and in falling stretched my arms out before me, and sustained a slight flesh wound in the left arm.
"After the firing stopped I heard my comrades shouting and shrieking in their agony. I then heard what sounded to me like the fixing of bayonets and, shortly afterwards, I heard moans and shrieks from more of my comrades, which sounded to me as if they were being bayoneted. I did not see this, since I did not lift my head, as I was afraid of being bayoneted myself. There was also pistol and rifle shots, which lasted for several minutes. The Germans left before long, after having made sure that there was no sign of life. After a while two Germans came and stood behind me and I heard them talking, but they left again without having done anything."
The other survivor, Private Bert Pooley, also gave a sworn affidavit to the war crimes trial and recalled the massacre in the following words:
"The first attempt to surrender was made by three men who walked into the open displaying a white cloth. They immediately came under heavy machine gun fire. The second attempt was then made by all of us running out into the open with our hands in the air. No further fire came from the enemy who stood up and cheered and a German officer ordered us to come forward with our hands in the air.
"We were lined-up and searched, our helmets were struck from our heads and our equipment and gas masks were forcibly removed. We had no weapons with us as these had been destroyed before we surrendered. Not one of us to my knowledge still possessed a weapon when we were searched by the Germans. We were told by an English speaking German NCO that any wounded could sit down, whereupon some of us did. I was one of those (I had been hit in the left arm and right hip, but not seriously wounded), but no sooner had I sat down then I received a brutal kick in the ribs from a German soldier and was ordered to stand up.
"During the march which then took place, several of us were struck because we did not answer questions or were not quick enough in obeying the orders of the Germans which naturally were unintelligible to us. During this time our wounded were being brought out of the farmhouse by our own stretcher bearers, but I do not know where they were taken.
"After some 15 minutes we were ordered to form up on the road with our hands clasped behind the backs of our heads. During this process some of us were struck with rifle butts while standing in the ranks. The guards who did this were not reprimanded by their officers or NCOs. While we were standing there our numbers must have been swollen by the addition of other prisoners because when I turned round I could see that the column had lengthened. I do not know where these additional men came from.
"At this time I estimate the number of prisoners in the column to have been 65 at the very least. We were then ordered to march along the road, all the time being struck and cuffed by the guards and any other Germans passing us. Our direction at this time appeared to be westerly across the road leading to Le Paradis until we came to the vicinity of another farm house with a field adjoining it on the western side.
"We halted on the road for two or three minutes. During this time a German took from my pocket a packet of cigarettes and when I turned to look at him he struck me with his rifle, knocking me through the ranks. An unbroken line of German transport was standing on the right hand side of the road facing us.
"We were then ordered to march again and it was at this moment that I saw what had apparently been prepared for us. At the far end of the field opposite the farm house I saw two machine guns, one of which was already in position and the other was in process of being set up. Some distance behind the guns there was a hedge.
"Standing just inside the gate leading into the field was a group of about a dozen Germans who seemed to be having a discussion. One of this group whom I saw at close quarters a few minutes later I identified as an officer by the silver cord on his peaked cap. He was about 5ft 10in tall, was of slim build, had a dark face with a prominent hooked nose and dark piercing eyes and was 35-40 years old. I am inclined to think that this group comprised officers and NCOs, but I cannot give the exact number of each. I cannot describe any of the other officers or NCOs and I do not think that I would be able to recognise any of them were I to see them again.
"At this moment the troops guarding us ordered us to continue the march. At this point we left the road and went into the field through the gate and I noticed at the foot of the wall of the farmhouse (which was then on our left) a large hole which was at least five feet deep, 15 to 20 feet long and about eight feet broad. When the first prisoners reached the far end of the hole firing commenced.
"I was then just entering the gate. It seemed that as the men were hit they fell into the hole. When I reached the hole the man nearest to me, Private Ward, was hit and I felt a sharp pain in my left knee and fell into the hole. I fell on top of some men who were already lying there and others fell on top of me. Firing continued for a few seconds during which time I noticed Major Ryder sitting inside the hole with his back to the side nearest to the wall. He seemed to me to be very badly hit.
"Groans were coming from men lying in the hole and it was at this point that three Germans jumped down into the hole near Major Ryder evidently for the purpose of finishing off any prisoners still alive with bayonets. These Germans evidently climbed out of the hole again because further shooting then started with revolvers and rifles from the edge of the hole. One of the men beneath me moved and two shots were fired into the heap of bodies, both of which hit me in the left leg. At the sound of a whistle firing ceased and all the Germans appeared to move away because I heard no further sound in my immediate vicinity. The shooting took place at approximately 15.30 hours."
Private Bob Brown was also with the Norfolk Regiment at Le Paradis but took a different option as he later explained:
"As late afternoon was approaching things were getting desperate, men were getting killed and wounded and the ammunition was almost finished. The CO Major Ryder got onto brigade by radio and told them the position, but he was told to hold on as long as possible and after dark make his way north. After another two hours there was no hope of lasting until dark as at the end of May we didn't get dark until late. The CO now made the decision to cease fighting and said that if any man thought he had a chance of getting away he could do so.
"Bill, John and myself thought that if we kept in the smoke from the burning house we might make it. We went out of the side door into a ditch beside the road. The remainder went out of the cowshed door onto the field. At first they were met by a hail of bullets. Then at the second attempt the Germans came rushing out shouting. They were knocked about by rifle butts and kicks, then taken across to some more buildings and searched.
"After a while they were marched across a road to a farm and, as they marched alongside a building, two machine guns opened fire and mowed them down. The Germans then went along and shot anybody that moved. By a stroke of luck Bert Pooley and Bill O'Callaghan, although wounded, survived underneath and eventually crawled away. "
The Aftermath
After the shooting, Bill O'Callaghan, feeling completely exhausted, fell asleep for something like five to six hours and was woken up by Bert Pooley shaking his leg. He later put this down to sheer exhaustion brought about by lack of sleep.
Together O'Callaghan and Pooley made their way across a field with O'Callaghan carrying and dragging Pooley despite the difference in their size (Pooley was well over six foot tall and O'Callaghan barely 5ft 6in). They found a barn and opened the door. Inside their saw a number of SS officers eating, drinking and celebrating. They made their way across to a farmhouse and found a pig sty which they made as comfortable as possible after chasing out pigs and chickens. They cleaned the place up and Pooley was laid on a bed of straw.
They lived in the barn for three days and nights, feeding on raw potatoes and drinking rancid water from puddles which made them ill.
On the fourth day they were discovered by Frenchwoman Madame Creton and were given their first food for days - egg, milk, bread and butter. Pooley had his wounds dressed. The French family were taking considerable risks in doing this as the Germans had threatened to execute any civilians supporting or helping Allied soldiers. Madame Creton and her son Victor continued to look after the two soldiers until it was agreed with them that they should be handed over to the German Wehrmacht.
Bill O'Callaghan recovered from his wounds and spent the rest of the war in Prisoner of War camps in Poland and Bavaria. Bert Pooley stayed in German hospitals until 1943 before being sent back to England in the first batch of repatriated prisoners thought to be of no threat to Germany.
Whilst in captivity neither Pooley nore O'Callaghan mentioned the massacre for fear of reprisals.
On returning to the UK, Bert Pooley related his story to the military authorities who refused to believe him. Pooley also refused to give O'Callaghan's name for corroborative evidence due to his concern about word getting back to Germany where Bill was still a prisoner.
Pooley told a magazine after the war that he began to believe that the massacre had been a delusion: "I couldn't eat or sleep and was in a perpetual state of nervous tension. In the end I began to think I might be suffering from delusions. I didn't even tell my own family the whole truth in case they didn't believe me."
At the end of the war, Bert Pooley decided to return to France to prove to himself that the massacre had indeed taken place. In September 1946, Pooley returned and saw the farmhouse and the site of the mass graves. By this time the bodies had been exhumed and re-buried in the village churchyard. He saw the bullet holes but more importantly met Madame Creton, the French woman who had helped him and Bill O'Callaghan. Bert this time reported what had happened to the French authorities.
The facts were relayed to the War Office in London and Bill O'Callaghan went to the capital to corroborate the details and, in a prisoner-of-war camp, the two soldiers identified Fritz Knoechlein as the man who had given the order to fire.
The Trial
The trial of Fritz Knoechlein took place in Hamburg on October 11th, 1948. This is covered in depth in other parts of this web site.
Postscript
In October 1964, Madame Creton and her son Victor travelled to Norwich to be reunited with Bill O'Callaghan. They met up in the Royal Hotel (now no longer an hotel) and were entertained to lunch by the Royal Norfolk Old Comrades' Association and the local branch of the Dunkirk Veterans' Association. Madame Creton and Bill had originally been re-united in 1954 at Le Paradis.